malb / algebraic_attacks (http://informatik.uni-bremen.de/~malb/blog.php)
This repository mainly holds code snippets for experimentation with algebraic attacks (and some general crypto code). The quality of this code is not 'release ready' at all. Although the code should work in general there is a lot of scratch, wrong and pathetic code in this repository. Also, some of this code dates back to my Diplomarbeit (master's thesis) and should be considered broken and outdated. By default all code listed here is released under the GPLv2+. Don't hesitate to ping me if you need something under some more permissive license like BSD-style.
Clone this repository (size: 122.6 KB): HTTPS / SSH
$ hg clone http://bitbucket.org/malb/algebraic_attacks/
| commit 35: | ce280e2b1a19 |
| parent 34: | 3dd50c6be752 |
| branch: | default |
| tags: | tip |
fixed a very stupid bug in PRESENT which made the polynomial system unecessarily hard
algebraic_attacks /
noise_poly.py
| r35:ce280e2b1a19 | 853 loc | 23.7 KB | embed / history / annotate / raw / |
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Proof-of-concept code for some attacks described in 'Attacking
Cryptographic Schemes Based on "Perturbation Polynomials"' by Martin
Albrecht, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi and Jonathan Katz.
AUTHOR:
-- 2009-01 Martin Albrecht <M.R.Albrecht@rhul.ac.uk>: initial version
"""
class MobiHoc2007:
"""
Class for experimenting with the key predistribution scheme from
W. Zhang, M. Tran, S. Zhu, and G. Cao. A Random Perturbation-based
Scheme for Pairwise Key Establishment in Sensor Networks. 8th ACM
International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
(MobiHoc'07), 2007.
"""
def __init__(self, p, t, r):
"""
Create new MobiHoc2007 instance:
INPUT:
p -- a prime
t -- a degree > 0
r -- an integer < p
"""
self.p = p
self.t = t
self.r = r
self.N = t + 3
self.u = 2
def random_symmetric_polynomial(self):
"""
Returns and stores a random symmetric polynomial of degree t
over GF(p)[x,y].
"""
verbose("",level=1)
p = self.p
t = self.t
P = PolynomialRing(GF(p), 2, 'x,y')
x,y = P.gens()
_, total = P._precomp_counts(2, t)
FF = P.random_element(degree=t, terms=total)
F = 0
for c,m in FF:
a,b = m.exponents()[0]
F += c* x**a *y**b + c* y**a * x**b
self.F = F
return F
def random_perturbation_polynomials(self):
"""
Returns and stores two random perturbation polynomials of
degree t over GF(p)[y]. Also a set S is returned and stored
which contains all elements in GF(p) for which the two
polynomials evaluate to values < r.
"""
_cpu = cputime()
verbose("",level=1)
p = self.p
t = self.t
r = self.r
N = self.N
K = GF(p)
P = PolynomialRing(K, 'y')
x, = P.gens()
g = P.random_element(degree=t)
h = P.random_element(degree=t)
S = []
i = 0
step = int(p)/10
try:
# Try if we have our hack applied which implements
# evaluation of all points on C level avoiding Python
# overhead. Fall back to Python if that fails.
S = g.eval_on_all_points(h, r)
S = map(K,S)
except AttributeError:
e = K(0)
end = K(p-1)
o = K(1)
while e!=end:
if i==step:
print ".",
step+=int(p)/10
sys.stdout.flush()
i+=1
if g(e) < r and h(e) < r:
S.append(e)
e+=o
print
self.g = g
self.h = h
self.S = S
print "Setup time %8.3f"%cputime(_cpu)
return g,h,S
def __getattr__(self, name):
if name in ('g', 'h', 'S'):
_ = self.random_perturbation_polynomials()
elif name == 'F':
_ = self.random_symmetric_polynomial()
else:
raise AttributeError(name)
return getattr(self, name)
def random_node(self, not_in=None):
"""
Return a random node which satisfies the random perturbation
polynomials.
"""
verbose("",level=1)
if not_in is None:
not_in = set()
else:
not_in = [n.x for n in not_in]
S = list(set(self.S).difference(not_in))
i = randint(0,len(S)-1)
return self.node(self.S.index(S[i]))
@cached_method
def node(self, i):
"""
Return the i-th node from the set of nodes which satisfy the
perturbation polynomials.
The result is cached.
INPUT:
i -- an integer >= 0 and < len(S)
"""
g, h, S, F = self.g, self.h, self.S, self.F
r = self.r
ai = randint(-self.u,self.u)
bi = randint(-self.u,self.u)
assert(g(S[i]) < r)
assert(h(S[i]) < r)
_,y = F.parent().gens()
fi =F(S[i],y).univariate_polynomial()
Si = fi + ai*g + bi*h
return MH07Node(S[i], fi, Si, ceil(log_b(self.r,2)))
def shared_secret(self, i=None, j=None):
"""
Return the shared secret between the nodes indexed by i and j
in the set S.
INPUT:
i -- an integer
j -- an integer
"""
if i is None:
i = self.random_node()
if j is None:
j = self.random_node()
return i.shared_secret(j)
def verify_noise_space(self, S):
"""
Given a matrix S with two rows verify that the space spanned
by these two rows is the same as the space spanned by the
perturbation polynomial coefficient vectors.
INPUT:
S -- a matrix over GF(p) with two rows.
"""
assert(S.rank() == 2)
t = self.t
M = Matrix(GF(self.p),2, t + 1)
for i in range(t + 1):
M[0,i] = self.g[i]
for i in range(t + 1):
M[1,i] = self.h[i]
M = M.stack(S)
return M.rank() == 2
@cached_method
def noise_space(self, small=True):
"""
Identify the spaces spanned by the coefficient vectors of the
perturbation polynomials.
The result is not verified.
INPUT:
small -- if True LLL is run to recover 'small' candidates
for basis vectors (default: True)
OUTPUT:
a matrix with two rows representing the two vectors
spanning the space.
"""
verbose("",level=1)
t = self.t
N = self.N
nodes = set()
while (len(nodes) < N):
n = self.random_node(nodes)
nodes.add(n)
nodes = list(nodes)
verbose("done",level=1)
self.compromised_nodes = nodes
X = [e.x for e in nodes]
S = Matrix(GF(self.p), N, t+1)
for i in range(N):
for j in range(t+1):
S[i,j] = nodes[i].S[j]
for i in range(N-2):
S[N-2] -= L(X[:N-2],X[N-2],i) * S[i]
for i in range(N-2):
S[N-1] -= L(X[:N-2],X[N-1],i) * S[i]
if small:
return self.small_linear_combinations(S.matrix_from_rows([N-2,N-1]))
else:
return S.matrix_from_rows([N-2,N-1])
def get_LLL(self, NS, n):
"""
Return the LLL reduced matrix B which was used to recover
'small' basis vectors for NS. The dimension of B will be
(n+2) x n.
INPUT:
NS -- a matrix with two rows
n -- an integer > 0
"""
node = self.compromised_nodes[0]
P = node.S.parent()
v = P(NS[0].list())
w = P(NS[1].list())
p, t, compromised_nodes = self.p, self.t, self.compromised_nodes
nodes = set()
while len(nodes) < n:
nodes.add(self.random_node(nodes))
nodes = list(nodes)
vals = [e.x for e in nodes]
A = Matrix(ZZ,n+2,n)
for i in range(n):
xi = vals[i]
A[0,i] = v(xi)
A[1,i] = w(xi)
A[i+2,i] = p
B = A.LLL()
return B, vals
def small_linear_combinations(self, NS):
"""
Given the noise space spanned by the two rows of NS, return
another matrix A where the two rows are 'small' basis vectors
also spanning NS.
INPUT:
NS -- a matrix with two rows.
"""
n = self.compromised_nodes[0]
r = self.r
P = n.S.parent()
v = P(NS[0].list())
w = P(NS[1].list())
p, t, compromised_nodes = self.p, self.t, self.compromised_nodes
n = 40
nodes = set()
while len(nodes) < n:
nodes.add(self.random_node(nodes))
nodes = list(nodes)
vals = [e.x for e in nodes]
A = Matrix(ZZ,n+2,n)
for i in range(n):
xi = vals[i]
A[0,i] = v(xi)
A[1,i] = w(xi)
A[i+2,i] = p
B = A.LLL()
# now solve for a,b,c,d
M = Matrix(GF(p),4,5)
M[0,0] = A[0,0]
M[0,1] = A[1,0]
M[0,4] = -B[2,0]
M[1,0] = A[0,1]
M[1,1] = A[1,1]
M[1,4] = -B[2,1]
M[2,2] = A[0,0]
M[2,3] = A[1,0]
M[2,4] = -B[3,0]
M[3,2] = A[0,1]
M[3,3] = A[1,1]
M[3,4] = -B[3,1]
E = M.echelon_form()
a,b,c,d = [-each for each in list(E.column(4))]
g = a*v + b*w
h = c*v + d*w
S = set([g,-g,h,-h,g+h,g-h,-g+h,-g-h])
polys = []
while len(S) > 0:
f = S.pop()
for n in self.compromised_nodes:
if ZZ(f(n.x)) >= r:
break
else:
polys.append(f)
assert(len(polys) == 2)
g,h = polys
return Matrix(GF(p), 2, t+1, g.list() + h.list())
def fi_equation_system(self):
r"""
Return an equation system to recover the $f_i$'s.
"""
p, t, r = self.p, self.t, self.r
N = self.N
VS = VectorSpace(GF(p), t+1)
NS = self.noise_space()
assert(self.verify_noise_space(NS))
nodes = self.compromised_nodes
P = PolynomialRing(GF(p), 2*N, ["gamma%d"%i for i in range(N)]+["delta%d"%i for i in range(N)])
gamma = P.gens()[:N]
delta = P.gens()[N:]
v = VS(NS[0])
w = VS(NS[1])
X = [e.x for e in nodes]
equations = []
for i in range(N):
xi = VS([nodes[i].x**exp for exp in xrange(t+1)])
Si = nodes[i].S.list()
assert(len(Si) == t+1)
Si = VS(Si)
for j in range(i+1, N):
xj = VS([nodes[j].x**exp for exp in xrange(t+1)])
Sj = nodes[j].S.list()
assert(len(Sj) == t+1)
Sj = VS(Sj)
lhs = Si.dot_product(xj) - gamma[i] * v.dot_product(xj) - delta[i] * w.dot_product(xj)
rhs = Sj.dot_product(xi) - gamma[j] * v.dot_product(xi) - delta[j] * w.dot_product(xi)
equations.append( lhs - rhs )
St1 = VS(nodes[N-2].S.list())
for j in range(N):
xj = VS([nodes[j].x**exp for exp in xrange(t+1)])
ft1 = St1.dot_product(xj) - gamma[N-2] * v.dot_product(xj) - delta[N-2] * w.dot_product(xj)
for i in range(N-2):
Si = VS(nodes[i].S.list())
mult = L(X[:N-2],X[N-2],i)
fi = Si.dot_product(xj) - gamma[i] * v.dot_product(xj) - delta[i] * w.dot_product(xj)
ft1 -= mult *fi
equations.append(ft1)
St2 = VS(nodes[N-1].S.list())
for j in range(N):
xj = VS([nodes[j].x**exp for exp in xrange(t+1)])
ft2 = St2.dot_product(xj) - gamma[N-1] * v.dot_product(xj) - delta[N-1] * w.dot_product(xj)
for i in range(N-2):
Si = VS(nodes[i].S.list())
mult = L(X[:N-2],X[N-1],i)
fi = Si.dot_product(xj) - gamma[i] * v.dot_product(xj) - delta[i] * w.dot_product(xj)
ft2 -= mult *fi
equations.append(ft2)
return mq.MPolynomialSystem(P,equations)
def guess_and_verify(self, MQ, a, b, c, pick_randomly):
r"""
Subsititute $a,b,c$ for
$\gamma_{t+1},\delta_{t+1},$\gamma_{t+2}$ respectively and
verify if all other $\delta$'s and $\gamma$'s are 'small'
under this guess. Small in this context means in [-u,u].
INPUT:
MQ -- an equation system
a -- an element in GF(p)
b -- an element in GF(p)
c -- an element in GF(p)
pick_randomly -- pick some sufficiently large random
subset of equations instead of
considering all equations.
"""
p = self.p
N = self.N
t = self.t
MQ = copy(MQ)
K = GF(p)
P = MQ.ring()
gamma = P.gens()[:N]
delta = P.gens()[N:]
if pick_randomly:
MQ2 = [gamma[-2] - a, delta[-2] -b, gamma[-1] - c]
for i in range(6*N):
MQ2.append(MQ[randint(0,MQ.ngens()-1)])
MQ = mq.MPolynomialSystem(MQ2)
else:
MQ += [gamma[-2] - a, delta[-2] -b, gamma[-1] - c]
V = self.linear_variety(MQ)
assert(len(V) == 1)
V = V[0]
V[gamma[-2]] = a
V[delta[-2]] = b
V[gamma[-1]] = c
for e in gamma[:t]:
if abs(ZZ(V[e])) > self.u and abs(ZZ(V[e])-p) > self.u:
return None
for e in delta[:t]:
if abs(ZZ(V[e])) > self.u and abs(ZZ(V[e])-p) > self.u:
return None
return V, gamma, delta
def linear_variety(self, MQ):
r"""
Return the variety for \var{MQ}
INPUT:
MQ -- an equation system.
"""
A,v = MQ.coefficient_matrix(sparse=False)
E = A.echelon_form()
assert(A.rank() == A.ncols() - 1)
F = [f for f in (E*v).list()]
V = {}
for f in F:
if f==0:
continue
V[f.variables()[0]] = -f.univariate_polynomial().constant_coefficient()
return [V]
def recover_master_secret(self):
"""
Run the attack on this instance.
"""
p = self.p
t = self.t
r = self.r
N = self.N
print "SYSTEM PARAMETERS"
print "p",p,"t",t,"r",r
_ = self.random_perturbation_polynomials()
print "ATTACK VERIFICATION"
K = GF(p)
_cpu = cputime()
NS = self.noise_space()
print "Noise Space time: %8.3f"%(cputime(_cpu))
v = K['y'](NS[0].list())
w = K['y'](NS[1].list())
print "Rank of the noise space:",(NS.rank())
A = Matrix(K,2, t+1,self.g.list() + self.h.list())
print "Noise spaces match:", A.echelon_form() == NS.echelon_form()
print r"v \in \{g, h\}:", v in [self.g, self.h]
print r"v' \in \{g, h\}:", w in [self.g, self.h]
_wall = walltime()
MQ = self.fi_equation_system()
V = None
for a in range(-self.u, self.u+1):
print a,
sys.stdout.flush()
for b in range(-self.u, self.u+1):
for c in range(-self.u, self.u+1):
sol = self.guess_and_verify(MQ,a,b,c, pick_randomly=True)
if sol is not None:
print "solution found!"
break
if sol is not None:
break
if sol is not None:
break
if sol is None:
raise ArithmeticError("no solution found")
print "Brute force time %8.3f"%(walltime(_wall))
V, gamma, delta = sol
X,Y = self.F.parent().gens()
myF = []
R = PolynomialRing(K, t+1, 'c')
nodes = self.compromised_nodes
x_coeffs = R.gens()
for y_deg in xrange(t+1):
equations = []
for i in range(len(nodes)):
fi = nodes[i].S - V[gamma[i]]*v - V[delta[i]]*w
equations.append(sum([x_coeffs[j]*nodes[i].x**j for j in range(len(x_coeffs))], -fi[y_deg]))
V_x = self.linear_variety(mq.MPolynomialSystem(equations))
assert(len(V_x) == 1)
V_x = V_x[0]
myF.append(sum([V_x[gen] * X**i for i,gen in enumerate(x_coeffs)]) * Y**y_deg)
myF = sum(myF)
print "F* matches F:",myF == self.F
return myF == self.F
def express_basis_in_g_and_h(self, B, vals):
r"""
Given a basis as rows of \var{B} express this as linear
combinations of $g$ and $h$.
INPUT:
B -- a matrix containing the basis
vals -- used to evaluate $g$ and $h$
"""
p = self.p
g = [self.g(each) for each in vals]
h = [self.h(each) for each in vals]
M = Matrix(GF(p), 2*B.nrows(), 2*B.nrows() + 1)
ncols = M.ncols()
for i in xrange(B.nrows()):
M[2*i , 2*i ] = g[0]
M[2*i , 2*i+1 ] = h[0]
M[2*i , ncols-1] = B[i,0]
M[2*i+1, 2*i ] = g[1]
M[2*i+1, 2*i+1 ] = h[1]
M[2*i+1, ncols-1] = B[i,1]
M.echelonize()
g_coeff = []
h_coeff = []
for i in xrange(B.nrows()):
g_coeff.append(-M[2*i, ncols-1])
h_coeff.append(-M[2*i+1,ncols-1])
# some checks
assert(g_coeff[0] * g[0] + h_coeff[0] * h[0] == B[0,0])
assert(g_coeff[0] * g[2] + h_coeff[0] * h[2] == B[0,2])
assert(g_coeff[1] * g[0] + h_coeff[1] * h[0] == B[1,0])
assert(g_coeff[1] * g[2] + h_coeff[1] * h[2] == B[1,2])
l = []
for coeff in g_coeff:
if ZZ(coeff) > p//2:
l.append(ZZ(coeff)-p)
else:
l.append(ZZ(coeff))
g_coeff = l
l = []
for coeff in h_coeff:
if ZZ(coeff) > p//2:
l.append(ZZ(coeff)-p)
else:
l.append(ZZ(coeff))
h_coeff = l
return g_coeff, h_coeff
def check_LLL(self, rs, trials=3):
r"""
For $e \in rs$ run \var{trials} and check whether the LLL step
was successful.
INPUT:
rs -- a range (e.g. [1,2,3])
trials -- the number of trials to run for each parameter.
"""
p = self.p
t = self.t
for e in rs:
r = 2**e
n = ceil(3*(log(p)/(log(p) - log(2*r))).n())
sys.stdout.flush()
alltme = 0.0
for trial in range(trials):
mh = MobiHoc2007(p=p, t=t, r=r)
tme = cputime()
B,vals = mh.get_LLL(mh.noise_space(small=True), n=n)
g_coeff, h_coeff = mh.express_basis_in_g_and_h(B, vals)
assert(abs(g_coeff[2]) <= 1 and abs(g_coeff[3]) <= 1 and abs(h_coeff[2]) <= 1 and abs(h_coeff[3]) <= 1)
sys.stdout.flush()
alltme += cputime(tme)
print "------------------------------------------"
print "2**%s"%e, n, alltme/trials
sys.stdout.flush()
class MH07Node:
"""
A Node in a sensor network capable of executing the protocol from
MobiHoc 2007.
"""
def __init__(self, x, f, S, bound):
self.x = x
self.f = f
self.S = S
self.bound = bound
def shared_secret(self, other):
a = ZZ(self.S(other.x))
b = ZZ(other.S(self.x))
return a.digits(2)[self.bound:] == b.digits(2)[self.bound:]
def __cmp__(self, other):
return cmp(self.x,other.x)
def __hash__(self):
return hash((self.x,self.S, self.bound))
def __repr__(self):
return "<node %s>"%self.x
def L(X, x, i):
xi = X[i]
prod = 1
for j,xj in enumerate(X):
if i == j:
continue
prod *= (x - xj)/(xi-xj)
return prod
class PerCom07:
"""
Class for experimenting with the key predistribution scheme from
N.V. Subramanian, C. Yang, and W. Zhang. Securing Distributed Data
Storage and Retrieval in Sensor Networks. 5th IEEE International
Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom'07),
2007.
"""
def __init__(self, p, t, r):
r"""
INPUT:
p -- a prime ($\approx 2^{64}$)
r -- an integer 0 < r < p ($\approx 2^{16})
t -- an integer ($\approx 15$)
"""
self.p = p
self.t = t
self.r = r
def random_master_polynomial(self):
"""
Return and store a random master polynomial.
"""
p,t,r = self.p,self.t,self.r
Pu = PolynomialRing(GF(p),'u')
Pv = PolynomialRing(GF(p),'v')
P = PolynomialRing(GF(p),'u,v')
Fu = Pu.random_element(degree=t)
Fv = Pv.random_element(degree=t)
self.F = P(Fu)*P(Fv)
return self.F
def __getattr__(self, name):
if name == 'F':
_ = self.random_master_polynomial()
else:
raise AttributeError(name)
return getattr(self, name)
@cached_method
def phase_polynomial(self, v):
r"""
Return a polynomial for the phase \var{v}.
"""
b_u = randint(0,self.r)
return self.F.subs(v=v).univariate_polynomial() + b_u
@cached_method
def node_polynomial(self, u):
r"""
Return a polynomial for the node \var{v}.
"""
a_u = randint(0,self.r)
return self.F.subs(u=u).univariate_polynomial() + a_u, a_u
def node(self, u):
r"""
Return a new node for u.
"""
return PC08Node(u,*self.node_polynomial(u))
def phase(self, v):
r"""
Return a new phase for v.
"""
return PC08Phase(v,self.phase_polynomial(v))
def random_node(self):
r"""
Return a random node.
"""
return self.node(u=randint(0,self.p-1))
def random_phase(self):
r"""
Return a random phase.
"""
return self.phase(v=randint(0,self.p-1))
def key(self, n, v):
r"""
Return the key for the node \var{n} for the phase \var{v}.
"""
return n.f(v)
def recover_F1(self, attack0=False):
r"""
Recover $F_1$.
"""
t = self.t
p = self.p
Q = self.F.parent()
u,v = Q.gens()
N = set()
while len(N) < t+1:
N.add(self.random_node())
if attack0:
P = set()
while len(P) < t+1:
P.add(self.random_phase())
_sum = []
for deg in range(1,t+1):
R = PolynomialRing(GF(p),'u')
X = [(n.u,n.f[deg]) for n in N]
_sum.append( R.lagrange_polynomial(X)*v**deg )
S_u = set(list(iter(sum(_sum))))
if attack0:
_sum = []
for deg in range(1,t+1):
R = PolynomialRing(GF(p),'v')
X = [(x.v,x.f[deg]) for x in P]
_sum.append( R.lagrange_polynomial(X) *u**deg )
S_v = set(list(iter(sum(_sum))))
if attack0:
return sum(map(mul,S_u.intersection(S_v).union(S_u.difference(S_v).union( S_v.difference(S_u) ))))
else:
return sum(map(mul,S_u))
def check_LLL(self, n=None):
"""
Verify the heuristic in Section 4.2.
"""
p,t,r = self.p,self.t,self.r
F1 = self.recover_F1(attack0 = False)
v = randint(0, self.p-1)
if n is None:
n = ceil(((t+1)*log(p)/(log(p)-log(2*r))).n())
N = set()
while len(N) < n + 1:
N.add(self.random_node())
N = list(N)
y = lambda i: N[i].f(v) - F1(N[i].u, v)
A = Matrix(ZZ,t+1+n+1,n)
for i in range(n):
A[0,i] = y(i+1) - y(i)
for j in range(1,t+1):
for i in range(n):
A[j,i] = N[i+1].u**j - N[i].u**j
for j in range(n):
A[t+1+j,j] = p
print A
B = A.LLL()
for row in B.rows():
if not row.is_zero():
break
return all(abs(row[i]) == abs(N[i+1].a - N[i].a) for i in range(n))
class PC08Node:
def __init__(self, u, fu, a):
self.u = u
self.f = fu
self.a = a
def __cmp__(self, other):
return cmp(self.u,other.u)
def __hash__(self):
return hash((self.u,self.f))
def __repr__(self):
return "<node %s>"%self.u
class PC08Phase:
def __init__(self, v, fv):
self.v = v
self.f = fv
def __cmp__(self, other):
return cmp(self.v,other.v)
def __hash__(self):
return hash((self.v,self.f))
def __repr__(self):
return "<phase %s>"%self.u
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