Commits

Alexander Seifert  committed c94910a

Added html output

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  • Parent commits e4fa22d

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+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
+<meta name="generator" content="Asciidoctor 0.1.3">
+<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
+<title>The Impact of Underdetermination in Thought Experiments on the Deliverances of Imagination and Intuition</title>
+<style>
+/* Asciidoctor default stylesheet | MIT License | http://asciidoctor.org */
+article, aside, details, figcaption, figure, footer, header, hgroup, main, nav, section, summary { display: block; }
+audio, canvas, video { display: inline-block; }
+audio:not([controls]) { display: none; height: 0; }
+[hidden] { display: none; }
+html { font-family: sans-serif; -webkit-text-size-adjust: 100%; -ms-text-size-adjust: 100%; }
+body { margin: 0; }
+a:focus { outline: thin dotted; }
+a:active, a:hover { outline: 0; }
+h1 { font-size: 2em; margin: 0.67em 0; }
+abbr[title] { border-bottom: 1px dotted; }
+b, strong { font-weight: bold; }
+dfn { font-style: italic; }
+hr { -moz-box-sizing: content-box; box-sizing: content-box; height: 0; }
+mark { background: #ff0; color: #000; }
+code, tt, kbd, pre, samp { font-family: monospace, serif; font-size: 1em; }
+pre { white-space: pre-wrap; }
+q { quotes: "\201C" "\201D" "\2018" "\2019"; }
+small { font-size: 80%; }
+sub, sup { font-size: 75%; line-height: 0; position: relative; vertical-align: baseline; }
+sup { top: -0.5em; }
+sub { bottom: -0.25em; }
+img { border: 0; }
+svg:not(:root) { overflow: hidden; }
+figure { margin: 0; }
+fieldset { border: 1px solid #c0c0c0; margin: 0 2px; padding: 0.35em 0.625em 0.75em; }
+legend { border: 0; padding: 0; }
+button, input, select, textarea { font-family: inherit; font-size: 100%; margin: 0; }
+button, input { line-height: normal; }
+button, select { text-transform: none; }
+button, html input[type="button"], input[type="reset"], input[type="submit"] { -webkit-appearance: button; cursor: pointer; }
+button[disabled], html input[disabled] { cursor: default; }
+input[type="checkbox"], input[type="radio"] { box-sizing: border-box; padding: 0; }
+input[type="search"] { -webkit-appearance: textfield; -moz-box-sizing: content-box; -webkit-box-sizing: content-box; box-sizing: content-box; }
+input[type="search"]::-webkit-search-cancel-button, input[type="search"]::-webkit-search-decoration { -webkit-appearance: none; }
+button::-moz-focus-inner, input::-moz-focus-inner { border: 0; padding: 0; }
+textarea { overflow: auto; vertical-align: top; }
+table { border-collapse: collapse; border-spacing: 0; }
+*, *:before, *:after { -moz-box-sizing: border-box; -webkit-box-sizing: border-box; box-sizing: border-box; }
+html, body { font-size: 100%; }
+body { background: white; color: #222222; padding: 0; margin: 0; font-family: "Helvetica Neue", "Helvetica", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; line-height: 1; position: relative; }
+a:focus { outline: none; }
+img, object, embed { max-width: 100%; height: auto; }
+object, embed { height: 100%; }
+img { -ms-interpolation-mode: bicubic; }
+#map_canvas img, #map_canvas embed, #map_canvas object, .map_canvas img, .map_canvas embed, .map_canvas object { max-width: none !important; }
+.left { float: left !important; }
+.right { float: right !important; }
+.text-left { text-align: left !important; }
+.text-right { text-align: right !important; }
+.text-center { text-align: center !important; }
+.text-justify { text-align: justify !important; }
+.hide { display: none; }
+.antialiased, body { -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; }
+img { display: inline-block; }
+textarea { height: auto; min-height: 50px; }
+select { width: 100%; }
+p.lead, .paragraph.lead > p, #preamble > .sectionbody > .paragraph:first-of-type p { font-size: 1.21875em; line-height: 1.6; }
+.subheader, .admonitionblock td.content > .title, .exampleblock > .title, .imageblock > .title, .listingblock > .title, .literalblock > .title, .openblock > .title, .paragraph > .title, .quoteblock > .title, .sidebarblock > .title, .tableblock > .title, .verseblock > .title, .ulist > .title, .olist > .title, .dlist > .title, .qlist > .title, .tableblock > caption { line-height: 1.4; color: #7a2518; font-weight: 300; margin-top: 0.2em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; }
+div, dl, dt, dd, ul, ol, li, h1, h2, h3, #toctitle, .sidebarblock > .content > .title, h4, h5, h6, pre, form, p, blockquote, th, td { margin: 0; padding: 0; direction: ltr; }
+a { color: #005498; text-decoration: underline; line-height: inherit; }
+a:hover, a:focus { color: #00467f; }
+a img { border: none; }
+p { font-family: inherit; font-weight: normal; font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.6; margin-bottom: 1.25em; text-rendering: optimizeLegibility; }
+p aside { font-size: 0.875em; line-height: 1.35; font-style: italic; }
+h1, h2, h3, #toctitle, .sidebarblock > .content > .title, h4, h5, h6 { font-family: Georgia, "URW Bookman L", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; color: #ba3925; text-rendering: optimizeLegibility; margin-top: 1em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; line-height: 1.2125em; }
+h1 small, h2 small, h3 small, #toctitle small, .sidebarblock > .content > .title small, h4 small, h5 small, h6 small { font-size: 60%; color: #e99b8f; line-height: 0; }
+h1 { font-size: 2.125em; }
+h2 { font-size: 1.6875em; }
+h3, #toctitle, .sidebarblock > .content > .title { font-size: 1.375em; }
+h4 { font-size: 1.125em; }
+h5 { font-size: 1.125em; }
+h6 { font-size: 1em; }
+hr { border: solid #dddddd; border-width: 1px 0 0; clear: both; margin: 1.25em 0 1.1875em; height: 0; }
+em, i { font-style: italic; line-height: inherit; }
+strong, b { font-weight: bold; line-height: inherit; }
+small { font-size: 60%; line-height: inherit; }
+code, tt { font-family: Consolas, "Liberation Mono", Courier, monospace; font-weight: normal; color: #6d180b; }
+ul, ol, dl { font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.6; margin-bottom: 1.25em; list-style-position: outside; font-family: inherit; }
+ul li ul, ul li ol { margin-left: 1.5em; margin-bottom: 0; font-size: 1em; }
+ul.square li ul, ul.circle li ul, ul.disc li ul { list-style: inherit; }
+ul.square { list-style-type: square; }
+ul.circle { list-style-type: circle; }
+ul.disc { list-style-type: disc; }
+ul.no-bullet { list-style: none; }
+ol li ul, ol li ol { margin-left: 1.5em; margin-bottom: 0; }
+dl dt { margin-bottom: 0.3125em; font-weight: bold; }
+dl dd { margin-bottom: 1.25em; }
+abbr, acronym { text-transform: uppercase; font-size: 90%; color: #222222; border-bottom: 1px dotted #dddddd; cursor: help; }
+abbr { text-transform: none; }
+blockquote { margin: 0 0 1.25em; padding: 0.5625em 1.25em 0 1.1875em; border-left: 1px solid #dddddd; }
+blockquote cite { display: block; font-size: inherit; color: #555555; }
+blockquote cite:before { content: "\2014 \0020"; }
+blockquote cite a, blockquote cite a:visited { color: #555555; }
+blockquote, blockquote p { line-height: 1.6; color: #6f6f6f; }
+.vcard { display: inline-block; margin: 0 0 1.25em 0; border: 1px solid #dddddd; padding: 0.625em 0.75em; }
+.vcard li { margin: 0; display: block; }
+.vcard .fn { font-weight: bold; font-size: 0.9375em; }
+.vevent .summary { font-weight: bold; }
+.vevent abbr { cursor: default; text-decoration: none; font-weight: bold; border: none; padding: 0 0.0625em; }
+@media only screen and (min-width: 48em) { h1, h2, h3, #toctitle, .sidebarblock > .content > .title, h4, h5, h6 { line-height: 1.4; }
+  h1 { font-size: 2.75em; }
+  h2 { font-size: 2.3125em; }
+  h3, #toctitle, .sidebarblock > .content > .title { font-size: 1.6875em; }
+  h4 { font-size: 1.4375em; } }
+.print-only { display: none !important; }
+@media print { * { background: transparent !important; color: #000 !important; box-shadow: none !important; text-shadow: none !important; }
+  a, a:visited { text-decoration: underline; }
+  a[href]:after { content: " (" attr(href) ")"; }
+  abbr[title]:after { content: " (" attr(title) ")"; }
+  .ir a:after, a[href^="javascript:"]:after, a[href^="#"]:after { content: ""; }
+  pre, blockquote { border: 1px solid #999; page-break-inside: avoid; }
+  thead { display: table-header-group; }
+  tr, img { page-break-inside: avoid; }
+  img { max-width: 100% !important; }
+  @page { margin: 0.5cm; }
+  p, h2, h3, #toctitle, .sidebarblock > .content > .title { orphans: 3; widows: 3; }
+  h2, h3, #toctitle, .sidebarblock > .content > .title { page-break-after: avoid; }
+  .hide-on-print { display: none !important; }
+  .print-only { display: block !important; }
+  .hide-for-print { display: none !important; }
+  .show-for-print { display: inherit !important; } }
+table { background: white; margin-bottom: 1.25em; border: solid 1px #dddddd; }
+table thead, table tfoot { background: whitesmoke; font-weight: bold; }
+table thead tr th, table thead tr td, table tfoot tr th, table tfoot tr td { padding: 0.5em 0.625em 0.625em; font-size: inherit; color: #222222; text-align: left; }
+table tr th, table tr td { padding: 0.5625em 0.625em; font-size: inherit; color: #222222; }
+table tr.even, table tr.alt, table tr:nth-of-type(even) { background: #f9f9f9; }
+table thead tr th, table tfoot tr th, table tbody tr td, table tr td, table tfoot tr td { display: table-cell; line-height: 1.6; }
+pre > code, pre > tt { color: #222222; }
+tt { font-size: 0.9375em; padding: 1px 3px 0; white-space: nowrap; background-color: #f2f2f2; border: 1px solid #cccccc; -webkit-border-radius: 4px; border-radius: 4px; text-shadow: none; }
+kbd.keyseq { color: #555555; }
+kbd:not(.keyseq) { display: inline-block; color: #222222; font-size: 0.75em; line-height: 1.4; background-color: #F7F7F7; border: 1px solid #ccc; -webkit-border-radius: 3px; border-radius: 3px; -webkit-box-shadow: 0 1px 0 rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2), 0 0 0 2px white inset; box-shadow: 0 1px 0 rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2), 0 0 0 2px white inset; margin: -0.15em 0.15em 0 0.15em; padding: 0.2em 0.6em 0.2em 0.5em; vertical-align: middle; white-space: nowrap; }
+kbd kbd:first-child { margin-left: 0; }
+kbd kbd:last-child { margin-right: 0; }
+.menuseq, .menu { color: #090909; }
+p a > tt { text-decoration: underline; }
+p a > tt:hover { color: #561309; }
+#header, #content, #footnotes, #footer { width: 100%; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0; max-width: 62.5em; *zoom: 1; position: relative; padding-left: 0.9375em; padding-right: 0.9375em; }
+#header:before, #header:after, #content:before, #content:after, #footnotes:before, #footnotes:after, #footer:before, #footer:after { content: " "; display: table; }
+#header:after, #content:after, #footnotes:after, #footer:after { clear: both; }
+#header { margin-bottom: 2.5em; }
+#header > h1 { color: black; font-weight: normal; border-bottom: 1px solid #dddddd; margin-bottom: -28px; padding-bottom: 32px; }
+#header span { color: #6f6f6f; }
+#header #revnumber { text-transform: capitalize; }
+#header br { display: none; }
+#header br + span { padding-left: 3px; }
+#header br + span:before { content: "\2013 \0020"; }
+#toc { border-bottom: 3px double #ebebeb; padding-bottom: 1.25em; }
+#toc > ol { margin-left: 0.25em; }
+#toc ol.sectlevel0 > li > a { font-style: italic; }
+#toc ol.sectlevel0 ol.sectlevel1 { margin-left: 0; margin-top: 0.5em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; }
+#toc ol { list-style-type: none; }
+#toctitle { color: #7a2518; }
+@media only screen and (min-width: 80em) { body.toc2 { padding-left: 20em; }
+  #toc.toc2 { position: fixed; width: 20em; left: 0; top: 0; border-right: 1px solid #ebebeb; border-bottom: 0; z-index: 1000; padding: 1em; height: 100%; overflow: auto; }
+  #toc.toc2 #toctitle { margin-top: 0; }
+  #toc.toc2 > ol { font-size: .95em; }
+  #toc.toc2 ol ol { margin-left: 0; padding-left: 1em; }
+  #toc.toc2 ol.sectlevel0 ol.sectlevel1 { padding-left: 0; margin-top: 0.5em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; } }
+#footer { max-width: 100%; background-color: #222222; padding: 1.25em; }
+#footer-text { color: #dddddd; line-height: 1.44; }
+.sect1 { border-bottom: 3px double #ebebeb; padding-bottom: 1.25em; }
+.sect1:last-of-type { border-bottom: 0; }
+#content h1 > a.anchor, h2 > a.anchor, h3 > a.anchor, #toctitle > a.anchor, .sidebarblock > .content > .title > a.anchor, h4 > a.anchor, h5 > a.anchor, h6 > a.anchor { position: absolute; width: 1em; margin-left: -1em; display: block; text-decoration: none; visibility: hidden; text-align: center; font-weight: normal; }
+#content h1 > a.anchor:before, h2 > a.anchor:before, h3 > a.anchor:before, #toctitle > a.anchor:before, .sidebarblock > .content > .title > a.anchor:before, h4 > a.anchor:before, h5 > a.anchor:before, h6 > a.anchor:before { content: '\00A7'; font-size: .85em; vertical-align: text-top; display: block; margin-top: 0.05em; }
+#content h1:hover > a.anchor, #content h1 > a.anchor:hover, h2:hover > a.anchor, h2 > a.anchor:hover, h3:hover > a.anchor, #toctitle:hover > a.anchor, .sidebarblock > .content > .title:hover > a.anchor, h3 > a.anchor:hover, #toctitle > a.anchor:hover, .sidebarblock > .content > .title > a.anchor:hover, h4:hover > a.anchor, h4 > a.anchor:hover, h5:hover > a.anchor, h5 > a.anchor:hover, h6:hover > a.anchor, h6 > a.anchor:hover { visibility: visible; }
+#content h1 > a.link, h2 > a.link, h3 > a.link, #toctitle > a.link, .sidebarblock > .content > .title > a.link, h4 > a.link, h5 > a.link, h6 > a.link { color: #ba3925; text-decoration: none; }
+#content h1 > a.link:hover, h2 > a.link:hover, h3 > a.link:hover, #toctitle > a.link:hover, .sidebarblock > .content > .title > a.link:hover, h4 > a.link:hover, h5 > a.link:hover, h6 > a.link:hover { color: #a53221; }
+.admonitionblock td.content > .title, .exampleblock > .title, .imageblock > .title, .listingblock > .title, .literalblock > .title, .openblock > .title, .paragraph > .title, .quoteblock > .title, .sidebarblock > .title, .tableblock > .title, .verseblock > .title, .ulist > .title, .olist > .title, .dlist > .title, .qlist > .title { text-align: left; font-weight: bold; }
+.tableblock > caption { text-align: left; font-weight: bold; white-space: nowrap; overflow: visible; max-width: 0; }
+table.tableblock #preamble > .sectionbody > .paragraph:first-of-type p { font-size: inherit; }
+.admonitionblock > table { border: 0; background: none; width: 100%; }
+.admonitionblock > table td.icon { text-align: center; width: 80px; }
+.admonitionblock > table td.icon img { max-width: none; }
+.admonitionblock > table td.icon .title { font-weight: bold; text-transform: uppercase; }
+.admonitionblock > table td.content { padding-left: 1.125em; padding-right: 1.25em; border-left: 1px solid #dddddd; color: #6f6f6f; }
+.admonitionblock > table td.content > .paragraph:last-child > p { margin-bottom: 0; }
+.exampleblock > .content { border-style: solid; border-width: 1px; border-color: #e6e6e6; margin-bottom: 1.25em; padding: 1.25em; background: white; -webkit-border-radius: 4px; border-radius: 4px; }
+.exampleblock > .content h1, .exampleblock > .content h2, .exampleblock > .content h3, .exampleblock > .content #toctitle, .sidebarblock.exampleblock > .content > .title, .exampleblock > .content h4, .exampleblock > .content h5, .exampleblock > .content h6, .exampleblock > .content p { color: #333333; }
+.exampleblock > .content > :first-child { margin-top: 0; }
+.exampleblock > .content > :last-child { margin-bottom: 0; }
+.exampleblock > .content h1, .exampleblock > .content h2, .exampleblock > .content h3, .exampleblock > .content #toctitle, .sidebarblock.exampleblock > .content > .title, .exampleblock > .content h4, .exampleblock > .content h5, .exampleblock > .content h6 { line-height: 1; margin-bottom: 0.625em; }
+.exampleblock > .content h1.subheader, .exampleblock > .content h2.subheader, .exampleblock > .content h3.subheader, .exampleblock > .content .subheader#toctitle, .sidebarblock.exampleblock > .content > .subheader.title, .exampleblock > .content h4.subheader, .exampleblock > .content h5.subheader, .exampleblock > .content h6.subheader { line-height: 1.4; }
+.exampleblock > .content > :last-child > :last-child, .exampleblock > .content .olist > ol > li:last-child > :last-child, .exampleblock > .content .ulist > ul > li:last-child > :last-child, .exampleblock > .content .qlist > ol > li:last-child > :last-child { margin-bottom: 0; }
+.exampleblock.result > .content { -webkit-box-shadow: 0 1px 8px #d9d9d9; box-shadow: 0 1px 8px #d9d9d9; }
+.imageblock { margin-bottom: 1.25em; }
+.sidebarblock { border-style: solid; border-width: 1px; border-color: #d9d9d9; margin-bottom: 1.25em; padding: 1.25em; background: #f2f2f2; -webkit-border-radius: 4px; border-radius: 4px; }
+.sidebarblock h1, .sidebarblock h2, .sidebarblock h3, .sidebarblock #toctitle, .sidebarblock > .content > .title, .sidebarblock h4, .sidebarblock h5, .sidebarblock h6, .sidebarblock p { color: #333333; }
+.sidebarblock > :first-child { margin-top: 0; }
+.sidebarblock > :last-child { margin-bottom: 0; }
+.sidebarblock h1, .sidebarblock h2, .sidebarblock h3, .sidebarblock #toctitle, .sidebarblock > .content > .title, .sidebarblock h4, .sidebarblock h5, .sidebarblock h6 { line-height: 1; margin-bottom: 0.625em; }
+.sidebarblock h1.subheader, .sidebarblock h2.subheader, .sidebarblock h3.subheader, .sidebarblock .subheader#toctitle, .sidebarblock > .content > .subheader.title, .sidebarblock h4.subheader, .sidebarblock h5.subheader, .sidebarblock h6.subheader { line-height: 1.4; }
+.sidebarblock > .content > .title { color: #7a2518; margin-top: 0; line-height: 1.6; }
+.sidebarblock > .content > .paragraph:last-child p { margin-bottom: 0; }
+pre { color: inherit; font-family: Consolas, "Liberation Mono", Courier, monospace; overflow-x: auto; line-height: 1.6; }
+.verseblock { margin-bottom: 1.25em; }
+.literalblock, .listingblock { margin-bottom: 1.25em; }
+.literalblock > .content > pre, .listingblock > .content > pre { background: none; color: inherit; font-family: Consolas, "Liberation Mono", Courier, monospace; border-width: 1px 0; border-style: dotted; border-color: #bfbfbf; -webkit-border-radius: 4px; border-radius: 4px; padding: 0.75em 0.75em 0.5em 0.75em; white-space: pre; overflow-x: auto; line-height: 1.6; }
+.literalblock > .content > pre > code, .literalblock > .content > pre > tt, .listingblock > .content > pre > code, .listingblock > .content > pre > tt { color: inherit; font-family: Consolas, "Liberation Mono", Courier, monospace; padding: 0; background: none; font-weight: normal; }
+@media only screen { .literalblock > .content > pre, .listingblock > .content > pre { font-size: 0.8em; } }
+@media only screen and (min-width: 48em) { .literalblock > .content > pre, .listingblock > .content > pre { font-size: 0.9em; } }
+@media only screen and (min-width: 80em) { .literalblock > .content > pre, .listingblock > .content > pre { font-size: 1em; } }
+.listingblock:hover .xml:before { content: "xml"; text-transform: uppercase; float: right; font-size: 0.9em; color: #999; }
+.listingblock:hover .html:before { content: "html"; text-transform: uppercase; float: right; font-size: 0.9em; color: #999; }
+.listingblock:hover .ruby:before { content: "ruby"; text-transform: uppercase; float: right; font-size: 0.9em; color: #999; }
+.listingblock:hover .asciidoc:before { content: "asciidoc"; text-transform: uppercase; float: right; font-size: 0.9em; color: #999; }
+.listingblock:hover .java:before { content: "java"; text-transform: uppercase; float: right; font-size: 0.9em; color: #999; }
+.listingblock:hover .javascript:before { content: "javascript"; text-transform: uppercase; float: right; font-size: 0.9em; color: #999; }
+.listingblock:hover .css:before { content: "css"; text-transform: uppercase; float: right; font-size: 0.9em; color: #999; }
+.listingblock:hover .scss:before { content: "scss"; text-transform: uppercase; float: right; font-size: 0.9em; color: #999; }
+.quoteblock { margin: 0 0 1.25em; padding: 0.5625em 1.25em 0 1.1875em; border-left: 1px solid #dddddd; }
+.quoteblock blockquote { margin: 0 0 1.25em 0; padding: 0 0 0.5625em 0; border: 0; }
+.quoteblock blockquote > .paragraph:last-child p { margin-bottom: 0; }
+.quoteblock .attribution { margin-top: -.25em; padding-bottom: 0.5625em; font-size: inherit; color: #555555; }
+.quoteblock .attribution br { display: none; }
+.quoteblock .attribution cite { display: block; margin-bottom: 0.625em; }
+table thead th, table tfoot th { font-weight: bold; }
+table.tableblock.grid-all { border-collapse: separate; border-spacing: 1px; -webkit-border-radius: 4px; border-radius: 4px; border-top: 1px solid #dddddd; border-bottom: 1px solid #dddddd; }
+table.tableblock.frame-topbot, table.tableblock.frame-none { border-left: 0; border-right: 0; }
+table.tableblock.frame-sides, table.tableblock.frame-none { border-top: 0; border-bottom: 0; }
+table.tableblock td .paragraph:last-child p, table.tableblock td > p:last-child { margin-bottom: 0; }
+th.tableblock.halign-left, td.tableblock.halign-left { text-align: left; }
+th.tableblock.halign-right, td.tableblock.halign-right { text-align: right; }
+th.tableblock.halign-center, td.tableblock.halign-center { text-align: center; }
+th.tableblock.halign-top, td.tableblock.halign-top { vertical-align: top; }
+th.tableblock.halign-bottom, td.tableblock.halign-bottom { vertical-align: bottom; }
+th.tableblock.halign-middle, td.tableblock.halign-middle { vertical-align: middle; }
+p.tableblock.header { color: #222222; font-weight: bold; }
+td > div.verse { white-space: pre; }
+ul { margin-left: 1.75em; }
+ol { margin-left: 1.875em; }
+dl dd { margin-left: 1.125em; }
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+</head>
+<body class="book toc2" style="max-width: 65em;">
+<div id="header">
+<h1>The Impact of Underdetermination in Thought Experiments on the Deliverances of Imagination and Intuition</h1>
+<span id="author">Alexander Seifert</span><br>
+<span id="email"><a href="mailto:alexander.seifert@gmail.com">alexander.seifert@gmail.com</a></span><br>
+<div id="toc" class="toc2">
+<div id="toctitle">Table of Contents</div>
+<ol type="none" class="sectlevel0">
+<li><a href="#_part_i">Part I</a></li>
+<li>
+<ol type="none" class="sectlevel1">
+<li><a href="#_introduction">1. Introduction</a></li>
+<li><a href="#_historical_notes">2. Historical Notes</a></li>
+<li><a href="#_definitory_and_systematical_notes">3. Definitory and Systematical Notes</a></li>
+<li><a href="#_central_themes_from_the_intuitions_debate">4. Central Themes from the Intuitions Debate</a></li>
+</ol>
+</li>
+<li><a href="#_part_ii">Part II</a></li>
+<li>
+<ol type="none" class="sectlevel1">
+<li><a href="#_parfit_s_combined_spectrum">1. Parfit’s Combined Spectrum</a></li>
+<li><a href="#_chalmers_zombies">2. Chalmers’ Zombies</a></li>
+<li><a href="#_putnam_s_twin_earth_cases">3. Putnam’s Twin Earth cases</a></li>
+<li>
+<ol type="none" class="sectlevel2">
+<li><a href="#_is_this_an_intuition">3.1. Is this an intuition?</a></li>
+<li><a href="#_overview_of_the_debate">3.2. Overview of the debate</a></li>
+<li><a href="#_underdetermination_of_concept_extension">3.3. Underdetermination of Concept Extension</a></li>
+</ol>
+</li>
+</ol>
+</li>
+<li><a href="#_part_iii">Part III</a></li>
+<li>
+<ol type="none" class="sectlevel1">
+<li><a href="#_conclusions">1. Conclusions</a></li>
+<li><a href="#_bibliography">Bibliography</a></li>
+</ol>
+</li>
+</ol>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="content">
+<h1 id="_part_i" class="sect0">Part I</h1>
+<div class="sect1">
+<h2 id="_introduction">1. Introduction</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>The method of cases is a philosophical tool with a long history dating back <em>at least</em> to the works of Plato. The basic idea is that you can test a theory (or build a new one) by doing a thought experiment. Let’s say you have a working theory of what it is to know something: what it means to know something is to have a justified, true belief. Now you test that theory by imagining/stipulating some scenario like the story of Smith and Jones from the original Gettier case. There you have a case that fulfills all the requirements of the traditional theory of knowledge, but where you still wouldn’t want to say that the subject S knows that p. This judgment is what we would call an intuitive judgment, because it supposedly isn’t just a trivial consequence from your background theory, but rather holds some evidential weight of its own.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>And this is basically how the concepts hang together: The <em>method of cases</em> uses <em>thought experiments</em> to test or to construct a theory. <em>Thought experiments</em> consist of two steps: first, you conceive of, that is you <em>imagine</em> a certain scenario. In a second step, you test your <em>intuition</em> in this specific case, that is you evaluate the scenario and draw some conclusion that is supposed to hold not only for this one case but more generally.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>This method has been used for thousands of years, and very heavily so. We find examples in classic antiquity, like Plato’s description of Gyges’ ring; we find them throughout medieval scholastic philosophy, like Aquinas’ use of cannibals to get clear on the concept of resurrection; we find them in early modern philosophy, as with the Cartesian Demon; and of course we find examples abound in contemporary philosophy, such as the Gettier cases, stories of brains in vats and of philosophical zombies. So the method of cases is at the heart of a <em>lot</em> of philosophical theorizing.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>The method’s reliability has been more or less taken for granted for most of the time it has been in use. Of course there has been the occasional critical voice in the last 2,5 thousand years, but it is no exaggeration to say that the method has been accepted uncritically for almost all of that time. Recently however, beginning in the late 1980s, the faculty of intuition, which is part of the method of cases has come under serious attack. Studies from what we now call experimental philosophy have shown systematic variation in peoples’ intuitions, a result that very much threatens the reliability and objectivity of the faculty of intuition and with it also the method of cases. What followed was a lively debate about the epistemology of intuition, which thrives to this day and deals with questions like: Are intuitions beliefs, or are they a mental state sui generis? Are intuitions evidence, and if so, what are they evidence for? Is there a non-circular explanation for them having evidential weight, and if not, how much of a problem is that? These are some of the questions that are central to the intuition debate.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>In my thesis I want to put the spotlight on one inevitable problem of every thought experiment: each and every thought experiment can only provide a partial description of a possible world. What I hope to show is that this necessary underdetermination of every thought experimental scenario opens up the method of cases to a number of different vulnerabilities. My strategy will be to analyze the debates revolving around three highly influential thought experiments and then demonstrate how each debate can be used to illuminate a different methodological problem. The common thread of all these problems is that they are a direct consequence of the thought experiment giving only a partial description of a possible world.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>None of these three attacks are completely new. However, while some have been wrongfully ignored in the past, with others their implications for the method of cases has not been properly recognized. What my thesis would have to offer, then, is to connect these objections to the array of already existing issues facing the faculty of intuition and the method of cases. Furthermore, in doing so I try to provide a systematic approach to fleshing out the problem of underdetermination.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Considering the central role of the method of cases in philosophical practice and the seriousness of the objections I will lay out in what follows, I think that this thesis can offer some fresh insights to a truly pressing problem and thus be a small but welcome addition to the wealth of already existing literature.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Part I of my thesis serves as an introduction for the reader, getting clear on the history, terms, and problems. Chapter 1 will show how the method of cases has always figured prominently in philosophical discourse from past to present, Plato to Putnam. Demonstrating the pervasive use of that method will hopefully prepare the reader to accept the importance of what is at stake here. In Chapter 2 I will try to give definitions for the central terms used in this thesis, and I will explain how all of these terms hang together. The crucial insight from this chapter will be to see how the whole method stands and falls with imagination and intuition. Chapter 3 will serve as an overview of the contemporary intuitions debate in order to both provide the bigger context of my work, and to heighten the reader’s sensibility of the serious problems that the method of cases is already faced with.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Part II of my thesis has a three-partite structure. I will consider three influential thought experiments and the discussions that revolve around them. Here, I am not interested in the philosophical questions posed by these thought experiments, I am rather interested in a formal feature of the debate: where and how intuitions in these cases come apart. As my focus lies on the underdetermination of thought experimental scenarios, I will be especially interested in tracing back diverging intuitions to different ways of “filling out the gaps” of the thought experiment.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Every debate should hopefully bring to light a different metaphilosophical problem. By looking at Derek Parfit’s Combined Spectrum case in Chapter 4, we will see how cognitive limitation poses a problem for a scenario’s successful conceivability. The debate around David Chalmers’ zombies in Chapter 5 will help us to see – [I don’t yet know]. Chapter 6 will look at Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario, and here we will be confronted with the problem of getting from possibility to actuality – in other words: the problem of drawing useful conclusions from a stipulated scenario.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>In the final part III we will draw the conclusions from what I laid out in the previous chapters, and explicate what this means for philosophical practice. By the end of the thesis, the reader should have a sense of the many open questions that every conscientious philosopher is faced with concerning that integral part of the philosopher’s toolbox. I will not have provided all the answers – in fact I will have provided <em>no</em> answers. But at least I will have provided many questions, and that, in philosophy, is often half the battle.</p>
+</div>
+
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="sect1">
+<h2 id="_historical_notes">2. Historical Notes</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="sect1">
+<h2 id="_definitory_and_systematical_notes">3. Definitory and Systematical Notes</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="sect1">
+<h2 id="_central_themes_from_the_intuitions_debate">4. Central Themes from the Intuitions Debate</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<h1 id="_part_ii" class="sect0">Part II</h1>
+<div class="sect1">
+<h2 id="_parfit_s_combined_spectrum">1. Parfit’s Combined Spectrum</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="sect1">
+<h2 id="_chalmers_zombies">2. Chalmers’ Zombies</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="sect1">
+<h2 id="_putnam_s_twin_earth_cases">3. Putnam’s Twin Earth cases</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment was one of the most influential thought experiment in the history of philosophy. It challenged the received view of meaning, which held that (1) the meaning that a speaker associates with a word is determined by individualistic facts about that speaker, and (2) the meaning of a word determines its extension. Putnam’s thought experiment shows that these two assumptions cannot be jointly satisfied, and it goes like this:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="admonitionblock important">
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td class="icon">
+<div class="title">Important</div>
+</td>
+<td class="content">
+
+give twin earth story
+</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>As Putnam holds the second assumption&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;that meaning determines extension&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;to be in itself sensible, he argues that we should give up (1): “Cut the pie any way you like”, he concluded famously, “‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head!” <a href="#Putnam 144">[Putnam 144]</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="sect2">
+<h3 id="_is_this_an_intuition">3.1. Is this an intuition?</h3>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>In the opening sentence of the section, where Putnam tells the Twin Earth story, he announces that his claim “will now be shown with the aid of a little science fiction.” <a href="#Putnam">139</a> Instead of first telling the story and then giving us his intuition on it, he weaves the intuition cleverly into the narrative. The important passage is the following:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="quoteblock">
+
+<blockquote>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>If a spaceship from Earth ever visits Twin Earth, then the supposition at first will be that “water” has the same meaning on Earth and on Twin Earth. This supposition will be corrected when it is discovered that “water” on Twin Earth is XYZ, and the Earthian spaceship will report somewhat as follows:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>“On Twin Earth the word ‘water’ means XYZ.” <a href="#Putnam">140</a></p>
+</div>
+
+</blockquote>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>To make Putnam’s intuition explicit: <em>When uttered on planet Earth, the word ‘water’ refers to H2O, but when uttered on Twin Earth it refers to XYZ.</em></p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>This judgment plays the role of an intuition. It is evidently not derived from some background theory, because Putnam uses this result to argue against the received views of meaning and proposes a different theory, which can account for the intuition.</p>
+</div>
+
+</div>
+<div class="sect2">
+<h3 id="_overview_of_the_debate">3.2. Overview of the debate</h3>
+<div class="sect3">
+<h4 id="_water_or_no_water">3.2.1. Water or no water?</h4>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>The implications Putnam’s thought experiment had were huge: it touches central tenants of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and also epistemology. It took the philosophical world by surprise. As Paul Boghossian described his reaction at a recent conference on intuition:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="quoteblock">
+
+<blockquote>
+[T]hat I was tempted to make that verdict having read through the thought experiment came as a big surprise to me. I tried to resist it, but it kept forcing itself back upon me. It seemed like an unexpected and significant new realization. I despise it even to this day. It has made a lot of trouble. But it can&#8217;t be helped.&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;<a href="#Boghossian2012">[Boghossian2012]</a>
+</blockquote>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>A lot of philosophers shared this feeling and quickly went on to draw out the conclusions that followed from Putnam’s results, without paying attention to the fact that the intuition is not unanimously accepted. In his critique of the method of reflective equilibrium, <a href="#Cummins">[Cummins]</a> criticizes the way philosophers reacted to the Twin Earth results:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="quoteblock">
+
+<blockquote>
+“It is commonplace for researchers in the Theory of Content to proceed as if the relevant intuitions were undisputed. Nor is the reason for this practice far to seek. The Putnamian take on these cases is widely enough shared to allow for a range of thriving intramural sports among believers. Those who do not share the intuition are simply not invited to the games. This kind of selection allows things to move forward, but it has its price. Since most nonphilosophers do not share the intuition, the resulting theories of content have little weight with them, and this is surely a drawback for a theory that is supposed to form an essential part of the foundations of cognitive psychology.” (Cummins, 116)
+</blockquote>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Cummins only cites nonphilosophers as not sharing the Putnam intuition, but professional philosophers were divided on this issue just as well. <a href="#Barnes">[Barnes]</a> frames these diverging intuitions in terms of a disagreement between descriptivists and realists. Descriptivists hold the orthodox view that “the extension of a kind term is fixed by a verbal specification of a set of manifest properties” <a href="#Barnes">[Barnes]</a>, in other words: what a term means is fixed by its definition alone. This would be the view of John Searle, Hugh Mellor or Timothy Crane. Realists on the other hand claim that when a term is first applied to a particular thing or instance, it ‘baptizes’ (or ‘christens’ or ‘dubs’) that thing or instance. This theory is also called the causal theory of reference, because the name finds its way into the linguistic community through some kind of dissemination, which is in any case a causal process. Putnam is of course a proponent of this view, but also Kripke and Paul Boghossian are on this side of the intuitive divide.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>In his discussion of the debate Barnes pits Putnam’s realist intuition against Mellor’s descriptivist intuition, when he says:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="quoteblock">
+
+<blockquote>
+“Putnam suggests that the new material should be set without the extension of ‘water’ because it has a different microstructure”, while “Mellor, in contrast, sees nothing objectionable in the descriptivist alternative of holding that water has been discovered to vary in its microstructure.” <a href="#Barnes">[Barnes]</a>
+</blockquote>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Barnes goes on to draw a wide-reaching metaphilosophical conclusion based on the form of that debate, which we will discuss later. Before we do that, I want to cite two further reactions to the Putnam intuition, which cannot be subsumed under the dichotomy that Barnes created. Both of these two reactions offer not a competing intuition, but rather take a step back and throw into doubt (1) the scientific basis of the Twin Earth scenario, or (2) the interpretational stance we adopt, when judging that scenario. Let us consider both in turn.</p>
+</div>
+
+</div>
+<div class="sect3">
+<h4 id="_questioning_the_scientific_basis_of_twin_earth">3.2.2. Questioning the scientific basis of Twin Earth</h4>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Putnam describes Twin Earth as a place which “apart from the differences we shall specify in our science-fiction examples … is <em>exactly</em> like Earth.” <a href="#Putnam">139</a> while the liquid called water is composed of XYZ, he stresses that “XYZ is indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures and pressures” (140).footIMPORTANT:[We shall put aside the point that Twin Oscar can’t really be identical to Oscar, given the fact that the human body consists to a very large part of H2O. <a href="#citations">[citations]</a>.]  This stipulation is where Christopher Grisdale’s objection comes into play. As he points out, our chemistry tells us that there is no possible world which is (1) exactly like ours but where at the same time (2) watery stuff is not H2O. This is because water’s microstructure determines its macrostructure. As <a href="#Paul Thagard 2012">[Paul Thagard 2012]</a> summarizes Grisdale’s work:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="quoteblock">
+
+<blockquote>
+“even a slight change in the chemical constitution of water produces dramatic changes in its effects. If normal hydrogen is replaced by different isotopes, deuterium or tritium, the water molecule markedly changes its chemical properties. Life would be impossible if H2O were replaced by heavy water, D2O or T2O; and compounds made of elements different from hydrogen and oxygen would be even more different in their properties.”
+</blockquote>
+</div>
+<div class="admonitionblock important">
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td class="icon">
+<div class="title">Important</div>
+</td>
+<td class="content">
+
+Reference to earlier chapter about inconceivability.
+</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+</div>
+<div class="sect3">
+<h4 id="__back_to_the_drawing_board_something_is_badly_wrong_with_chemical_theory">3.2.3. ‘Back to the drawing board! Something is badly wrong with chemical theory.’</h4>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>This is also very reminding of the way Thomas Kuhn argues. Trying to save his concept of incommensurability in the face of rigid designation, which is supposed to fix a sample’s reference even across scientific revolutions, Kuhn offers his own interpretation of the Twin Earth story. While Putnam describes the scientist who visits Twin Earth as judging the watery stuff there not to be ‘water’, Kuhn gives a different description of what would happen. The report that visitors send home about the stuff that lies in Twin Earth’s lakes “should not be about language but about chemistry”, he writes. “It must take some form like: ‘Back to the drawing board! Something is badly wrong with chemical theory.’” <a href="#Kuhn 310">[Kuhn 310]</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Now one might interpret Kuhn as simply offering another diverging intuition. After all, he gives us another story of what the scientist “would say”. On this view, we would have three different intuitions corresponding to three things the scientist might say: “that stuff is not ‘water’” (Putnam et al.), “that stuff is ‘water’” (Mellor et al.), “something is badly wrong with chemical theory” (Kuhn et al.). However, even though the debate is indeed often framed in terms of asking what the scientist visiting Twin Earth would say, I don’t think that this is the best way to put the question, and I think it is misleading. After all, Putnam isn’t really interested about what some visiting Earthling would <em>say</em>, he rather wants to find out whether the extensions of the two linguistic communities’ word ‘water’ are overlapping or non-overlapping. It might very well be that the visiting scientist would react by saying: “We need to rewrite all of our chemistry”, but even then Putnam might <em>still</em> ask whether or not the estranged visitor would refer to the stuff on Twin Earth as ‘water’. The compatibility of the visitor’s reaction with this question shows that the third possible reaction isn’t the manifestation of a third competing intuition on the same question, but rather an artifact of posing the question in an imprecise manner. The better way to phrase the question, then, is to ask: If Oscar on Earth and Twin Oscar on Twin Earth utter (or think) the word ‘water’, do they mean the same thing? This is a question to which Kuhn doesn’t really give an answer. Therefore I think his interpretation is best understood in terms of the Grisdale/Thagard reaction of saying that the stipulated world is not coherently possible for all we know, and that it is therefore illegitimate to ask that question in the first place.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>The problem of the omniscient third person observer</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>There is one last position in the Twin Earth debate that I want to bring up. In a forthcoming paper <a href="#Slezak 2013">[Slezak 2013]</a> questions our very act of evaluating the thought experimental scenario from the point of an omniscient third person observer. This, he thinks, leads to the conflation of belief and belief ascription.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>\[also: Chomsky’s reaction&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;we have no intuitions in these cases]</p>
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+</div>
+<div class="sect2">
+<h3 id="_underdetermination_of_concept_extension">3.3. Underdetermination of Concept Extension</h3>
+<div class="admonitionblock important">
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td class="icon">
+<div class="title">Important</div>
+</td>
+<td class="content">
+
+say more about descriptivism, realism, theories of concepts; meaning determinism vs. meaning finitism (cf. de Saussure’s structuralism, St Augustine’s ostensive element)
+</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>How can we explain this clash of intuitions? Before we come to Barnes’ answer, let us consider the historical roots in Wittgenstein and Quine.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="sect3">
+<h4 id="_knowing_what_we_would_say_wittgenstein_and_quine">3.3.1. Knowing what we would say: Wittgenstein and Quine</h4>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Wittgenstein suggests that the method of cases might enable us to stipulate cases, which are so far from our actual world, that our concepts don’t fit these circumstances.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="quoteblock">
+
+<blockquote>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>‘Es ist als wären unsere Begriffe bedingt durch ein Gerüst von Tatsachen.’</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Das hieße doch: Wenn du dir gewisse Tatsachen anders denkst, sie anders beschreibst, als sie sind, dann kannst du die Anwendung gewisser Begriffe dir nicht mehr vorstellen, weil die Regeln ihrer Anwendung kein Analogon unter den neuen Umständen haben.&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;Was ich sage, kommt also darauf hinaus: Ein Gesetz wird für Menschen gegeben, und ein Jurist mag wohl fähig sein, Konsequenzen für jeden Fall zu ziehen, der ihm gewöhnlich vorkommt, das Gesetz hat also offenbar seine Verwendung, einen Sinn. Trotzdem aber setzt seine Gültigkeit allerlei voraus; und wenn das Wesen, welches er zu richten hat, ganz vom gewöhnlichen Menschen abweicht, dann wird z. B. die Entscheidung, ob er eine Tat mit böser Absicht begangen hat, nicht etwa schwer, sondern (einfach) unmöglich werden. <a href="#private language argument Cohnitz 156">[private language argument Cohnitz 156]</a></p>
+</div>
+
+</blockquote>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>In a very similar vein, W.V.O. Quine wonders whether language is cut out for such extraordinary circumstances:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="quoteblock">
+
+<blockquote>
+“The method of imaginary cases has its uses in philosophy, but at points […] I wonder whether the limits of the method are properly heeded. To seek what is ‘logically required’ for sameness of person under unprecedented circumstances is to suggest that words have some logical force beyond what our past needs have invested them with.” <a href="#Cohnitz 156">[Cohnitz 156]</a>
+</blockquote>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>His background assumption is that language is an instrument that was developed in order to describe our actual world, and this is where it can be used successfully. In situations that are so extraordinary that they don’t occur in our everyday life, language consequently fails to be an adequate tool for description.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>In <em>Reasons and Persons</em>, Parfit addresses this objection:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="quoteblock">
+
+<blockquote>
+“Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s criticism might be justified if, when considering such imagined cases, we had no reactions. But these cases arouse in most of us strong beliefs.” <a href="#Parfit">200</a>
+</blockquote>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>But even if we leave aside the empirical question of whether or not this observation is true for at least <em>most</em> of the influential thought experiments, simply pointing to the strong reaction cannot ground the epistemic value of our intuitions. After all, we have seen that intuitions can and do clash, and from analogy with perception we know that even in cases where our reactions systematically align, as in the case of optical illusions, they might even be misleading us.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>In a forthcoming paper, Peter Slezak takes up this point. Slezak cites Chomsky, who argues that our blind acceptance of seductive intuitions creates a deeply persuasive, but illegitimate, picture of the world. But simply brushing them off as unscientific is not enough, Slezak says, because “characterizing the error as a commitment to commonsense conceptions leaves its precise source and character obscure”. He acknowledges that the intuitions at the heart of mental externalism are not random, but “systematic, robust and widely shared”, and in this respect are “much like the intuitions that are the data for Chomsky’s generative grammars”. He compares the externalist intuitions with the ones arising in paradoxes, and says that an explanation of their faulty etiology “may defuse the intuition even if not curing us of it” <a href="#Slezak">6</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="admonitionblock important">
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td class="icon">
+<div class="title">Important</div>
+</td>
+<td class="content">
+
+should I bring in Slezak’s explanation at this point?
+</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>---And Gendler: certain concepts don’t lend themselves to counterfactual evaluation---</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Barnes gives just such an explanation. And so, as promised earlier, we will now discuss the metaphilosophical conclusion that Barnes drew from examining the Twin Earth debate.</p>
+</div>
+
+</div>
+<div class="sect3">
+<h4 id="_barnes">3.3.2. Barnes</h4>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Barnes described the Twin Earth debate as one, where each of the two camps involved proposed a theory of meaning and relied heavily upon examples of normal accepted usage, or modification of usage. He stresses that no camp can account for all the examples, and they each acknowledge that empirical shortcoming. When it comes to hypothetical situations, he says, “both sides are able to gloss them to their own satisfaction.” <a href="#Barnes">30</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Now even though Barnes doesn’t exactly explain how each of the clashing intuitions came to be, he gives an explanation of why it is possible (and maybe even expected) for them to clash in the first place. Barnes first describes the form of the debate: two camps citing their respective intuitions as support while at the same time acknowledging but failing to account for a number of counterexamples. In an inference to the best explanation, he then gives us the reason why “both sides are able to gloss [scenarios like Twin Earth] to their own satisfaction.” The reason is that the concepts themselves are underdetermined. What this means for actual usage is that</p>
+</div>
+<div class="quoteblock">
+
+<blockquote>
+“there is no utility in the notion of the extension of a concept … Far from the meaning of a concept fixing its future proper use, we can now see that people judge how to develop the use of a concept, and that imputations of meaning can do no better than to follow on behind, rationalizing the effects of sequences of such judgments.” <a href="#Barnes">32</a>
+</blockquote>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>In a sense, this view is the radical succession of Quine’s above quoted critique of the method of cases. The problem with the method of cases, to repeat the gist of Quine’s view, is the assumption “that words have some logical force beyond what our past needs have invested them with”. While this remark is situated in the context of the personal identity debate, with examples arguably far removed from our everyday situations, Barnes takes this idea one step further:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="quoteblock">
+
+<blockquote>
+Concept application is always a matter of contingent judgment in every particular case. No act of concept application is ever fixed or determined by previous acts of concept application or by alleged ‘meanings’ intrinsic to concepts. <a href="#Barnes">33</a>
+</blockquote>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>In the original paper from 1982 he presents all of this as if it would follow easily from the phenomenon of two clashing intuitions on the extension of a concept in one particular case. Apart from that, there is little argument in favor of a finitist semantics, or conversely against meaning determinism. But even though the argument there is a bit thin, the underlying idea of a language community making up, shaping and constantly reshaping the extension of our concepts seems to be so apparent as to be almost undeniable.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="admonitionblock important">
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td class="icon">
+<div class="title">Important</div>
+</td>
+<td class="content">
+
+give arguments for intuitions being manifestation of conceptual competence
+</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Barnes would later go on to develop a program called Sociological Study of Knowledge  (SSK) together with David Bloor and John Henry. In their programmatic book “Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis” the authors further develop the meaning finitist view and summarize the position in five main theses:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="olist arabic">
+
+<ol class="arabic">
+<li>
+<p>‘the future applications of concepts’ are open-ended’ (55)</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>‘no act of classification is every indefeasibly correct’ (56)</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>‘all acts of classification are revisable’ (57)</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>‘successive applications of a kind term are not independent’ (57)</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>‘the applications of different kind terms are not independent of each other’ (58f)</p>
+</li>
+</ol>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>I cannot here delve into the merits and problems of meaning finitism. For discussions of its benefits see <a href="#Barnes et al. (1996">ch. 3), and Bloor (1997). See also Barnes (1992).</a> For a discussion of its problems I refer the reader to <a href="#TODO">[TODO]</a>.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="admonitionblock important">
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td class="icon">
+<div class="title">Important</div>
+</td>
+<td class="content">
+
+point out the glaring similarities to de Saussure’s structuralism and his chapter in the <em>Cours de linguistique générale</em>
+</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>We have now arrived at a point where the reader is hopefully sympathetic to the plausibility of the meaning finitist view of concept extension. I will now conclude this section by drawing out the consequences this position&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;if true&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;has for the method of cases and for the deliverances of intuition.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>As I see it, the implications are threefold. First of all, the status of the method of cases as an objective philosophical method gets called into question once again, and very radically so. Because concepts on this view are inherently open-ended and their future application is “always a matter of contingent judgment in every particular case” <a href="#Barnes">33</a>, the faculty of intuition loses its privileged epistemic status. My intuitive judgment of a particular situation should then be understood as a manifestation of how I personally <em>wish</em> the concept to be extended; it simply reflects my individual interests. A concept’s meaning is however fixed only through its acceptance and coming in use by a linguistic community, and is thus a social category. It follows that my personal intuition matters only insofar as it is shared by a larger proportion of my linguistic community. This is because, as <a href="#Kusch 206">[Kusch 206]</a> already pointed out, shared interests are much more powerful determinants of conceptual judgments, “because they enter in many more acts of judgements and because they lead to collective actions.”</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Second, the contingency component of concept application also implies that diverging intuitions can be explained in psychological and sociological terms. My judgment over a matter of concept application reflects both facts about my personal psychology and my individual interests. Insofar, as the relevant part of my psychology or of my interests is widely (or even universally) shared, my judgment will be more likely to fall in line with other people’s judgments.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="admonitionblock important">
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td class="icon">
+<div class="title">Important</div>
+</td>
+<td class="content">
+
+Relationship to other theories:
+</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<div class="ulist">
+
+<ul>
+<li>
+<p>Foley’s results are the consequence of Barnes view applied to the concept of knowledge. He talks about “important information”&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;what information is important is exactly the contingent judgment Barnes talks about</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>Gendler’s results may be the consequence of Barnes’ view applied to the concept of personal identity</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>Think about relationship to Jennifer Nagel’s view</p>
+</li>
+</ul>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Third and somewhat derivatively, it shows the latent commitment to meaning determinism (maybe also to classic theory of concept)&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;As <a href="#Kusch 201">[Kusch 201]</a> observes “Most of mainstream philosophy of language falls within the […] ‘meaning-determinist’ camp.” I suspect that the vast majority of philosophers from other sub-disciplines implicitly shares this view.</p>
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<h1 id="_part_iii" class="sect0">Part III</h1>
+<div class="sect1">
+<h2 id="_conclusions">1. Conclusions</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="sect1">
+<h2 id="_bibliography">Bibliography</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="ulist bibliography">
+
+<ul>
+<li>
+<p><a id="Boghossian2012"></a> Boghossian, Paul, talk at <em>Philosophy without Intuitions</em>, London 2012, <a href="http://philevents.org/event/show/3603">philevents</a></p>
+</li>
+</ul>
+</div>
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
+
+</div>
+<div id="footer">
+<div id="footer-text">
+Last updated 2013-08-31 15:10:02 CEST
+</div>
+</div>
+</body>
+</html>