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 <ul class="sectlevel3">
 <li><a href="#_water_or_no_water">2.3.1. Water or no water?</a></li>
 <li><a href="#_questioning_the_scientific_basis_of_twin_earth">2.3.2. Questioning the scientific basis of Twin Earth</a></li>
-<li><a href="#__back_to_the_drawing_board_something_is_badly_wrong_with_chemical_theory">2.3.3. &#8220;Back to the drawing board! Something is badly wrong with chemical theory.&#8221;</a></li>
-<li><a href="#_the_problem_of_the_omniscient_third_person_observer">2.3.4. The problem of the omniscient third person observer</a></li>
 </ul>
 </li>
 <li><a href="#_underdetermination_of_concept_extension">2.4. Underdetermination of Concept Extension</a></li>
 <div class="sect2">
 <h3 id="_putnam_s_twin_earth_cases">2.1. Putnam&#8217;s Twin Earth cases</h3>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>Putnam&#8217;s Twin Earth thought experiment is often listed as one of the most influential thought experiment in the history of philosophy. It challenged the received view of meaning, which held that (1) the meaning that a speaker associates with a word is determined by individualistic facts about that speaker, and (2) the meaning of a word determines its extension. Putnam&#8217;s thought experiment shows that these two assumptions cannot be jointly satisfied. The following rendition is taken from a chapter called &#8220;Experimental Methods and Conceptual Confusion&#8221; from Phil Hutchinson&#8217;s book &#8220;Shame and Philosophy&#8221;:</p>
+<p>Putnam&#8217;s Twin Earth thought experiment is often cited as one of the most influential thought experiment in the history of philosophy. It challenged the received view of meaning, which held that (1) the meaning that a speaker associates with a word is determined by individualistic facts about that speaker, and (2) the meaning of a word determines its extension. Putnam&#8217;s thought experiment shows that these two assumptions cannot be jointly satisfied. The following rendition is taken from a chapter called &#8220;Experimental Methods and Conceptual Confusion&#8221; from Phil Hutchinson&#8217;s book &#8220;Shame and Philosophy&#8221;:</p>
 </div>
 <div class="quoteblock">
 <blockquote>
 <p>Putnam crafts this story to make explicit that we intuitively judge Oscar and Oscar<sub>2</sub> to have different thought contents. Remember that the received view of meaning held that (1) the meaning that a speaker associates with a word is determined by individualistic facts about that speaker, and (2) the meaning of a word determines its extension.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>As Putnam holds the second assumption to be very sensible, he follows that individualistic facts alone cannot determine meaning. The difference in thought contents can only be explained with additional reference to the extension of the natural kind&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;i.&thinsp;e. H<sub>2</sub>O in Oscar&#8217;s case, and XYZ in Oscar<sub>2</sub>'s case: &#8220;Cut the pie any way you like&#8221;, he concluded famously, &#8220;`meanings' just ain&#8217;t in the head!&#8221; (<a href="#Putnam1975">Putnam&#44; 1975&#44; p.&#160;144</a>)</p>
+<p>As Putnam holds the second assumption to be warranted, he follows that individualistic facts alone cannot determine meaning. The difference in thought contents can only be explained with additional reference to the extension of the natural kind&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;i.&thinsp;e. H<sub>2</sub>O in Oscar&#8217;s case, and XYZ in Oscar<sub>2</sub>'s case: &#8220;Cut the pie any way you like&#8221;, he concluded famously, &#8220;`meanings' just ain&#8217;t in the head!&#8221; (<a href="#Putnam1975">Putnam&#44; 1975&#44; p.&#160;144</a>)</p>
 </div>
 </div>
 <div class="sect2">
 <h3 id="_are_we_dealing_with_an_intuition">2.2. Are we dealing with an intuition?</h3>
 <div class="paragraph">
+<p>Instead of deriving his conclusion from some background theory, Putnam cites his intuition as counterevidence against the received view of meaning. He then proposes a different theory, which can account for the intuition.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
 <p>In the opening sentence of the section, where Putnam tells the Twin Earth story, he announces that his claim &#8220;will now be shown with the aid of a little science fiction.&#8221; (<a href="#Putnam1975">Putnam&#44; 1975&#44; p.&#160;139</a>) Instead of first telling the story and then giving us his intuition on it, he weaves the intuition cleverly into the narrative. The important passage is the following:</p>
 </div>
 <div class="quoteblock">
 <div class="paragraph">
 <p>To make Putnam&#8217;s intuition explicit: <em>When uttered on planet Earth, the word &#8216;water&#8217; refers to H<sub>2</sub>O, but when uttered on Twin Earth it refers to XYZ.</em></p>
 </div>
-<div class="paragraph">
-<p>This judgment clearly plays the role of an intuition. It is evidently not derived from some background theory, because Putnam uses this result to argue against the received views of meaning and proposes a different theory, which can account for the intuition.</p>
-</div>
 </div>
 <div class="sect2">
 <h3 id="_the_debate_that_followed">2.3. The debate that followed</h3>
 </blockquote>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>A lot of philosophers shared that feeling and quickly went on to draw out the conclusions that followed from Putnam&#8217;s results, without paying attention to the fact that the intuition is not unanimously accepted. In his critique of the method of reflective equilibrium, (<a href="#Cummins1998">Cummins&#44; 1998</a>) criticizes the way philosophers reacted to the Twin Earth results:</p>
+<p>A lot of philosophers shared that feeling and quickly went on to draw out the conclusions that followed from Putnam&#8217;s results, without paying attention to the fact that the intuition is not unanimously accepted. In his critique of the method of reflective equilibrium, Robert Cummins criticizes the way philosophers reacted to the Twin Earth results:</p>
 </div>
 <div class="quoteblock">
 <blockquote>
 <p>Cummins only cites nonphilosophers as not sharing the Putnam intuition, but professional philosophers were divided on this issue just as well. (<a href="#Barnes1982">Barnes&#44; 1982</a>) frames these diverging intuitions in terms of a disagreement between descriptivists and realists. Descriptivists hold the orthodox view that &#8220;the extension of a kind term is fixed by a verbal specification of a set of manifest properties&#8221; (<a href="#Barnes1982">Barnes&#44; 1982</a>), in other words: what a term means is fixed by its definition alone. This would be the view of John Searle [cite:Searle??], Hugh Mellor (<a href="#Mellor1977">Mellor&#44; 1977</a>) or Timothy Crane (<a href="#Crane1991">Crane&#44; 1991</a>). Realists on the other hand claim that when a term is first applied to a particular thing or instance, it &#8216;baptizes&#8217; (or &#8216;christens&#8217; or &#8216;dubs&#8217;) that thing or instance. This theory is also called the causal theory of reference, because the term finds its way into the linguistic community through a kind of dissemination, which is in any case a causal process. Putnam is of course a proponent of this view, but also Kripke and Paul Boghossian are on this side of the intuitive divide.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>In his discussion of the debate Barnes pits Putnam&#8217;s realist intuition against Mellor&#8217;s descriptivist intuition, when he says:</p>
+<p>In his discussion of the debate, Barnes pits Putnam&#8217;s realist intuition against Mellor&#8217;s descriptivist intuition:</p>
 </div>
 <div class="quoteblock">
 <blockquote>
 </blockquote>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>Barnes goes on to draw a wide-reaching metaphilosophical conclusion based on the form of that debate, which we will discuss later. Before we do that, I want to cite two further reactions to the Putnam intuition, which cannot be subsumed under the dichotomy that Barnes created. Both of these two reactions offer not a competing intuition, but rather take a step back and cast into doubt (1) the scientific basis of the Twin Earth scenario, and (2) the interpretational stance we adopt, when judging that scenario. Let us consider both in turn.</p>
+<p>Barnes goes on to draw a wide-reaching metaphilosophical conclusion based on the form of that debate, which we will discuss later. Before we do that, I want to cite two further reactions to the Putnam intuition, which can not be subsumed under the dichotomy that Barnes created. Both of these two reactions don&#8217;t offer a competing intuition, but rather take a step back and cast into doubt (1) the scientific basis of the Twin Earth scenario, and (2) the interpretational stance we adopt when judging that scenario. Let us consider both in turn.</p>
 </div>
 </div>
 <div class="sect3">
 <h4 id="_questioning_the_scientific_basis_of_twin_earth">2.3.2. Questioning the scientific basis of Twin Earth</h4>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>Putnam describes Twin Earth as a place which &#8220;apart from the differences we shall specify in our science-fiction examples &#8230; is <em>exactly</em> like Earth.&#8221; (<a href="#Putnam1975">Putnam&#44; 1975&#44; p.&#160;139</a>) This difference is that the liquid called water is composed of XYZ, a substance which, as Putnam stresses, &#8220;is indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures and pressures&#8221; (140).<span class="footnote">[<a id="_footnoteref_1" class="footnote" href="#_footnote_1" title="View footnote.">1</a>]</span> This stipulation is where Christopher Grisdale&#8217;s objection comes into play. As he points out, our chemistry tells us that there is no possible world which is (1) exactly like ours but where at the same time (2) watery stuff is not H<sub>2</sub>O. This is because water&#8217;s microstructure determines its macrostructure. As (<a href="#Thagard2012">Thagard&#44; 2012</a>) summarizes Grisdale&#8217;s work:</p>
+<p>Trying to save his concept of incommensurability in the face of rigid designation (which would be able to fix a sample&#8217;s reference even across scientific revolutions), Kuhn offers his own interpretation of the Twin Earth story (<a href="#Kuhn1990">Kuhn&#44; 1990</a>).</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Putnam describes Twin Earth as a place which &#8220;apart from the differences we shall specify in our science-fiction examples &#8230; is <em>exactly</em> like Earth.&#8221; (<a href="#Putnam1975">Putnam&#44; 1975&#44; p.&#160;139</a>) Said difference is that the liquid called water is composed of a substance with a long complicated formula, abbreviated as XYZ. It is a substance which, as Putnam stresses, &#8220;is indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures and pressures&#8221; (<a href="#Putnam1975">Putnam&#44; 1975&#44; p.&#160;140</a>).<span class="footnote">[<a id="_footnoteref_1" class="footnote" href="#_footnote_1" title="View footnote.">1</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>But while Putnam describes the scientist who visits Twin Earth as judging the watery stuff there not to be &#8216;water&#8217;, Kuhn gives a different description of what would happen: The report that visitors send home about the stuff that lies in Twin Earth&#8217;s lakes &#8220;should not be about language but about chemistry&#8221;, he writes. &#8220;It must take some form like: &#8216;Back to the drawing board! Something is badly wrong with chemical theory.&#8217;&#8221; (<a href="#Kuhn1990">Kuhn&#44; 1990&#44; p.&#160;310</a>)</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>Now one might interpret Kuhn as simply offering another diverging intuition. After all, he gives us one more story of what the scientist &#8220;would say&#8221;. On this view, we would have three different intuitions corresponding to three things the scientist might say: &#8220;that stuff is not &#8216;water&#8217;&#8221; (Putnam et al.), &#8220;that stuff is &#8216;water&#8217;&#8221; (Mellor et al.), &#8220;something is badly wrong with chemical theory&#8221; (<a href="#Kuhn1990">Kuhn (1990)</a> et al.). However, even though the debate is indeed often framed in terms of asking what the scientist visiting Twin Earth would say, I think this way of putting the question is misleading. After all, Putnam wants to find out whether the extensions of the two linguistic communities' word &#8216;water&#8217; are overlapping or non-overlapping. It might very well be that the visiting scientist would react by saying: &#8220;We need to rewrite all of our chemistry&#8221;, but even then Putnam might <em>still</em> ask whether or not the estranged visitor would refer to the stuff on Twin Earth as &#8216;water&#8217;. The compatibility of the visitor&#8217;s reaction with this question shows that the third possible reaction isn&#8217;t the manifestation of a third competing intuition on the same question, but rather an artifact of posing the question in an imprecise manner. The better way to phrase the question, then, is to ask: If Oscar on Earth and Twin Oscar on Twin Earth utter (or think) the word &#8216;water&#8217;, do they mean the same thing? This is a question to which Kuhn doesn&#8217;t really give an answer. Therefore I think Kuhn ist best understood as questioning the scientific basis of the thought experiment:</p>
 </div>
 <div class="quoteblock">
 <blockquote>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>&#8220;even a slight change in the chemical constitution of water produces dramatic changes in its effects. If normal hydrogen is replaced by different isotopes, deuterium or tritium, the water molecule markedly changes its chemical properties. Life would be impossible if H<sub>2</sub>O were replaced by heavy water, D<sub>2</sub>O or T<sub>2</sub>O; and compounds made of elements different from hydrogen and oxygen would be even more different in their properties.&#8221;</p>
+<p>&#8220;The terms &#8216;XYZ&#8217; and &#8216;H<sub>2</sub>O&#8217; are drawn from modern chemical theory, and that theory is incompatible with the existence of a  substance with properties very nearly the same as water but described by an elaborate chemical formula. Such a substance would &#8230; demonstrate the presence of fundamental errors in the chemical theory that gives meanings to compound names like &#8216;H<sub>2</sub>O&#8217; and the unabbreviated form of &#8216;XYZ&#8217;.&#8221;&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;(<a href="#Kuhn">Kuhn</a>)</p>
 </div>
 </blockquote>
 </div>
-<div class="admonitionblock important">
-<table>
-<tr>
-<td class="icon">
-<i class="icon-important" title="Important"></i>
-</td>
-<td class="content">
-Reference to earlier chapter about inconceivability.
-</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-</div>
-</div>
-<div class="sect3">
-<h4 id="__back_to_the_drawing_board_something_is_badly_wrong_with_chemical_theory">2.3.3. &#8220;Back to the drawing board! Something is badly wrong with chemical theory.&#8221;</h4>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>This is also very reminding of the way Thomas Kuhn argues. Trying to save his concept of incommensurability in the face of rigid designation, which is supposed to fix a sample&#8217;s reference even across scientific revolutions, Kuhn offers his own interpretation of the Twin Earth story. While Putnam describes the scientist who visits Twin Earth as judging the watery stuff there not to be &#8216;water&#8217;, Kuhn gives a different description of what would happen. The report that visitors send home about the stuff that lies in Twin Earth&#8217;s lakes &#8220;should not be about language but about chemistry&#8221;, he writes. &#8220;It must take some form like: &#8216;Back to the drawing board! Something is badly wrong with chemical theory.&#8221;&#8217; (<a href="#Kuhn1990">Kuhn&#44; 1990&#44; p.&#160;310</a>)</p>
+<p>A recent, scientifically more comprehensive support for this position comes from Christopher Grisdale. He agin points out that our chemistry tells us that there is no possible world which is (1) exactly like ours but where at the same time (2) watery stuff is not H<sub>2</sub>O. This is because water&#8217;s microstructure significantly influences its macrostructure. As Paul Thagard summarizes Grisdale&#8217;s work:</p>
 </div>
+<div class="quoteblock">
+<blockquote>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>Now one might interpret Kuhn as simply offering another diverging intuition. After all, he gives us another story of what the scientist &#8220;would say&#8221;. On this view, we would have three different intuitions corresponding to three things the scientist might say: &#8220;that stuff is not &#8216;water&#8221;&#8217; (Putnam et al.), &#8220;that stuff is &#8216;water&#8221;&#8217; (Mellor et al.), &#8220;something is badly wrong with chemical theory&#8221; (<a href="#Kuhn1990">Kuhn (1990)</a> et al.). However, even though the debate is indeed often framed in terms of asking what the scientist visiting Twin Earth would say, I don&#8217;t think that this is the best way to put the question, and I think it is misleading. After all, Putnam isn&#8217;t really interested about what some visiting Earthling would <em>say</em>, he rather wants to find out whether the extensions of the two linguistic communities' word &#8216;water&#8217; are overlapping or non-overlapping. It might very well be that the visiting scientist would react by saying: &#8220;We need to rewrite all of our chemistry&#8221;, but even then Putnam might <em>still</em> ask whether or not the estranged visitor would refer to the stuff on Twin Earth as &#8216;water&#8217;. The compatibility of the visitor&#8217;s reaction with this question shows that the third possible reaction isn&#8217;t the manifestation of a third competing intuition on the same question, but rather an artifact of posing the question in an imprecise manner. The better way to phrase the question, then, is to ask: If Oscar on Earth and Twin Oscar on Twin Earth utter (or think) the word &#8216;water&#8217;, do they mean the same thing? This is a question to which Kuhn doesn&#8217;t really give an answer. Therefore I think his interpretation is best understood in terms of the Grisdale/Thagard reaction of saying that the stipulated world is not coherently possible for all we know, and that it is therefore illegitimate to ask that question in the first place.</p>
+<p>&#8220;even a slight change in the chemical constitution of water produces dramatic changes in its effects. If normal hydrogen is replaced by different isotopes, deuterium or tritium, the water molecule markedly changes its chemical properties. Life would be impossible if H<sub>2</sub>O were replaced by heavy water, D<sub>2</sub>O or T<sub>2</sub>O; and compounds made of elements different from hydrogen and oxygen would be even more different in their properties.&#8221;&#8201;&#8212;&#8201; (<a href="#Thagard2012">Thagard&#44; 2012</a>)</p>
 </div>
+</blockquote>
 </div>
-<div class="sect3">
-<h4 id="_the_problem_of_the_omniscient_third_person_observer">2.3.4. The problem of the omniscient third person observer</h4>
-<div class="paragraph">
-<p>There is one last position in the Twin Earth debate that I want to bring up. In a forthcoming paper (<a href="#Slezak2013">Slezak&#44; 2013</a>) questions our very act of evaluating the thought experimental scenario from the point of an omniscient third person observer. This, he thinks, leads to the conflation of belief and belief ascription.</p>
-</div>
-<div class="admonitionblock important">
+<div class="admonitionblock warning">
 <table>
 <tr>
 <td class="icon">
-<i class="icon-important" title="Important"></i>
+<i class="icon-warning" title="Warning"></i>
 </td>
 <td class="content">
-Chomsky&#8217;s reaction: we have no intuitions in these cases
+Reference to earlier chapter about inconceivability.
 </td>
 </tr>
 </table>
 </div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>As the stipulated world is not coherently possible for all we know, it is illegitimate to ask that question in the first place.</p>
+</div>
 </div>
 </div>
 <div class="sect2">
 <h3 id="_underdetermination_of_concept_extension">2.4. Underdetermination of Concept Extension</h3>
-<div class="admonitionblock important">
+<div class="admonitionblock warning">
 <table>
 <tr>
 <td class="icon">
-<i class="icon-important" title="Important"></i>
+<i class="icon-warning" title="Warning"></i>
 </td>
 <td class="content">
 say more about descriptivism, realism, theories of concepts; meaning determinism vs. meaning finitism (cf. de Saussure&#8217;s structuralism, St Augustine&#8217;s ostensive element)
 <div class="quoteblock">
 <blockquote>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>„‚Es ist als wären unsere Begriffe bedingt durch ein Gerüst von Tatsachen.'</p>
+<p>„‚Es ist als wären unsere Begriffe bedingt durch ein Gerüst von Tatsachen.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
 <p>Das hieße doch: Wenn du dir gewisse Tatsachen anders denkst, sie anders beschreibst, als sie sind, dann kannst du die Anwendung gewisser Begriffe dir nicht mehr vorstellen, weil die Regeln ihrer Anwendung kein Analogon unter den neuen Umständen haben.&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;Was ich sage, kommt also darauf hinaus: Ein Gesetz wird für Menschen gegeben, und ein Jurist mag wohl fähig sein, Konsequenzen für jeden Fall zu ziehen, der ihm gewöhnlich vorkommt, das Gesetz hat also offenbar seine Verwendung, einen Sinn. Trotzdem aber setzt seine Gültigkeit allerlei voraus; und wenn das Wesen, welches er zu richten hat, ganz vom gewöhnlichen Menschen abweicht, dann wird z. B. die Entscheidung, ob er eine Tat mit böser Absicht begangen hat, nicht etwa schwer, sondern (einfach) unmöglich werden.“&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;(<a href="#Cohnitz2005">Cohnitz&#44; 2005&#44; p.&#160;156</a>)</p>
 </blockquote>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>But even if we leave aside the empirical question of whether or not this observation is true for at least <em>most</em> of the influential thought experiments, simply pointing to the strong reaction cannot ground the epistemic value of our intuitions. After all, we have seen that intuitions can and do clash, and from analogy with perception we know that even in cases where our reactions systematically align, as in the case of optical illusions, they might even be misleading us.</p>
+<p>Parfit is probably right to notice that these cases arouse in most of us strong beliefs. But leaving aside that empirical matter, simply pointing to that strong reaction cannot ground the epistemic value of our intuitions. After all, we have seen that intuitions can and do clash, and from analogy with perception we know that even in cases where our reactions systematically align, as in the case of optical illusions, they might be misleading us.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>In a forthcoming paper, Peter Slezak takes up this point. Slezak cites Chomsky, who argues that our blind acceptance of seductive intuitions creates a deeply persuasive, but illegitimate, picture of the world. But simply brushing them off as unscientific is not enough, Slezak says, because &#8220;characterizing the error as a commitment to commonsense conceptions leaves its precise source and character obscure&#8221;. He acknowledges that the intuitions at the heart of mental externalism are not random, but &#8220;systematic, robust and widely shared&#8221;, and in this respect are &#8220;much like the intuitions that are the data for Chomsky&#8217;s generative grammars&#8221;. He compares the externalist intuitions with the ones arising in paradoxes, and suggests that an explanation of their faulty etiology &#8220;may defuse the intuition even if not curing us of it&#8221; (<a href="#Slezak2013">Slezak&#44; 2013&#44; p.&#160; 6</a>)</p>
+<p>In a forthcoming paper, Peter Slezak takes up this point. Slezak follows Chomsky, who argues that our blind acceptance of seductive intuitions creates a deeply persuasive, but illegitimate, picture of the world (<a href="#Chomsky2000">Chomsky&#44; 2000</a>). But simply brushing them off as unscientific is not enough, Slezak says, because &#8220;characterizing the error as a commitment to commonsense conceptions leaves its precise source and character obscure&#8221;. He acknowledges that the intuitions at the heart of mental externalism are not random, but &#8220;systematic, robust and widely shared&#8221;, and in this respect are &#8220;much like the intuitions that are the data for Chomsky&#8217;s generative grammars&#8221;. He compares the externalist intuitions with the ones arising in paradoxes, and suggests that an explanation of their faulty etiology &#8220;may defuse the intuition even if not curing us of it&#8221; (<a href="#Slezak2013">Slezak&#44; 2013&#44; p.&#160; 6</a>)</p>
 </div>
-<div class="admonitionblock important">
+<div class="admonitionblock tip">
 <table>
 <tr>
 <td class="icon">
-<i class="icon-important" title="Important"></i>
+<i class="icon-tip" title="Tip"></i>
 </td>
 <td class="content">
 should I bring in Slezak&#8217;s explanation at this point?
 </tr>
 </table>
 </div>
-<div class="admonitionblock important">
-<table>
-<tr>
-<td class="icon">
-<i class="icon-important" title="Important"></i>
-</td>
-<td class="content">
-&#8230; and Gendler: certain concepts don&#8217;t lend themselves to counterfactual evaluation
-</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-</div>
 <div class="paragraph">
 <p>Barnes gives just such an explanation. And so, as promised earlier, we will now discuss the metaphilosophical conclusion that Barnes drew from examining the Twin Earth debate.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="sect3">
 <h4 id="_barnes">2.4.2. Barnes</h4>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>Barnes described the Twin Earth debate as one, where each of the two camps involved proposed a theory of meaning and relied heavily upon examples of normal accepted usage, or modification of usage. He stresses that no camp can account for all the examples, and they each acknowledge that empirical shortcoming. When it comes to hypothetical situations, he says, &#8220;both sides are able to gloss them to their own satisfaction.&#8221; (<a href="#Barnes1982">Barnes&#44; 1982&#44; p.&#160;30</a>)</p>
+<p>Barnes describes the Twin Earth debate as one, where each of the two camps involved proposed a theory of meaning and relied heavily upon examples of normal accepted usage, or modification of usage. He stresses that no camp can account for all the examples, and they each acknowledge that empirical shortcoming. When it comes to hypothetical situations, he says, &#8220;both sides are able to gloss them to their own satisfaction.&#8221; (<a href="#Barnes1982">Barnes&#44; 1982&#44; p.&#160;30</a>)</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
 <p>Now even though Barnes doesn&#8217;t exactly explain how each of the clashing intuitions came to be, he gives an explanation of why it is possible (and maybe even expected) for them to clash in the first place. Barnes first describes the form of the debate: two camps citing their respective intuitions as support while at the same time acknowledging but failing to account for a number of counterexamples. In an inference to the best explanation, he then gives us the reason why &#8220;both sides are able to gloss [scenarios like Twin Earth] to their own satisfaction.&#8221; The reason is that the concepts themselves are underdetermined. What this means for actual usage is that</p>
 </blockquote>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>In a sense, this view is the radical succession of Quine&#8217;s above quoted critique of the method of cases. The problem with the method of cases, to repeat the gist of Quine&#8217;s view, is the assumption &#8220;that words have some logical force beyond what our past needs have invested them with&#8221;. While this remark is situated in the context of the personal identity debate, with examples arguably far removed from our everyday situations, Barnes takes this idea one step further:</p>
+<p>In a sense, this view is Quine&#8217;s position on the method of cases, thought to its radical conclusion. The problem with the method of cases, to repeat the gist of Quine&#8217;s view, is the assumption &#8220;that words have some logical force beyond what our past needs have invested them with&#8221;. While this remark is situated in the context of the personal identity debate, with examples arguably far removed from our everyday situations, Barnes takes this idea one step further:</p>
 </div>
 <div class="quoteblock">
 <blockquote>
 </blockquote>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>In the original paper from 1982 he presents all of this as if it would follow easily from the phenomenon of two clashing intuitions on the extension of a concept in one particular thought experiment. Apart from that, there is little argument in favor of a finitist semantics, or conversely against meaning determinism. But even though the argument there is a bit thin, the underlying idea of a language community making up, shaping and constantly reshaping the extension of our concepts seems to be so apparent as to be almost undeniable.</p>
+<p>In the original paper from 1982 Barnes presents his conclusions as if they followed easily from the phenomenon of two clashing intuitions in one thought experiment on the extension of &#8216;water&#8217;. Apart from that observation, he offers no substantive argument in favor of a finitist semantics, or conversely against meaning determinism. But regardless of this shortcoming in his original paper from 1982, the underlying idea of a language community making up, shaping and constantly reshaping the extension of our concepts seems to be so apparent as to be almost undeniable.</p>
 </div>
-<div class="admonitionblock important">
+<div class="admonitionblock warning">
 <table>
 <tr>
 <td class="icon">
-<i class="icon-important" title="Important"></i>
+<i class="icon-warning" title="Warning"></i>
 </td>
 <td class="content">
 give arguments for intuitions being manifestation of conceptual competence
 </table>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>Barnes would later go on to develop a program called Sociological Study of Knowledge  (SSK) together with David Bloor and John Henry. In their programmatic book &#8220;Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis&#8221; (<a href="#SSK1996">Barnes&#44; Bloor &#38; Henry&#44; 1996</a>) the authors further develop the meaning finitist view and summarize the position in five main theses:</p>
+<p>Barnes would later go on to develop a program called Sociological Study of Knowledge  (SSK) together with David Bloor and John Henry. In their programmatic book &#8220;Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis&#8221; (<a href="#SSK1996">Barnes&#44; Bloor &#38; Henry&#44; 1996</a>) the authors further develop the meaning finitist view and summarize their position in five main theses:</p>
 </div>
 <div class="olist arabic">
 <ol class="arabic">
 </ol>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>I cannot here delve into the merits and problems of meaning finitism. For discussions of its benefits see (<a href="#SSK1996">Barnes&#44; Bloor &#38; Henry&#44; 1996&#44; p.&#160;ch3</a>; <a href="#Bloor1997">Bloor&#44; 1997</a>; <a href="#Barnes1992">Barnes&#44; 1992</a>) For a discussion of its problems I refer the reader to TODO.</p>
+<p>I cannot here delve into the merits and problems of meaning finitism. For discussions of its benefits see (<a href="#SSK1996">Barnes&#44; Bloor &#38; Henry&#44; 1996&#44; p.&#160;ch3</a>; <a href="#Bloor1997">Bloor&#44; 1997</a>; <a href="#Barnes1992">Barnes&#44; 1992</a>) For a discussion of its problems I refer the reader to ##.</p>
 </div>
-<div class="admonitionblock important">
+<div class="admonitionblock warning">
 <table>
 <tr>
 <td class="icon">
-<i class="icon-important" title="Important"></i>
+<i class="icon-warning" title="Warning"></i>
 </td>
 <td class="content">
-point out the similarities to de Saussure&#8217;s structuralism and his chapter in the <em>Cours de linguistique générale</em>
+add references to counter-position
 </td>
 </tr>
 </table>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>We have now arrived at a point where the reader is hopefully sympathetic to the plausibility of the meaning finitist view of concept extension. I will now conclude this section by drawing out the consequences this position&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;if true&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;has for the method of cases and for the deliverances of intuition.</p>
+<p>&#8203;</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>We have now arrived at a point where the reader is hopefully at least sympathetic to the plausibility of the meaning finitist view of concept extension. I will conclude this section by drawing out the consequences this position&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;if true&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;has for the method of cases and for the deliverances of intuition.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>As I see it, the implications are threefold. First of all, the status of the method of cases as an objective philosophical method gets called into question once again, and very radically so. Because concepts on this view are inherently open-ended and their future application is &#8220;always a matter of contingent judgment in every particular case&#8221; (<a href="#Barnes1982">Barnes&#44; 1982&#44; p.&#160;33</a>), the faculty of intuition loses its privileged epistemic status. My intuitive judgment of a particular situation should then be understood as a manifestation of how I personally <em>wish</em> the concept to be extended; it simply reflects my individual interests. A concept&#8217;s meaning is however fixed only through its acceptance and coming in use by a linguistic community, and is thus a social category. It follows that my personal intuition matters only insofar as it is shared by a larger proportion of my linguistic community. This is because, as Kusch already pointed out, shared interests are much more powerful determinants of conceptual judgments, &#8220;because they enter in many more acts of judgements and because they lead to collective actions.&#8221; (<a href="#Kusch2005">Kusch&#44; 2005&#44; p.&#160;206</a>)</p>
+<p>As I see it, the implications are threefold. First of all, the status of the method of cases as an objective philosophical method is called into question once again, and very radically so. Because concepts on this view are inherently open-ended and their future application is &#8220;always a matter of contingent judgment in every particular case&#8221; (<a href="#Barnes1982">Barnes&#44; 1982&#44; p.&#160;33</a>), the faculty of intuition loses its privileged epistemic status. My intuitive judgment of a particular situation should then be understood as a manifestation of how I personally <em>wish</em> the concept to be extended; it simply reflects my individual interests. A concept&#8217;s meaning is however fixed only through its acceptance and coming to use by a linguistic community, and is thus a social category. My personal intuition matters only insofar as it is shared by a larger proportion of my linguistic community. This is because, as Kusch already pointed out, shared interests are much more powerful determinants of conceptual judgments, &#8220;because they enter in many more acts of judgements and because they lead to collective actions.&#8221; (<a href="#Kusch2005">Kusch&#44; 2005&#44; p.&#160;206</a>)</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
 <p>Second, the contingency of concept application also implies that diverging intuitions can be explained in psychological and sociological terms. My judgment over a matter of concept application reflects both facts about my personal psychology and my individual interests. Insofar, as the relevant part of my psychology or of my interests is widely (or even universally) shared, my judgment will be more likely to fall in line with other people&#8217;s judgments.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>Third and somewhat derivatively, it shows philosophers' widespread but latent commitment to meaning determinism (maybe also to classic theory of concept)&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;As (<a href="#Kusch2005">Kusch&#44; 2005&#44; p.&#160;201</a>) observes: &#8220;Most of mainstream philosophy of language falls within the [&#8230;] &#8216;meaning-determinist&#8217; camp.&#8221;&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;I suspect that the vast majority of philosophers from other sub-disciplines implicitly shares this view.</p>
+<p>Third and somewhat derivatively, it shows philosophers' widespread but latent commitment to meaning determinism (maybe also to classic theory of concept). As (<a href="#Kusch2005">Kusch&#44; 2005&#44; p.&#160;201</a>) observes: &#8220;Most of mainstream philosophy of language falls within the [&#8230;] &#8216;meaning-determinist&#8217; camp.&#8221;&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;I suspect that the vast majority of philosophers from other sub-disciplines quietly shares this view too.</p>
 </div>
 </div>
 <div class="sect3">
 <p>In a recently published book called &#8220;When is True Belief Knowledge?&#8221; (<a href="#Foley2012">Foley&#44; 2012</a>), Richard Foley suggests a new approach to the analysis of knowledge. As I want to show briefly, this approach fits perfectly into the meanining finitist view outlined above.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>Traditional proposals for the analysis of knowledge all assume that what needs to be added to justified true belief is something related to, but distinct from true belief. Some traditions seek it in a special kind of justification (nondefective, indefeasible), others try to qualify the process and faculties that produce or sustain a belief (reliably generated, truth tracking, product of properly functioning cognitive faculties). Foley suggests that what is really needed in order to get from true belief to knowledge are <em>more true beliefs</em>. Not <em>any</em> true beliefs however, but those which are deemed important in the evaluative context. Restating the problem as one of important information allows Foley to zoom out of the problem space and better account for the full diversity of those instances we call knowledge: &#8220;Although there is a variety of such shortcomings, it can be tempting to fasten upon stories involving a particular kind of shortcoming and to try to build an entire theory of knowledge around them.&#8221; (<a href="#Foley2012">Foley&#44; 2012&#44; p.&#160;22</a>) By making the test of what&#8217;s important relative both to the situation and the values, interests and interests (??) of the community judging that situation, he can elegantly subsume all those competing analyses of knowledge under his account: &#8220;[J]ustification theoriests, reliability theorists, or proponents of other approaches &#8230; provide a directory to the sorts of gaps that are apt to strike observers as important.&#8221; (ibid., p.&#160;24)</p>
+<p>Traditional proposals for the analysis of knowledge all assume that what needs to be added to justified true belief is something related to, but distinct from true belief. Some traditions seek it in a special kind of justification (nondefective, indefeasible, &#8230;), others try to qualify the process and faculties that produce or sustain a belief (reliably generated, truth tracking, product of properly functioning cognitive faculties, &#8230;). Foley suggests that what is really needed in order to get from true belief to knowledge are <em>more true beliefs</em>. Not any true beliefs however, but those which are deemed important in the evaluative context. Restating the problem as one of important information allows Foley to zoom out of the problem space and better account for the full diversity of those instances we call knowledge: &#8220;Although there is a variety of such shortcomings, it can be tempting to fasten upon stories involving a particular kind of shortcoming and to try to build an entire theory of knowledge around them.&#8221; (<a href="#Foley2012">Foley&#44; 2012&#44; p.&#160;22</a>) By making the test of what&#8217;s important relative both to the situation and the values, interests and interests (??) of the community judging that situation, he can elegantly subsume all those competing analyses of knowledge under his account: &#8220;[J]ustification theoriests, reliability theorists, or proponents of other approaches &#8230; provide a directory to the sorts of gaps that are apt to strike observers as important.&#8221; (ibid., p.&#160;24)</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>This ties together neatly with the idea of contingent concept application. Remember that this view held that concepts are malleable rather than fixed, and each and every concept application amounts to a contingent judgment on the part of an actor in a language community. This corresponds to the contingency of important information in Foley&#8217;s account, which depends on the values and interests of an actor. We can see here that Foley&#8217;s account has a latent commitment to meaning finitism: Whether or not the concept of &#8216;knowledge&#8217; applies to a certain situation is not inherently contained in some fixed definition of knowledge, but depends on contingent facts about the actor.</p>
+<p>Foley&#8217;s view fits neatly with the idea of contingent concept application. Remember that this position holds that concepts are malleable rather than fixed, and each and every concept application amounts to a contingent judgment on the part of an actor in a language community. We can see here that Foley&#8217;s account has a latent commitment to meaning finitism: Whether or not the concept of &#8216;knowledge&#8217; applies to a certain situation is not inherently contained in some fixed definition of knowledge, but depends on contingent facts about the actor. The contingency of important information, depends on the values and interests of an actor, correspond to the contingent judgments about concept application, which are responsible for our malleable and ever-shifting terms.</p>
 </div>
 </div>
 <div class="sect4">
 <h5 id="_tamar_szabo_gendler">Tamar Szabo Gendler</h5>
-<div class="sect5">
-<h6 id="_conceptual_structure">Conceptual Structure</h6>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>Many critics of the method of cases have suggested that the more far-fetched a case is, the less likely it is to be informative. In a paper titled &#8220;Exceptional Persons: On the Limits of Imaginary Cases&#8221; Tamar Gendler argues that it is not the outlandishness of the scenarios, but the structure of the concept which the thought experiment is intended to explore (<a href="#Gendler1998">Gendler&#44; 1998</a>). Using two cases from Bernard Williams, she shows that the concepts of personhood and personal identity are not organized around necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather through the continued coincidence of enough of the factors that ordinarily allow us to persist over time. This has the consequence that we judge one and the same case depending on how it is framed, because we will assimilate the case to different general rule.</p>
+<p>Many critics of the method of cases have suggested that the more far-fetched a case is, the less likely it is to be informative. In a paper titled &#8220;Exceptional Persons: On the Limits of Imaginary Cases&#8221; (<a href="#Gendler1998">Gendler&#44; 1998</a>) Tamar Gendler argues that it is not the outlandishness of the scenarios, but the structure of the concept which the thought experiment is intended to explore. Using two cases from Bernard Williams, she shows that the concepts of personhood and personal identity are not organized around necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather through the continued coincidence of enough of the factors that ordinarily allow us to persist over time. This has the consequence that we judge one and the same case depending on how it is framed, because we will assimilate the case to different general rule.</p>
 </div>
-</div>
-<div class="sect5">
-<h6 id="_borrowed_lustre">Borrowed Lustre</h6>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>In a paper called &#8220;Personal Identity and Thought Experiments&#8221; Gendler expands on that idea and argues that our judgments concerning imaginary scenarios can go awry in certain situations. Many thought experiments make use of what John Stuart Mill called the <em>method of agreement</em>, which holds that &#8220;If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in comon, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon&#8221;. (<a href="#Mill1973">Mill&#44; 1973&#44; p.&#160;390</a>) Gendler argues that this principle, useful as it is for causal explanations, can mislead us in cases where we want to explain value judgments. To illustrate this, she gives examples of both an unproblematic as well as a problematic assessment:</p>
+<p>In a paper called &#8220;Personal Identity and Thought Experiments&#8221; (<a href="#Gendler2002">Gendler&#44; 2002</a>) Gendler expands on that idea and argues that our judgments concerning imaginary scenarios can go awry in certain situations. Many thought experiments make use of what John Stuart Mill called the <em>method of agreement</em>, which holds that &#8220;[i]f two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in comon, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon&#8221;. (<a href="#Mill1973">Mill&#44; 1973&#44; p.&#160;390</a>) Gendler argues that this principle, useful as it is for causal explanations, can mislead us in cases where we want to explain value judgments. To illustrate this, she gives examples of both an unproblematic as well as a problematic assessment:</p>
 </div>
 <div class="quoteblock">
 <blockquote>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>&#8220;Suppose that whenever I strike a match against the side of a matchbox and say &#8216;Let there be light&#8217;, the match bursts into flame; whenever I strike a match against the side of a matchbox and say nothing, the match bursts into flame; whenever I simply hold the match in the air and say &#8216;Let there be light&#8217;, the match remains unlit; and whenever I neither strike the match nor recite the incantation, the match remains unlit.&#8221; (<a href="#Gendler2002a">Gendler&#44; 2002&#44; p.&#160;42</a>)</p>
+<p>&#8220;Suppose that whenever I strike a match against the side of a matchbox and say &#8216;Let there be light&#8217;, the match bursts into flame; whenever I strike a match against the side of a matchbox and say nothing, the match bursts into flame; whenever I simply hold the match in the air and say &#8216;Let there be light&#8217;, the match remains unlit; and whenever I neither strike the match nor recite the incantation, the match remains unlit.&#8221; (<a href="#Gendler2002">Gendler&#44; 2002&#44; p.&#160;42</a>)</p>
 </div>
 </blockquote>
 </div>
 </table>
 
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>The chart reveals that whenever something is square-like, it is an appropriate target of geometrical veneration. This however does not mean that it is square-likeness rather than squareness that explains the appropriateness of geometrical veneration: what explains the veneration is rather the approximation to an ideal, i.&thinsp;e. the approximation to ideal squareness.</p>
+<p>The chart reveals that whenever something is square-like, it is an appropriate target of geometrical veneration, and whenever something is not square-like, it is not an appropriate target of geometrical veneration. It would be mistaken to think, however, that it is square-likeness rather than squareness that explains the appropriateness of geometrical veneration. What explains the veneration is rather the approximation to an ideal, i.&thinsp;e. (the approximation to) ideal squareness.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>Gendler calls this the problem of &#8216;borrowed lustre&#8217;, &#8220;where both pure and impure instances of a phenomenon are accorded the same assessment because impure instances are treated as relevantly similar to pure ones.&#8221; (<a href="#Gendler2002a">Gendler&#44; 2002&#44; p.&#160;47</a>)</p>
-</div>
+<p>Gendler calls this the problem of &#8216;borrowed lustre&#8217;, &#8220;where both pure and impure instances of a phenomenon are accorded the same assessment because impure instances are treated as relevantly similar to pure ones.&#8221; (<a href="#Gendler2002">Gendler&#44; 2002&#44; p.&#160;47</a>)</p>
 </div>
 </div>
 <div class="sect4">
 <h2 id="_references">3. References</h2>
 <div class="sectionbody">
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Barnes1982"></a>Barnes, B. (1982). On the extensions of concepts and the growth of knowledge. <em>The Sociological Review</em>, <em>30</em>(1), 23–44. doi:10.1111/j.1467-954X.1982.tb00652.x</p>
+<p><a id="Barnes1982"></a>Barnes, B. (1982). On the extensions of concepts and the growth of knowledge. <em>Sociol. Rev.</em>, <em>30</em>(1), 23–44. doi:10.1111/j.1467-954X.1982.tb00652.x</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
 <p><a id="Barnes1992"></a>Barnes, B. (1992). Realism, relativism and finitism. In D. Raven, L. Van Vucht Tijssen &#38; J. de Wolf (Eds.), <em>Cognitive Relativism and Social Science</em> (131–47).</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="SSK1996"></a>Barnes, B., Bloor, D., &#38; Henry, J. (1996). <em>Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis</em>. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press and Athlone Press.</p>
+<p><a id="SSK1996"></a>Barnes, B., Bloor, D., &#38; Henry, J. (1996). <em>Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis</em>. Chicago University Press and Athlone Press.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p><a id="Bloor1997"></a>Bloor, D. (1997). <em>Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions</em>. Routledge.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Bloor1997"></a>Bloor, D. (1997). <em>Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions</em>. London: Routledge.</p>
+<p><a id="BoghossianLondonTalk2013"></a>Boghossian, P. (2013). Philosophy without Intuitions - PhilEvents.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="BoghossianLondonTalk2013"></a>Boghossian, P. (2013). Talk on Herman Cappelen’s <em>Philosophy Without Intuition</em>. London. Retrieved from <a href="http://philevents.org/event/show/3603">http://philevents.org/event/show/3603</a></p>
+<p><a id="Chomsky2000"></a>Chomsky, N. (2000). <em>New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind</em>. Cambridge University Press.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Cohnitz2005"></a>Cohnitz, D. (2005). Ørsteds „Gedankenexperiment“: eine Kantianische Fundierung der Infinitesimalrechnung? Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte von ‚Gedankenexperiment’ und zur Mathematikgeschichte des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts, 1–34.</p>
+<p><a id="Cohnitz2005"></a>Cohnitz, D. (2005). <em>Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie</em> (Vol. 7163). Mentis.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Crane1991"></a>Crane, T. (1991). All The Difference in the World. <em>The Philosophical Quarterly</em>, <em>41</em>(162), 1–25. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219783">http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219783</a></p>
+<p><a id="Crane1991"></a>Crane, T. (1991). All The Difference in the World. <em>Philos. Q.</em>, <em>41</em>(162), 1–25.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Cummins1998"></a>Cummins, R. C. (1998). Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium. In M. DePaul &#38; W. Ramsey (Eds.), <em>Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry</em> (113–127). Lanham: Rowman &#38; Littlefield.</p>
+<p><a id="Cummins1998"></a>Cummins, R. C. (1998). Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium. In M. DePaul &#38; W. Ramsey (Eds.), <em>Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry</em> (113–127). Rowman &#38; Littlefield.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Foley2012"></a>Foley, R. (2012). <em>When Is True Belief Knowledge?</em>. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.</p>
+<p><a id="Foley2012"></a>Foley, R. (2012). <em>When Is True Belief Knowledge?</em>. Princeton University Press.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
 <p><a id="Gendler1998"></a>Gendler, T. S. (1998). Exceptional Persons: On the Limits of Imaginary Cases. <em>Journal of Consciousness Studies</em>, <em>5</em>(5-6), 592–610.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Gendler2002a"></a>Gendler, T. S. (2002). Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments. <em>The Philosophical Quarterly</em>, <em>52</em>(206), 34–54. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/3543008">http://www.jstor.org/stable/3543008</a></p>
+<p><a id="Gendler2002"></a>Gendler, T. S. (2002). Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments. <em>Philos. Q.</em>, <em>52</em>(206), 34–54.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p><a id="Hutchinson2008"></a>Hutchinson, P. (2008). <em>Shame and Philosophy: An Investigation in the Philosophy of Emotions and Ethics</em>. Palgrave Macmillan.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Hutchinson2008"></a>Hutchinson, P. (2008). Experimental Methods and Conceptual Confusion: Philosophy, Science, and What Emotions Really Are. In <em>Shame and Philosophy</em> (7–41). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.</p>
+<p><a id="Kuhn1990"></a>Kuhn, T. S. (1990). Dubbing and redubbing: The vulnerability of rigid designation. In C. Wade Savage (Ed.), <em>Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science</em> (Vol. 14, 298–318). University of Minnesota Press.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Kuhn1990"></a>Kuhn, T. S. (1990). Dubbing and redubbing: The vulnerability of rigid designation. In C. W. Savage (Ed.), <em>Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science</em> (Vol. 14, 298–318). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.</p>
+<p><a id="Kusch2005"></a>Kusch, M. (2005). <em>Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology</em>. Oxford University Press.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Kusch2005"></a>Kusch, M. (2005). <em>Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</p>
+<p><a id="Kuhn"></a>Kuhn</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Mellor1977"></a>Mellor, D. H. (1977). Natural Kinds. <em>The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science</em>, <em>28</em>, 299–312. doi:10.1007/s10441-008-9056-7</p>
+<p><a id="Mellor1977"></a>Mellor, D. H. (1977). Natural Kinds. <em>Br. J. Philos. Sci.</em>, <em>28</em>, 299–312. doi:10.1007/s10441-008-9056-7</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Mill1973"></a>Mill, J. S. (1973). A System of Logic, III viii 2. In J. M. Robson (Ed.), <em>Collected Works, Vol. VII</em>. University of Toronto Press.</p>
+<p><a id="Mill1973"></a>Mill, J. S. (1973). A System of Logic, III viii 2. In Jm. Robson (Ed.), <em>Collected Works, Vol. VII</em>. University of Toronto Press.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Parfit1986"></a>Parfit, D. (1986). <em>Reasons and Persons</em> (560). Oxford: Oxford University Press.</p>
+<p><a id="Parfit1986"></a>Parfit, D. (1986). <em>Reasons and Persons</em> (560). Oxford University Press.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Putnam1975"></a>Putnam, H. (1975). The Meaning of "Meaning". <em>Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science</em>, <em>7</em>, 131–193.</p>
+<p><a id="Putnam1975"></a>Putnam, H. (1975). The Meaning of “Meaning”. <em>Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science</em>, <em>7</em>, 131–193.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
 <p><a id="Slezak2013"></a>Slezak, P. (2013). <em>Content Externalism and Intuition</em>.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p><a id="Stalnaker1993"></a>Stalnaker, R. (1993). Twin Earth Revisited. <em>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</em>, <em>93</em>, 297–311. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545179">http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545179</a></p>
+<p><a id="Stalnaker1993"></a>Stalnaker, R. (1993). Twin Earth Revisited. <em>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</em>, <em>93</em>, 297–311.</p>
 </div>
 <div class="paragraph">
 <p><a id="Thagard2012"></a>Thagard, P. (2012). <em>The Cognitive Science of Science</em>. Mit Press.</p>
 </div>
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+Last updated 2013-10-19 15:38:41 CEST
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+}

src/6-intuition.ad

 
 Putnam crafts this story to make explicit that we intuitively judge Oscar and {Oscar2} to have different thought contents. Remember that the received view of meaning held that (1) the meaning that a speaker associates with a word is determined by individualistic facts about that speaker, and (2) the meaning of a word determines its extension.
 
-As Putnam holds the second assumption to be very sensible, he follows that individualistic facts alone cannot determine meaning. The difference in thought contents can only be explained with additional reference to the extension of the natural kind -- {ie} {H2O} in Oscar's case, and XYZ in {Oscar2}'s case: ``Cut the pie any way you like'', he concluded famously, ```meanings' just ain't in the head!'' [cite:Putnam1975,144]
+As Putnam holds the second assumption to be warranted, he follows that individualistic facts alone cannot determine meaning. The difference in thought contents can only be explained with additional reference to the extension of the natural kind -- {ie} {H2O} in Oscar's case, and XYZ in {Oscar2}'s case: ``Cut the pie any way you like'', he concluded famously, ```meanings' just ain't in the head!'' [cite:Putnam1975,144]
 
 
 ////
 
 == Are we dealing with an intuition?
 
+Instead of deriving his conclusion from some background theory, Putnam cites his intuition as counterevidence against the received view of meaning. He then proposes a different theory, which can account for the intuition.
+
 In the opening sentence of the section, where Putnam tells the Twin Earth story, he announces that his claim ``will now be shown with the aid of a little science fiction.'' [cite:Putnam1975,139] Instead of first telling the story and then giving us his intuition on it, he weaves the intuition cleverly into the narrative. The important passage is the following:
 
 > If a spaceship from Earth ever visits Twin Earth, then the supposition at first will be that ``water'' has the same meaning on Earth and on Twin Earth. This supposition will be corrected when it is discovered that ``water'' on Twin Earth is XYZ, and the Earthian spaceship will report somewhat as follows:
 
 To make Putnam's intuition explicit: _When uttered on planet Earth, the word `water' refers to {H2O}, but when uttered on Twin Earth it refers to XYZ._
 
-This judgment clearly plays the role of an intuition. It is evidently not derived from some background theory, because Putnam uses this result to argue against the received views of meaning and proposes a different theory, which can account for the intuition.
 
 
 
 == The debate that followed
 
-
-
-
 === Water or no water?
 
 The implications Putnam's thought experiment had were huge: it touched central tenants of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and also epistemology. It took the philosophical world by surprise. As Paul Boghossian described his reaction at a recent conference on intuition:
 
 > [T]hat I was tempted to make that verdict having read through the thought experiment came as a big surprise to me. I tried to resist it, but it kept forcing itself back upon me. It seemed like an unexpected and significant new realization. I despise it even to this day. It has made a lot of trouble. But it can't be helped. -- [cite:BoghossianLondonTalk2013]
 
-A lot of philosophers shared that feeling and quickly went on to draw out the conclusions that followed from Putnam's results, without paying attention to the fact that the intuition is not unanimously accepted. In his critique of the method of reflective equilibrium, [cite:Cummins1998] criticizes the way philosophers reacted to the Twin Earth results:
+A lot of philosophers shared that feeling and quickly went on to draw out the conclusions that followed from Putnam's results, without paying attention to the fact that the intuition is not unanimously accepted. In his critique of the method of reflective equilibrium, Robert Cummins criticizes the way philosophers reacted to the Twin Earth results:
 
 > ``It is commonplace for researchers in the Theory of Content to proceed as if the relevant intuitions were undisputed. Nor is the reason for this practice far to seek. The Putnamian take on these cases is widely enough shared to allow for a range of thriving intramural sports among believers. Those who do not share the intuition are simply not invited to the games. This kind of selection allows things to move forward, but it has its price. Since most nonphilosophers do not share the intuition, the resulting theories of content have little weight with them, and this is surely a drawback for a theory that is supposed to form an essential part of the foundations of cognitive psychology.'' [cite:Cummins1998,116]
 
 Cummins only cites nonphilosophers as not sharing the Putnam intuition, but professional philosophers were divided on this issue just as well. [cite:Barnes1982] frames these diverging intuitions in terms of a disagreement between descriptivists and realists. Descriptivists hold the orthodox view that ``the extension of a kind term is fixed by a verbal specification of a set of manifest properties'' [cite:Barnes1982], in other words: what a term means is fixed by its definition alone. This would be the view of John Searle [cite:Searle??], Hugh Mellor [cite:Mellor1977] or Timothy Crane [cite:Crane1991]. Realists on the other hand claim that when a term is first applied to a particular thing or instance, it `baptizes' (or `christens' or `dubs') that thing or instance. This theory is also called the causal theory of reference, because the term finds its way into the linguistic community through a kind of dissemination, which is in any case a causal process. Putnam is of course a proponent of this view, but also Kripke and Paul Boghossian are on this side of the intuitive divide.
 
-In his discussion of the debate Barnes pits Putnam's realist intuition against Mellor's descriptivist intuition, when he says:
+In his discussion of the debate, Barnes pits Putnam's realist intuition against Mellor's descriptivist intuition:
 
 > ``Putnam suggests that the new material should be set without the extension of `water' because it has a different microstructure'', while ``Mellor, in contrast, sees nothing objectionable in the descriptivist alternative of holding that water has been discovered to vary in its microstructure.'' [cite:Barnes1982]
 
-Barnes goes on to draw a wide-reaching metaphilosophical conclusion based on the form of that debate, which we will discuss later. Before we do that, I want to cite two further reactions to the Putnam intuition, which cannot be subsumed under the dichotomy that Barnes created. Both of these two reactions offer not a competing intuition, but rather take a step back and cast into doubt (1) the scientific basis of the Twin Earth scenario, and (2) the interpretational stance we adopt, when judging that scenario. Let us consider both in turn.
+Barnes goes on to draw a wide-reaching metaphilosophical conclusion based on the form of that debate, which we will discuss later. Before we do that, I want to cite two further reactions to the Putnam intuition, which can not be subsumed under the dichotomy that Barnes created. Both of these two reactions don't offer a competing intuition, but rather take a step back and cast into doubt (1) the scientific basis of the Twin Earth scenario, and (2) the interpretational stance we adopt when judging that scenario. Let us consider both in turn.
 
 
 === Questioning the scientific basis of Twin Earth
 
-Putnam describes Twin Earth as a place which ``apart from the differences we shall specify in our science-fiction examples ... is _exactly_ like Earth.'' [cite:Putnam1975,139] This difference is that the liquid called water is composed of XYZ, a substance which, as Putnam stresses, ``is indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures and pressures'' (140).footnote:[We shall put aside the point that Twin Oscar can't really be identical to Oscar, given the fact that the human body consists to a very large part of {H2O}. ([citenp:Stalnaker1993] and others TODO)] This stipulation is where Christopher Grisdale's objection comes into play. As he points out, our chemistry tells us that there is no possible world which is (1) exactly like ours but where at the same time (2) watery stuff is not {H2O}. This is because water's microstructure determines its macrostructure. As [cite:Thagard2012] summarizes Grisdale's work:
+Trying to save his concept of incommensurability in the face of rigid designation (which would be able to fix a sample's reference even across scientific revolutions), Kuhn offers his own interpretation of the Twin Earth story [cite:Kuhn1990].
 
-> ``even a slight change in the chemical constitution of water produces dramatic changes in its effects. If normal hydrogen is replaced by different isotopes, deuterium or tritium, the water molecule markedly changes its chemical properties. Life would be impossible if {H2O} were replaced by heavy water, D~2~O or T~2~O; and compounds made of elements different from hydrogen and oxygen would be even more different in their properties.''
+Putnam describes Twin Earth as a place which ``apart from the differences we shall specify in our science-fiction examples ... is _exactly_ like Earth.'' [cite:Putnam1975,139] Said difference is that the liquid called water is composed of a substance with a long complicated formula, abbreviated as XYZ. It is a substance which, as Putnam stresses, ``is indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures and pressures'' [cite:Putnam1975,140].footnote:[We shall put aside the point that Twin Oscar can't really be identical to Oscar, given the fact that the human body consists to a very large part of {H2O}. ([citenp:Stalnaker1993] and others TODO)] 
 
-IMPORTANT: Reference to earlier chapter about inconceivability.
+But while Putnam describes the scientist who visits Twin Earth as judging the watery stuff there not to be `water', Kuhn gives a different description of what would happen: The report that visitors send home about the stuff that lies in Twin Earth's lakes ``should not be about language but about chemistry'', he writes. ``It must take some form like: `Back to the drawing board! Something is badly wrong with chemical theory.'(())'' [cite:Kuhn1990,310]
 
+Now one might interpret Kuhn as simply offering another diverging intuition. After all, he gives us one more story of what the scientist ``would say''. On this view, we would have three different intuitions corresponding to three things the scientist might say: ``that stuff is not `water'(())'' (Putnam et al.), ``that stuff is `water'(())'' (Mellor et al.), ``something is badly wrong with chemical theory'' ([citenp:Kuhn1990] et al.). However, even though the debate is indeed often framed in terms of asking what the scientist visiting Twin Earth would say, I think this way of putting the question is misleading. After all, Putnam wants to find out whether the extensions of the two linguistic communities' word `water' are overlapping or non-overlapping. It might very well be that the visiting scientist would react by saying: ``We need to rewrite all of our chemistry'', but even then Putnam might _still_ ask whether or not the estranged visitor would refer to the stuff on Twin Earth as `water'. The compatibility of the visitor's reaction with this question shows that the third possible reaction isn't the manifestation of a third competing intuition on the same question, but rather an artifact of posing the question in an imprecise manner. The better way to phrase the question, then, is to ask: If Oscar on Earth and Twin Oscar on Twin Earth utter (or think) the word `water', do they mean the same thing? This is a question to which Kuhn doesn't really give an answer. Therefore I think Kuhn ist best understood as questioning the scientific basis of the thought experiment:
 
-=== ``Back to the drawing board! Something is badly wrong with chemical theory.''
+> ``The terms `XYZ' and `{H2O}' are drawn from modern chemical theory, and that theory is incompatible with the existence of a  substance with properties very nearly the same as water but described by an elaborate chemical formula. Such a substance would ... demonstrate the presence of fundamental errors in the chemical theory that gives meanings to compound names like `{H2O}' and the unabbreviated form of `XYZ'.'' -- [cite:Kuhn]
 
-This is also very reminding of the way Thomas Kuhn argues. Trying to save his concept of incommensurability in the face of rigid designation, which is supposed to fix a sample's reference even across scientific revolutions, Kuhn offers his own interpretation of the Twin Earth story. While Putnam describes the scientist who visits Twin Earth as judging the watery stuff there not to be `water', Kuhn gives a different description of what would happen. The report that visitors send home about the stuff that lies in Twin Earth's lakes ``should not be about language but about chemistry'', he writes. ``It must take some form like: `Back to the drawing board! Something is badly wrong with chemical theory.''' [cite:Kuhn1990,310]
+A recent, scientifically more comprehensive support for this position comes from Christopher Grisdale. He agin points out that our chemistry tells us that there is no possible world which is (1) exactly like ours but where at the same time (2) watery stuff is not {H2O}. This is because water's microstructure significantly influences its macrostructure. As Paul Thagard summarizes Grisdale's work:
 
-Now one might interpret Kuhn as simply offering another diverging intuition. After all, he gives us another story of what the scientist ``would say''. On this view, we would have three different intuitions corresponding to three things the scientist might say: ``that stuff is not `water''' (Putnam et al.), ``that stuff is `water''' (Mellor et al.), ``something is badly wrong with chemical theory'' ([citenp:Kuhn1990] et al.). However, even though the debate is indeed often framed in terms of asking what the scientist visiting Twin Earth would say, I don't think that this is the best way to put the question, and I think it is misleading. After all, Putnam isn't really interested about what some visiting Earthling would _say_, he rather wants to find out whether the extensions of the two linguistic communities' word `water' are overlapping or non-overlapping. It might very well be that the visiting scientist would react by saying: ``We need to rewrite all of our chemistry'', but even then Putnam might _still_ ask whether or not the estranged visitor would refer to the stuff on Twin Earth as `water'. The compatibility of the visitor's reaction with this question shows that the third possible reaction isn't the manifestation of a third competing intuition on the same question, but rather an artifact of posing the question in an imprecise manner. The better way to phrase the question, then, is to ask: If Oscar on Earth and Twin Oscar on Twin Earth utter (or think) the word `water', do they mean the same thing? This is a question to which Kuhn doesn't really give an answer. Therefore I think his interpretation is best understood in terms of the Grisdale/Thagard reaction of saying that the stipulated world is not coherently possible for all we know, and that it is therefore illegitimate to ask that question in the first place.
+> ``even a slight change in the chemical constitution of water produces dramatic changes in its effects. If normal hydrogen is replaced by different isotopes, deuterium or tritium, the water molecule markedly changes its chemical properties. Life would be impossible if {H2O} were replaced by heavy water, D~2~O or T~2~O; and compounds made of elements different from hydrogen and oxygen would be even more different in their properties.'' --  [cite:Thagard2012]
 
-=== The problem of the omniscient third person observer
+WARNING: Reference to earlier chapter about inconceivability.
 
-There is one last position in the Twin Earth debate that I want to bring up. In a forthcoming paper [cite:Slezak2013] questions our very act of evaluating the thought experimental scenario from the point of an omniscient third person observer. This, he thinks, leads to the conflation of belief and belief ascription. 
+As the stipulated world is not coherently possible for all we know, it is illegitimate to ask that question in the first place.
 
-IMPORTANT: Chomsky's reaction: we have no intuitions in these cases
 
 
 
 
 == Underdetermination of Concept Extension
 
-IMPORTANT: say more about descriptivism, realism, theories of concepts; meaning determinism vs. meaning finitism (cf. de Saussure's structuralism, St Augustine's ostensive element)
+WARNING: say more about descriptivism, realism, theories of concepts; meaning determinism vs. meaning finitism (cf. de Saussure's structuralism, St Augustine's ostensive element)
 
 How can we explain this clash of intuitions? Before we come to Barnes' answer, let us consider the historical roots in Wittgenstein and Quine.
 
 
 Wittgenstein suggests that the method of cases might enable us to stipulate situations, which are so far from our actual world, that our concepts don't fit these circumstances.
 
-> „‚Es ist als wären unsere Begriffe bedingt durch ein Gerüst von Tatsachen.'
+> {ldq-de}{lsq-de}Es ist als wären unsere Begriffe bedingt durch ein Gerüst von Tatsachen.{rsq-de}
 > 
-> Das hieße doch: Wenn du dir gewisse Tatsachen anders denkst, sie anders beschreibst, als sie sind, dann kannst du die Anwendung gewisser Begriffe dir nicht mehr vorstellen, weil die Regeln ihrer Anwendung kein Analogon unter den neuen Umständen haben. -- Was ich sage, kommt also darauf hinaus: Ein Gesetz wird für Menschen gegeben, und ein Jurist mag wohl fähig sein, Konsequenzen für jeden Fall zu ziehen, der ihm gewöhnlich vorkommt, das Gesetz hat also offenbar seine Verwendung, einen Sinn. Trotzdem aber setzt seine Gültigkeit allerlei voraus; und wenn das Wesen, welches er zu richten hat, ganz vom gewöhnlichen Menschen abweicht, dann wird z. B. die Entscheidung, ob er eine Tat mit böser Absicht begangen hat, nicht etwa schwer, sondern (einfach) unmöglich werden.“ -- (<<Cohnitz2005,Cohnitz&#44; 2005&#44; p.&#160;156>>)
+> Das hieße doch: Wenn du dir gewisse Tatsachen anders denkst, sie anders beschreibst, als sie sind, dann kannst du die Anwendung gewisser Begriffe dir nicht mehr vorstellen, weil die Regeln ihrer Anwendung kein Analogon unter den neuen Umständen haben. -- Was ich sage, kommt also darauf hinaus: Ein Gesetz wird für Menschen gegeben, und ein Jurist mag wohl fähig sein, Konsequenzen für jeden Fall zu ziehen, der ihm gewöhnlich vorkommt, das Gesetz hat also offenbar seine Verwendung, einen Sinn. Trotzdem aber setzt seine Gültigkeit allerlei voraus; und wenn das Wesen, welches er zu richten hat, ganz vom gewöhnlichen Menschen abweicht, dann wird z. B. die Entscheidung, ob er eine Tat mit böser Absicht begangen hat, nicht etwa schwer, sondern (einfach) unmöglich werden.{rdq-de} -- (<<Cohnitz2005,Cohnitz&#44; 2005&#44; p.&#160;156>>)
 
 // [cite:Cohnitz2005,156]
 
 
 > ``Quine's and Wittgenstein's criticism might be justified if, when considering such imagined cases, we had no reactions. But these cases arouse in most of us strong beliefs.'' [cite:Parfit1986,200]
 
-But even if we leave aside the empirical question of whether or not this observation is true for at least _most_ of the influential thought experiments, simply pointing to the strong reaction cannot ground the epistemic value of our intuitions. After all, we have seen that intuitions can and do clash, and from analogy with perception we know that even in cases where our reactions systematically align, as in the case of optical illusions, they might even be misleading us.
+Parfit is probably right to notice that these cases arouse in most of us strong beliefs. But leaving aside that empirical matter, simply pointing to that strong reaction cannot ground the epistemic value of our intuitions. After all, we have seen that intuitions can and do clash, and from analogy with perception we know that even in cases where our reactions systematically align, as in the case of optical illusions, they might be misleading us.
 
-In a forthcoming paper, Peter Slezak takes up this point. Slezak cites Chomsky, who argues that our blind acceptance of seductive intuitions creates a deeply persuasive, but illegitimate, picture of the world. But simply brushing them off as unscientific is not enough, Slezak says, because ``characterizing the error as a commitment to commonsense conceptions leaves its precise source and character obscure''. He acknowledges that the intuitions at the heart of mental externalism are not random, but ``systematic, robust and widely shared'', and in this respect are ``much like the intuitions that are the data for Chomsky's generative grammars''. He compares the externalist intuitions with the ones arising in paradoxes, and suggests that an explanation of their faulty etiology ``may defuse the intuition even if not curing us of it'' [cite:Slezak2013, 6]
+In a forthcoming paper, Peter Slezak takes up this point. Slezak follows Chomsky, who argues that our blind acceptance of seductive intuitions creates a deeply persuasive, but illegitimate, picture of the world [cite:Chomsky2000]. But simply brushing them off as unscientific is not enough, Slezak says, because ``characterizing the error as a commitment to commonsense conceptions leaves its precise source and character obscure''. He acknowledges that the intuitions at the heart of mental externalism are not random, but ``systematic, robust and widely shared'', and in this respect are ``much like the intuitions that are the data for Chomsky's generative grammars''. He compares the externalist intuitions with the ones arising in paradoxes, and suggests that an explanation of their faulty etiology ``may defuse the intuition even if not curing us of it'' [cite:Slezak2013, 6]
 
-IMPORTANT: should I bring in Slezak's explanation at this point?
-
-IMPORTANT: ... and Gendler: certain concepts don't lend themselves to counterfactual evaluation
+TIP: should I bring in Slezak's explanation at this point?
 
 Barnes gives just such an explanation. And so, as promised earlier, we will now discuss the metaphilosophical conclusion that Barnes drew from examining the Twin Earth debate.
 
 
 === Barnes
 
-Barnes described the Twin Earth debate as one, where each of the two camps involved proposed a theory of meaning and relied heavily upon examples of normal accepted usage, or modification of usage. He stresses that no camp can account for all the examples, and they each acknowledge that empirical shortcoming. When it comes to hypothetical situations, he says, ``both sides are able to gloss them to their own satisfaction.'' [cite:Barnes1982,30]
+Barnes describes the Twin Earth debate as one, where each of the two camps involved proposed a theory of meaning and relied heavily upon examples of normal accepted usage, or modification of usage. He stresses that no camp can account for all the examples, and they each acknowledge that empirical shortcoming. When it comes to hypothetical situations, he says, ``both sides are able to gloss them to their own satisfaction.'' [cite:Barnes1982,30]
 
 Now even though Barnes doesn't exactly explain how each of the clashing intuitions came to be, he gives an explanation of why it is possible (and maybe even expected) for them to clash in the first place. Barnes first describes the form of the debate: two camps citing their respective intuitions as support while at the same time acknowledging but failing to account for a number of counterexamples. In an inference to the best explanation, he then gives us the reason why ``both sides are able to gloss [scenarios like Twin Earth] to their own satisfaction.'' The reason is that the concepts themselves are underdetermined. What this means for actual usage is that
 
 > ``there is no utility in the notion of the extension of a concept ... Far from the meaning of a concept fixing its future proper use, we can now see that people judge how to develop the use of a concept, and that imputations of meaning can do no better than to follow on behind, rationalizing the effects of sequences of such judgments.'' [cite:Barnes1982,32]
 
-In a sense, this view is the radical succession of Quine's above quoted critique of the method of cases. The problem with the method of cases, to repeat the gist of Quine's view, is the assumption ``that words have some logical force beyond what our past needs have invested them with''. While this remark is situated in the context of the personal identity debate, with examples arguably far removed from our everyday situations, Barnes takes this idea one step further:
+In a sense, this view is Quine's position on the method of cases, thought to its radical conclusion. The problem with the method of cases, to repeat the gist of Quine's view, is the assumption ``that words have some logical force beyond what our past needs have invested them with''. While this remark is situated in the context of the personal identity debate, with examples arguably far removed from our everyday situations, Barnes takes this idea one step further:
 
 > Concept application is always a matter of contingent judgment in every particular case. No act of concept application is ever fixed or determined by previous acts of concept application or by alleged `meanings' intrinsic to concepts. [cite:Barnes1982,33]
 
-In the original paper from 1982 he presents all of this as if it would follow easily from the phenomenon of two clashing intuitions on the extension of a concept in one particular thought experiment. Apart from that, there is little argument in favor of a finitist semantics, or conversely against meaning determinism. But even though the argument there is a bit thin, the underlying idea of a language community making up, shaping and constantly reshaping the extension of our concepts seems to be so apparent as to be almost undeniable.
+In the original paper from 1982 Barnes presents his conclusions as if they followed easily from the phenomenon of two clashing intuitions in one thought experiment on the extension of `water'. Apart from that observation, he offers no substantive argument in favor of a finitist semantics, or conversely against meaning determinism. But regardless of this shortcoming in his original paper from 1982, the underlying idea of a language community making up, shaping and constantly reshaping the extension of our concepts seems to be so apparent as to be almost undeniable.
 
-IMPORTANT: give arguments for intuitions being manifestation of conceptual competence
+WARNING: give arguments for intuitions being manifestation of conceptual competence
 
-Barnes would later go on to develop a program called Sociological Study of Knowledge  (SSK) together with David Bloor and John Henry. In their programmatic book ``Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis'' [cite:SSK1996] the authors further develop the meaning finitist view and summarize the position in five main theses:
+Barnes would later go on to develop a program called Sociological Study of Knowledge  (SSK) together with David Bloor and John Henry. In their programmatic book ``Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis'' [cite:SSK1996] the authors further develop the meaning finitist view and summarize their position in five main theses:
 
 	. `the future applications of concepts are open-ended' (55)
 	. `no act of classification is ever indefeasibly correct' (56)
 	. `successive applications of a kind term are not independent' (57)
 	. `the applications of different kind terms are not independent of each other' (58f)
 
-I cannot here delve into the merits and problems of meaning finitism. For discussions of its benefits see [cite:SSK1996,ch3;Bloor1997;Barnes1992] For a discussion of its problems I refer the reader to TODO.
-
-IMPORTANT: point out the similarities to de Saussure's structuralism and his chapter in the _Cours de linguistique générale_
+I cannot here delve into the merits and problems of meaning finitism. For discussions of its benefits see [cite:SSK1996,ch3;Bloor1997;Barnes1992] For a discussion of its problems I refer the reader to ##.
 
+WARNING: add references to counter-position
 
+{leerzeile}
 
-We have now arrived at a point where the reader is hopefully sympathetic to the plausibility of the meaning finitist view of concept extension. I will now conclude this section by drawing out the consequences this position -- if true -- has for the method of cases and for the deliverances of intuition.
+We have now arrived at a point where the reader is hopefully at least sympathetic to the plausibility of the meaning finitist view of concept extension. I will conclude this section by drawing out the consequences this position -- if true -- has for the method of cases and for the deliverances of intuition.
 
-As I see it, the implications are threefold. First of all, the status of the method of cases as an objective philosophical method gets called into question once again, and very radically so. Because concepts on this view are inherently open-ended and their future application is ``always a matter of contingent judgment in every particular case'' [cite:Barnes1982,33], the faculty of intuition loses its privileged epistemic status. My intuitive judgment of a particular situation should then be understood as a manifestation of how I personally _wish_ the concept to be extended; it simply reflects my individual interests. A concept's meaning is however fixed only through its acceptance and coming in use by a linguistic community, and is thus a social category. It follows that my personal intuition matters only insofar as it is shared by a larger proportion of my linguistic community. This is because, as Kusch already pointed out, shared interests are much more powerful determinants of conceptual judgments, ``because they enter in many more acts of judgements and because they lead to collective actions.'' [cite:Kusch2005,206]
+As I see it, the implications are threefold. First of all, the status of the method of cases as an objective philosophical method is called into question once again, and very radically so. Because concepts on this view are inherently open-ended and their future application is ``always a matter of contingent judgment in every particular case'' [cite:Barnes1982,33], the faculty of intuition loses its privileged epistemic status. My intuitive judgment of a particular situation should then be understood as a manifestation of how I personally _wish_ the concept to be extended; it simply reflects my individual interests. A concept's meaning is however fixed only through its acceptance and coming to use by a linguistic community, and is thus a social category. My personal intuition matters only insofar as it is shared by a larger proportion of my linguistic community. This is because, as Kusch already pointed out, shared interests are much more powerful determinants of conceptual judgments, ``because they enter in many more acts of judgements and because they lead to collective actions.'' [cite:Kusch2005,206]
 
 Second, the contingency of concept application also implies that diverging intuitions can be explained in psychological and sociological terms. My judgment over a matter of concept application reflects both facts about my personal psychology and my individual interests. Insofar, as the relevant part of my psychology or of my interests is widely (or even universally) shared, my judgment will be more likely to fall in line with other people's judgments.
 
-Third and somewhat derivatively, it shows philosophers' widespread but latent commitment to meaning determinism (maybe also to classic theory of concept) -- As [cite:Kusch2005,201] observes: ``Most of mainstream philosophy of language falls within the [...] `meaning-determinist' camp.'' -- I suspect that the vast majority of philosophers from other sub-disciplines implicitly shares this view.
+Third and somewhat derivatively, it shows philosophers' widespread but latent commitment to meaning determinism (maybe also to classic theory of concept). As [cite:Kusch2005,201] observes: ``Most of mainstream philosophy of language falls within the [...] `meaning-determinist' camp.'' -- I suspect that the vast majority of philosophers from other sub-disciplines quietly shares this view too.
 
 
 
 
 In a recently published book called ``When is True Belief Knowledge?'' [cite:Foley2012], Richard Foley suggests a new approach to the analysis of knowledge. As I want to show briefly, this approach fits perfectly into the meanining finitist view outlined above.
 
-Traditional proposals for the analysis of knowledge all assume that what needs to be added to justified true belief is something related to, but distinct from true belief. Some traditions seek it in a special kind of justification (nondefective, indefeasible), others try to qualify the process and faculties that produce or sustain a belief (reliably generated, truth tracking, product of properly functioning cognitive faculties). Foley suggests that what is really needed in order to get from true belief to knowledge are _more true beliefs_. Not _any_ true beliefs however, but those which are deemed important in the evaluative context. Restating the problem as one of important information allows Foley to zoom out of the problem space and better account for the full diversity of those instances we call knowledge: ``Although there is a variety of such shortcomings, it can be tempting to fasten upon stories involving a particular kind of shortcoming and to try to build an entire theory of knowledge around them.'' [cite:Foley2012,22] By making the test of what's important relative both to the situation and the values, interests and interests (??) of the community judging that situation, he can elegantly subsume all those competing analyses of knowledge under his account: ``[J]ustification theoriests, reliability theorists, or proponents of other approaches ... provide a directory to the sorts of gaps that are apt to strike observers as important.'' (ibid., p.{nbsp}24)
+Traditional proposals for the analysis of knowledge all assume that what needs to be added to justified true belief is something related to, but distinct from true belief. Some traditions seek it in a special kind of justification (nondefective, indefeasible, ...), others try to qualify the process and faculties that produce or sustain a belief (reliably generated, truth tracking, product of properly functioning cognitive faculties, ...). Foley suggests that what is really needed in order to get from true belief to knowledge are _more true beliefs_. Not any true beliefs however, but those which are deemed important in the evaluative context. Restating the problem as one of important information allows Foley to zoom out of the problem space and better account for the full diversity of those instances we call knowledge: ``Although there is a variety of such shortcomings, it can be tempting to fasten upon stories involving a particular kind of shortcoming and to try to build an entire theory of knowledge around them.'' [cite:Foley2012,22] By making the test of what's important relative both to the situation and the values, interests and interests (??) of the community judging that situation, he can elegantly subsume all those competing analyses of knowledge under his account: ``[J]ustification theoriests, reliability theorists, or proponents of other approaches ... provide a directory to the sorts of gaps that are apt to strike observers as important.'' (ibid., p.{nbsp}24)
 
-This ties together neatly with the idea of contingent concept application. Remember that this view held that concepts are malleable rather than fixed, and each and every concept application amounts to a contingent judgment on the part of an actor in a language community. This corresponds to the contingency of important information in Foley's account, which depends on the values and interests of an actor. We can see here that Foley's account has a latent commitment to meaning finitism: Whether or not the concept of `knowledge' applies to a certain situation is not inherently contained in some fixed definition of knowledge, but depends on contingent facts about the actor.
+Foley's view fits neatly with the idea of contingent concept application. Remember that this position holds that concepts are malleable rather than fixed, and each and every concept application amounts to a contingent judgment on the part of an actor in a language community. We can see here that Foley's account has a latent commitment to meaning finitism: Whether or not the concept of `knowledge' applies to a certain situation is not inherently contained in some fixed definition of knowledge, but depends on contingent facts about the actor. The contingency of important information, depends on the values and interests of an actor, correspond to the contingent judgments about concept application, which are responsible for our malleable and ever-shifting terms.
 
 ==== Tamar Szabo Gendler
 
-===== Conceptual Structure
-
-Many critics of the method of cases have suggested that the more far-fetched a case is, the less likely it is to be informative. In a paper titled ``Exceptional Persons: On the Limits of Imaginary Cases'' Tamar Gendler argues that it is not the outlandishness of the scenarios, but the structure of the concept which the thought experiment is intended to explore [cite:Gendler1998]. Using two cases from Bernard Williams, she shows that the concepts of personhood and personal identity are not organized around necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather through the continued coincidence of enough of the factors that ordinarily allow us to persist over time. This has the consequence that we judge one and the same case depending on how it is framed, because we will assimilate the case to different general rule.
-
-===== Borrowed Lustre
+Many critics of the method of cases have suggested that the more far-fetched a case is, the less likely it is to be informative. In a paper titled ``Exceptional Persons: On the Limits of Imaginary Cases'' [cite:Gendler1998] Tamar Gendler argues that it is not the outlandishness of the scenarios, but the structure of the concept which the thought experiment is intended to explore. Using two cases from Bernard Williams, she shows that the concepts of personhood and personal identity are not organized around necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather through the continued coincidence of enough of the factors that ordinarily allow us to persist over time. This has the consequence that we judge one and the same case depending on how it is framed, because we will assimilate the case to different general rule.
 
-In a paper called ``Personal Identity and Thought Experiments'' Gendler expands on that idea and argues that our judgments concerning imaginary scenarios can go awry in certain situations. Many thought experiments make use of what John Stuart Mill called the _method of agreement_, which holds that ``If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in comon, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon''. [cite:Mill1973,390] Gendler argues that this principle, useful as it is for causal explanations, can mislead us in cases where we want to explain value judgments. To illustrate this, she gives examples of both an unproblematic as well as a problematic assessment:
+In a paper called ``Personal Identity and Thought Experiments'' [cite:Gendler2002] Gendler expands on that idea and argues that our judgments concerning imaginary scenarios can go awry in certain situations. Many thought experiments make use of what John Stuart Mill called the _method of agreement_, which holds that ``[i]f two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in comon, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon''. [cite:Mill1973,390] Gendler argues that this principle, useful as it is for causal explanations, can mislead us in cases where we want to explain value judgments. To illustrate this, she gives examples of both an unproblematic as well as a problematic assessment:
 
-> ``Suppose that whenever I strike a match against the side of a matchbox and say `Let there be light', the match bursts into flame; whenever I strike a match against the side of a matchbox and say nothing, the match bursts into flame; whenever I simply hold the match in the air and say `Let there be light', the match remains unlit; and whenever I neither strike the match nor recite the incantation, the match remains unlit.'' [cite:Gendler2002a,42]
+> ``Suppose that whenever I strike a match against the side of a matchbox and say `Let there be light', the match bursts into flame; whenever I strike a match against the side of a matchbox and say nothing, the match bursts into flame; whenever I simply hold the match in the air and say `Let there be light', the match remains unlit; and whenever I neither strike the match nor recite the incantation, the match remains unlit.'' [cite:Gendler2002,42]
 
 Which gives:
 
 |X is not a square	|X is an appropriate target of veneration	|X is not an appropriate target of veneration
 |====================================================================
 
-The chart reveals that whenever something is square-like, it is an appropriate target of geometrical veneration. This however does not mean that it is square-likeness rather than squareness that explains the appropriateness of geometrical veneration: what explains the veneration is rather the approximation to an ideal, {ie} the approximation to ideal squareness.
+The chart reveals that whenever something is square-like, it is an appropriate target of geometrical veneration, and whenever something is not square-like, it is not an appropriate target of geometrical veneration. It would be mistaken to think, however, that it is square-likeness rather than squareness that explains the appropriateness of geometrical veneration. What explains the veneration is rather the approximation to an ideal, {ie} (the approximation to) ideal squareness.
 
-Gendler calls this the problem of `borrowed lustre', ``where both pure and impure instances of a phenomenon are accorded the same assessment because impure instances are treated as relevantly similar to pure ones.'' [cite:Gendler2002a,47]
+Gendler calls this the problem of `borrowed lustre', ``where both pure and impure instances of a phenomenon are accorded the same assessment because impure instances are treated as relevantly similar to pure ones.'' [cite:Gendler2002,47]
 
 
 

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-year = {1998}
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-@article{Borsboom2002,
-abstract = {The literature on thought experiments has been mainly concerned with thought experiments that are directed at a theory, be it in a constructive or a destructive manner. This has led some philosophers to argue that all thought experiments can be formulated as arguments. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to a type of thought experiment that is not directed at a theory, but fulfills a specific function within a theory. Such thought experiments are referred to as functional thought experiments, and they are routinely used in applied statistics. An example is given from frequentist statistics, where a thought experiment is required to establish the probability space. It is concluded that (a) not all thought experiments can be formulated as arguments, and (b) the role of thought experiments is more generaland more important to scientific reasoning than has previously been recognized.},
-author = {Borsboom, Denny and Mellenbergh, Gideon J and Heerden, Jaap V A N},
-doi = {10.1023/A:1014840616403},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Borsboom, Mellenbergh, Heerden/Borsboom, Mellenbergh, Heerden - 2002 - Functional Thought Experiments.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Synthese},
-number = {3},
-pages = {379--387},
-title = {{Functional Thought Experiments}},
-volume = {130},
-year = {2002}
-}
-@incollection{Brown2004,
-address = {Malden, MA},
-annote = {        From Duplicate 1 (                   Why Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism                 - Brown, James Robert )
-And  Duplicate 3 (                   Why Thought Experiments Transcend Experience                 - Brown, James Robert )
-                
-        
-        
-      },
-author = {Brown, James Robert},
-booktitle = {Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science},
-editor = {Hitchcock, C.},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Brown/Brown - 2004 - Why Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism.pdf:pdf},
-pages = {23--43},
-publisher = {Blackwell},
-title = {{Why Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism}},
-year = {2004}
-}
-@book{Brown1991-BROTLO-8,
-abstract = {The book concludes with chapters on the nature of Einstein's work and on the interpretation of quantum mechanics which stand as a test of the author's central ...},
-author = {Brown, James Robert},
-publisher = {Routledge},
-title = {{The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences}},
-year = {1991}
-}
-@article{Brown2007,
-annote = {        From Duplicate 1 (                   Counter Thought Experiments                 - Brown, James Robert )
-                
-        From Duplicate 2 (                           Counter Thought Experiments                         - Brown, James Robert )
-                
-        
-        
-        
-        
-        From Duplicate 3 (                   Counter Thought Experiments                 - Brown, James Robert )
-                
-        
-        
-      },
-author = {Brown, James Robert},
-doi = {10.1017/S1358246107000185},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Brown/Brown - 2007 - Counter Thought Experiments.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {1358-2461},
-journal = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement},
-month = nov,
-number = {October 2007},
-pages = {155--177},
-title = {{Counter Thought Experiments}},
-url = {http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract\_S1358246107000185},
-volume = {61},
-year = {2007}
-}
-@article{Brown1986,
-author = {Brown, James Robert},
-doi = {10.1080/02698598608573279},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Brown/Brown - 1986 - Thought Experiments since the Scientific Revolution.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0269-8595},
-journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
-month = sep,
-number = {1},
-pages = {1--15},
-title = {{Thought Experiments since the Scientific Revolution}},
-url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02698598608573279},
-volume = {1},
-year = {1986}
-}
-@article{Brown1992,
-abstract = {Thought experiments provide us with scientific understanding and theoretical advances which are sometimes quite significant, yet they do this without new empirical input, and possibly without any empirical input at all. How is this possible? The challenge to empiricism is to give an account which is compatible with the traditional empiricist principle that all knowledge is based on sensory experience. Thought experiments present an enormous challenge to empiricist views of knowledge; so much so that some of us have (cheerfully) thrown in the towel and embraced good old fashioned platonism. I'll try to explain why one brand of empiricism, namely John Norton's argument view of thought experiments, won't work.},
-author = {Brown, James Robert},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Brown/Brown - 1992 - Why Empiricism Won't Work.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association},
-pages = {271--279},
-title = {{Why Empiricism Won't Work}},
-url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/192841 http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/192841},
-volume = {2},
-year = {1992}
-}
-@article{Brown2007a,
-abstract = {Most disciplines make use of thought experiments, but physics and philosophy lead the pack with heavy dependence upon them. Often this is for conceptual clarification, but occasionally they provide real theoretical advances. In spite of their importance, however, thought experirnents have received rather little attention as a topic in their own right until recently. The situation has improved in the past few years, but a mere generation ago the entire published literature on thought experiments could have been mastered in a long weekend. Now the subject is beginning to flourish. Given the relative newness of the field, it might be useful to have several examples at one’s finger tips, so a number of great ones will be described. Attention will also be drawn outside physics and philosophy. In mathematics there is something analogous to thought experiments -- visual reasoning and picture proofs. I will look briefly at this class of thought experiments and try using them to make a case for possibly settling the continuum hypothesis. After this, I will return to thought experiments in the sciences and propose an account of how they work. Finally, I will end with a sketch of a topic I am currently working on, a kind of progress report which, I hope, will be an inducement to others.},
-author = {Brown, James Robert},
-journal = {Croatian Journal of Philosophy},
-number = {1},
-pages = {3--27},
-title = {{Thought Experiments in Science, Philosophy, and Mathematics}},
-volume = {7},
-year = {2007}
-}
-@incollection{Brown1991,
-address = {Lanham},
-author = {Brown, James Robert},
-booktitle = {Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy},
-editor = {Horowitz, T. and Massey, G.},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Brown/Brown - 1991 - Thought Experiments A Platonic Account.pdf:pdf},
-pages = {119--128},
-publisher = {Rowman \& Littlefield},
-title = {{Thought Experiments: A Platonic Account}},
-url = {http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3190/1/7\_brown.pdf},
-year = {1991}
-}
-@incollection{SEP-TE,
-author = {Brown, James Robert and Fehige, Yiftach J. H.},
-booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
-edition = {Fall 2011},
-editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Brown, Fehige/Brown, Fehige - 2011 - Thought Experiments.pdf:pdf},
-publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
-title = {{Thought Experiments}},
-url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment/},
-year = {2011}
-}
-@article{Brueckner2003,
-abstract = {A. Horowitz has recently argued against semantic externalism. Inthis paper, I will show that his arguments are unsuccessful,owing to misconceptions regarding the nature of that semantic view.},
-author = {Brueckner, Anthony},
-doi = {10.1023/A:1021889421860},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Brueckner/Brueckner - 2003 - Contents Just Aren't in the Head.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Erkenntnis},
-number = {1},
-pages = {1--6},
-title = {{Contents Just Aren't in the Head}},
-volume = {58},
-year = {2003}
-}
-@article{Brueckner2001,
-author = {Brueckner, Anthony},
-doi = {10.1023/A:1013371602468},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Brueckner/Brueckner - 2001 - Defending Burge's Thought Experiment.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Erkenntnis},
-number = {3},
-pages = {387--391},
-title = {{Defending Burge's Thought Experiment}},
-volume = {55},
-year = {2001}
-}
-@article{Bunzl1996,
-abstract = {In this paper I argue that (at least many) philosophical thought experiments are unreliable. But I argue that this notion of unreliability has to be understood relative to the goal of thought experiments as knowledge producing. And relative to that goal many thought experiments in science are just as unreliable. But in fact thought experiments in science play a varied role and I will suggest that knowledge production is a goal only under quite limited circumstances. I defend the view that these circumstances can (sometimes) arise in philosophy as well.},
-author = {Bunzl, Martin},
-doi = {10.1007/BF00413701},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Bunzl/Bunzl - 1996 - The Logic of Thought Experiments.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0039-7857},
-journal = {Synthese},
-month = feb,
-number = {2},
-pages = {227--240},
-title = {{The Logic of Thought Experiments}},
-url = {http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/BF00413701},
-volume = {106},
-year = {1996}
-}
-@article{Burge2007,
-address = {Oxford},
-author = {Burge, Tyler},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Burge/Burge - 2007 - Individualism and the Mental.pdf:pdf},
-isbn = {0-19-921623-1},
-journal = {Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays, Vol. 2},
-number = {1},
-pages = {100--181},
-publisher = {Oxford University Press},
-title = {{Individualism and the Mental}},
-volume = {4},
-year = {2007}
-}
-@article{Byrd2007,
-abstract = {In his Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues from the possibility of cases of fission and/or fusion of persons that one must reject identity as what matters for personal survival. Instead Parfit concludes that what matters is “psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the right kind of cause,” or what he calls an R-relation. In this paper, I argue that, if one accepts Parfit’s conclusion, one must accept that R-relations are what matter for moral responsibility as well. Unfortunately, it seems that accepting that the R-relation is what matters for both survival and moral responsibility leads to a contradiction. My goal, however, is not merely to point out a problem in Parfit’s account. Instead, I believe that once we understand the basic intuitions which lead to this contradiction, it is clear that there is no fully satisfactory way to account for what matters with respect to survival and moral responsibility.},
-author = {Byrd, Jeremy Allen},
-doi = {10.1007/s11229-006-0004-2},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Byrd/Byrd - 2007 - The perfect murder A philosophical whodunit.pdf:pdf},
-isbn = {1122900600},
-issn = {0039-7857},
-journal = {Synthese},
-keywords = {Parfit,Personal identity,R relation,Responsibility,Survival},
-month = feb,
-number = {1},
-pages = {47--58},
-title = {{The perfect murder: A philosophical whodunit}},
-url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-006-0004-2},
-volume = {157},
-year = {2007}
-}
-@article{Chomsky1995,
-author = {Chomsky, Noam},
-doi = {10.1093/mind/104.413.1},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Chomsky/Chomsky - 1995 - Language and Nature.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0026-4423},
-journal = {Mind},
-number = {413},
-pages = {1--61},
-title = {{Language and Nature}},
-url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/mind/104.413.1},
-volume = {104},
-year = {1995}
-}
-@phdthesis{Cohen2008,
-author = {Cohen, S. Marc},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Cohen/Cohen - 2008 - On Putnam's Meaning and Reference.pdf:pdf},
-pages = {1--9},
-title = {{On Putnam's Meaning and Reference}},
-year = {2008}
-}
-@article{Cohen1999,
-author = {Cohen, Stewart},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Cohen/Cohen - 1999 - Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
-pages = {57--89},
-title = {{Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons}},
-volume = {13},
-year = {1999}
-}
-@article{Cohnitz2005,
-author = {Cohnitz, Daniel},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Cohnitz/Cohnitz - 2005 - \O rsteds „Gedankenexperiment“ eine Kantianische Fundierung der Infinitesimalrechnung Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte von ‚Gedankenexperiment’ und zur Mathematikgeschichte des fr\"{u}hen 19. Jahrhunderts.pdf:pdf},
-pages = {1--34},
-title = {{\O rsteds „Gedankenexperiment“: eine Kantianische Fundierung der Infinitesimalrechnung? Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte von ‚Gedankenexperiment’ und zur Mathematikgeschichte des fr\"{u}hen 19. Jahrhunderts}},
-year = {2005}
-}
-@book{Cohnitz2005,
-address = {Paderborn},
-annote = {
-        From Duplicate 1 ( 
-        
-        
-          Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie
-        
-        
-         - Cohnitz, Daniel; H\"{a}ggqvist, S\"{o}ren )
-And  Duplicate 2 ( 
-        
-        
-          Science (of) Fiction. Zur Zukunft des Gedankenexperiments in der Philosophie des Geistes
-        
-        
-         - Cohnitz, Daniel )
-And  Duplicate 4 ( 
-        
-        
-          Science (of) Fiction
-        
-        
-         - Cohnitz, Daniel )
-And  Duplicate 5 ( 
-        
-        
-          Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie
-        
-        
-         - Cohnitz, Daniel )
-And  Duplicate 6 ( 
-        
-        
-          Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie
-        
-        
-         - Cohnitz, Daniel; H\"{a}ggqvist, S\"{o}ren )
-And  Duplicate 7 ( 
-        
-        
-          Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie
-        
-        
-         - Cohnitz, Daniel; H\"{a}ggqvist, S\"{o}ren )
-
-        
-        
-
-        
-
-        
-
-      },
-author = {Cohnitz, Daniel},
-publisher = {Mentis},
-title = {{Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie}},
-volume = {7163},
-year = {2005}
-}
-@incollection{Cohnitz2003,
-abstract = {In their paper, $\backslash$textquoteleft\{\}When are thought experiments poor ones?$\backslash$textquoteright (Peijnenburg and Atkinson 2003), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are $\backslash$textquotedblleft\{\}poor$\backslash$textquotedblright ones with $\backslash$textquotedblleft\{\}disastrous consequences$\backslash$textquotedblright and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy and that instead of concocting more $\backslash$textquotedblleft\{\}recherch\'{e}$\backslash$textquotedblright thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical.},
-author = {Cohnitz, Daniel},
-booktitle = {The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-evaluation and Future Percpectives},
-editor = {Stadler, Fritz},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Cohnitz/Cohnitz - 2003 - Modal Skepticism Philosophical Thought Experiments and Modal Epistemology.pdf:pdf},
-pages = {281--296},
-publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
-title = {{Modal Skepticism: Philosophical Thought Experiments and Modal Epistemology}},
-volume = {10},
-year = {2003}
-}
-@article{Cohnitz2007,
-abstract = {In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor” ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy and that instead of concocting more “recherch\'{e}” thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical. In this comment I will argue that Peijnenburg’s and Atkinson’s view on thought experiments is based on a misleading characterization of both, the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a considerably different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments. For I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering that an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. We are already at the present time, in my opinion, in possession of methods which make any such conflict in principle unnecessary. What is now required is their resolute application. (Schlick, ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy’, 1930/1959, p. 54).},
-annote = {        From Duplicate 1 (                   Discussions: Poor Thought Experiments? A Comment on Peijnenburg and Atkinson                 - Cohnitz, Daniel )
-And  Duplicate 2 (                   Poor Thought Experiments? A Comment on Peijnenburg and Atkinson                 - Cohnitz, Daniel )
-                
-        
-        
-      },
-author = {Cohnitz, Daniel},
-doi = {10.1007/s10838-006-9027-0},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Cohnitz/Cohnitz - 2007 - Discussions Poor Thought Experiments A Comment on Peijnenburg and Atkinson.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0925-4560},
-journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
-keywords = {epr,knowledge argument,newton's bucket,thought experiments},
-month = jan,
-number = {2},
-pages = {373--392},
-title = {{Discussions: Poor Thought Experiments? A Comment on Peijnenburg and Atkinson}},
-url = {http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s10838-006-9027-0},
-volume = {37},
-year = {2007}
-}
-@article{Cohnitz2009,
-abstract = {As we write this, philosophers all over the world are in a state of temporary, collective self-scrutiny. Tey are poring over the results of the PhilPapers Survey, conducted by David Chalmers and David Bourgeta grand-scale survey of the professions views on 30 major philosophical issues, ranging from aesthetic value to zombies. More than 3000 people have responded, andmanymore are currently absorbing and analyzing the results.},
-author = {Cohnitz, Daniel and H\"{a}ggqvist, S\"{o}ren},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Cohnitz, H\"{a}ggqvist/Cohnitz, H\"{a}ggqvist - 2009 - The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {17365899},
-journal = {Studia Philosophica Estonica},
-number = {2},
-pages = {1--14},
-title = {{The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy}},
-url = {http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs-2.2.2/index.php/spe/article/view/84/53},
-volume = {2},
-year = {2009}
-}
-@article{Coleman2000,
-abstract = {Thought experiments are profitably compared to compasses. A compass is a simple but useful device for determining direction. Nevertheless, it systematically errs in the presence of magnets ...it becomes unreliable near the North Pole, in mine shafts, when vibrated, in the presence of metal ...experts will wish to use the compass as one element in a wider portfolio of navigational techniques. Analogously, thought experiments are simple but useful devices for determining the status of propositions. Sadly, they systematically err under certain conditions and so are best used with sensitivity to their foibles and limited scope (Sorensen, 1992, pp. 288–289).},
-author = {Coleman, Stephen R.},
-doi = {10.1023/A:1018655732675},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Coleman/Coleman - 2000 - Thought experiments and personal identity.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-number = {1},
-pages = {51--66},
-publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
-title = {{Thought experiments and personal identity}},
-volume = {98},
-year = {2000}
-}
-@article{Cooper2005,
-abstract = {This article seeks to explain how thought experiments work, and also the reasons why they can fail. It is divided into four sections. The first argues that thought experiments in philosophy and science should be treated together. The second examines existing accounts of thought experiments and shows why they are inadequate. The third proposes a better account of thought experiments. According to this account, a thought experimenter manipulates her worldview in accord with the “what if” questions posed by a thought experiment. When all necessary manipulations are carried through, the result is either a consistent model or a contradiction. If a consistent model is achieved, the thought experimenter can conclude that the scenario is possible; if a consistent model cannot be constructed, then the scenario is not possible. The fourth section of the article uses this account to shed light on the circumstances in which thought experiments fail.},
-author = {Cooper, Rachel},
-doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00372.x},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Cooper/Cooper - 2005 - Thought Experiments.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0026-1068},
-journal = {Metaphilosophy},
-keywords = {Thomas Kuhn,thought experiment},
-month = apr,
-number = {3},
-pages = {328--347},
-title = {{Thought Experiments}},
-url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00372.x},
-volume = {36},
-year = {2005}
-}
-@article{Crane1991,
-author = {Crane, Tim},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Crane/Crane - 1991 - All The Difference in the World.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
-number = {162},
-pages = {1--25},
-title = {{All The Difference in the World}},
-url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219783},
-volume = {41},
-year = {1991}
-}
-@incollection{Cummins1998,
-abstract = {As a procedure, reflective equilibrium (RE) is simply a familiar kind of standard scientific method with a new name. (For descriptions of reflective equilibrium, see Daniels 1979, 1980b, 1984; Goodman 1965; Rawls 1971.) A theory is constructed to account for a set of observations. Recalcitrant data may be rejected as noise or explained away as the effects of interference of some sort. Recalcitrant data that cannot be plausibly dismissed force emendations in theory. What counts as a plausible dismissal depends, among other things, on the going theory, as well as on background theory and on knowledge that may be relevant to under-standing the experimental design that is generating the observations, including knowledge of the apparatus and observation conditions. This sort of mutual adjustment between theory and data is a familiar feature of scientific practice. Whatever authority RE seems to have comes, I think, from a tacit or explicit recognition that it has the same form as this familiar sort of scientific inference. One way to see the rationale underlying this procedure in science is to focus on prediction. Think of prediction as a matter of projecting what is known onto uncharted territory. To do this, you need a vehicle—a theory—that captures some invariant or pattern in what is known so that you can project it onto the unknown. How convincing the projection is depends on two factors: (i) how sure one is of the observational base, and (ii) how sure one is that the theory gets the invariants right. The two factors are not independent, of course. One's confidence in the observational base will be affected by how persuasively the theory identifies and dismisses noise; one's confidence in the theory, on the other hand, will depend on one's confidence in the observations it takes seriously. Prediction is important as a test of theory precisely because verified predictions seem to show that the theory has correctly captured the general in the particular, that it has got the drift of the observational evidence in which our confidence is ultimately grounded..},
-address = {Lanham},
-author = {Cummins, Robert C.},
-booktitle = {Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry},
-editor = {DePaul, Michael and Ramsey, William},
-pages = {113--127},
-publisher = {Rowman \& Littlefield},
-title = {{Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium}},
-year = {1998}
-}
-@article{Davidson1987,
-author = {Davidson, Donald},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Davidson/Davidson - 1987 - Knowing One's Own Mind.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Proceedings and Addresses of the American \ldots},
-number = {3},
-pages = {441--458},
-title = {{Knowing One's Own Mind}},
-url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/3131782},
-volume = {60},
-year = {1987}
-}
-@article{Donnellan1993,
-author = {Donnellan, Keith S.},
-doi = {10.2307/2214120},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Donnellan/Donnellan - 1993 - There Is a Word for that Kind of Thing An Investigation of Two Thought Experiments.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {15208583},
-journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
-number = {Language and Logic},
-pages = {155--171},
-title = {{There Is a Word for that Kind of Thing: An Investigation of Two Thought Experiments}},
-url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214120},
-volume = {7},
-year = {1993}
-}
-@book{Dworkin1986,
-annote = {judge hercules: pp. 239-275
-        
-http://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/25/books/hercules-and-the-snail-darter.html?pagewanted=all
-        
-      },
-author = {Dworkin, Ronald},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Dworkin/Dworkin - 1986 - Law's Empire.pdf:pdf},
-isbn = {0674518365},
-keywords = {judge hercules},
-pages = {470},
-publisher = {Harvard University Press},
-title = {{Law's Empire}},
-year = {1986}
-}
-@article{Einstein1935a,
-author = {Einstein, A. and Podolsky, B. and Rosen, N.},
-doi = {10.1103/PhysRev.47.777},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen/Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen - 1935 - Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0031-899X},
-journal = {Physical Review},
-month = may,
-number = {10},
-pages = {777--780},
-title = {{Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?}},
-url = {http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRev.47.777},
-volume = {47},
-year = {1935}
-}
-@article{Fedyk2009,
-abstract = {What exactly is a philosophical intuition? And what makes such an intuition reliable, when it is reliable? This paper provides a terminological framework that is able answer to the first question, and then puts the framework to work developing an answer to the second question. More specifically, the paper argues that we can distinguish between two different "evidential roles" which intuitions can occupy: under certain conditions they can provide information about the representational structure of an intuitor's concept, and under different conditions, they can provide information about whether or not a property is instantiated. The paper describes two principles intended to capture the difference between the two sets of conditions---that is, the paper offers a principle that explains when an intuition will be a reliable source of evidence about the representation structure of an intuitor's concept, and another principle that explains when an intuition will be a reliable source of evidence about whether or not a property is instantiated. The paper concludes by briefly arguing that, insofar as philosophers are interested using intuitions to determine whether or not some philosophically interesting property is instantiated by some scenario (for instance, whether knowledge is instantiated in a Gettier-case), the reliability of the intuition in question does not depend on whether or not the intuition is widely shared.},
-author = {Fedyk, Mark},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Fedyk/Fedyk - 2009 - Philosophical Intuitions.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Studia Philosophica Estonica},
-keywords = {epistemology,intuitions,metaphilosophy,philosophical naturalism},
-number = {2},
-pages = {54--80},
-title = {{Philosophical Intuitions}},
-volume = {2},
-year = {2009}
-}
-@article{Fehige2011,
-author = {Fehige, Joerg H. Y.},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Fehige/Fehige - 2011 - Schwerpunkt Gedankenexperimentieren.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f\"{u}r Philosophie},
-number = {1},
-pages = {53--60},
-title = {{Schwerpunkt: Gedankenexperimentieren}},
-volume = {59},
-year = {2011}
-}
-@article{Focquaert2003,
-author = {Focquaert, Farah},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Focquaert/Focquaert - 2003 - Personal Identity and its Boundaries.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Philosophica},
-pages = {131--152},
-title = {{Personal Identity and its Boundaries}},
-volume = {72},
-year = {2003}
-}
-@book{Foley2012,
-abstract = {A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. In this provocative book, Richard Foley finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs--something important that she doesn't quite "get." This may seem a modest point but, as Foley shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information. Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.},
-address = {Princeton and Oxford},
-author = {Foley, Richard},
-isbn = {9780691154725},
-publisher = {Princeton University Press},
-title = {{When Is True Belief Knowledge?}},
-year = {2012}
-}
-@article{Friedman1998,
-author = {Friedman, Michael},
-doi = {10.1016/S0039-3681(97)00021-6},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Friedman/Friedman - 1998 - On the sociology of scientific knowledge and its philosophical agenda.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {00393681},
-journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A},
-month = jun,
-number = {2},
-pages = {239--271},
-title = {{On the sociology of scientific knowledge and its philosophical agenda}},
-url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0039368197000216},
-volume = {29},
-year = {1998}
-}
-@incollection{Frigg2010a,
-address = {Munich},
-author = {Frigg, Roman},
-booktitle = {Fictions and Models: New Essays},
-editor = {Woods, John},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Frigg/Frigg - 2010 - Fiction in Science.pdf:pdf},
-pages = {247--287},
-publisher = {Philosophia Verlag},
-title = {{Fiction in Science}},
-year = {2010}
-}
-@incollection{Frigg2010,
-abstract = {Most scientific models are not physical objects. But what sort of objects are they? What is truth in a model, and how do we learn about models? In this first part of this chapter I develop an answer to these questions based on the so-called pretense theory of literary fiction. In the second part I draw on the analogy between maps and models to develop an account of scientific representation and discuss in detail the Newtonian model of the planetary system to illustrate how the account works.},
-address = {Berlin, New York},
-author = {Frigg, Roman},
-booktitle = {Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science},
-doi = {10.1007/978-90-481-3851-7},
-editor = {Frigg, Roman and Hunter, Matthew},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Frigg/Frigg - 2010 - Fiction and Scientific Representation.pdf:pdf},
-isbn = {978-90-481-3850-0},
-pages = {97--138},
-publisher = {Springer},
-series = {Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
-title = {{Fiction and Scientific Representation}},
-url = {http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/978-90-481-3851-7},
-volume = {262},
-year = {2010}
-}
-@article{Frigg2009,
-abstract = {Most scientific models are not physical objects, and this raises important questions. What sort of entity aremodels, what is truth in amodel, and how do we learn about models? In this paper I argue that models share important aspects in common with literary fiction, and that therefore theories of fiction can be brought to bear on these questions. In particular, I argue that the pretence theory as developed byWalton (1990,Mimesis as make-believe: on the foundations of the representational arts. Harvard University Press, Cambridge/MA) has the resources to answer these questions. I introduce this account, outline the answers that it offers, and develop a general picture of scientific modelling based on it.},
-author = {Frigg, Roman},
-doi = {10.1007/s11229-009-9505-0},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Frigg/Frigg - 2009 - Models and fiction.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0039-7857},
-journal = {Synthese},
-keywords = {fiction,models,pretence,semantic view of theories,structuralist view of models,truth in fiction},
-month = mar,
-number = {2},
-pages = {251--268},
-title = {{Models and fiction}},
-url = {http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s11229-009-9505-0},
-volume = {172},
-year = {2009}
-}
-@article{Gendler2002a,
-abstract = {Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit’s ‘fission argument’ for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit’s argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what matters. I argue that Parfit’s conclusion can be blocked without denying that he has presented an imaginary case where prudential concern would be rational in the absence of identity. My analysis depends on the recognition that the features that explain or justify a relation may be distinct from the features that underpin it as necessary conditions},
-author = {Gendler, Tamar Szab\'{o}},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Gendler/Gendler - 2002 - Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
-number = {206},
-pages = {34--54},
-title = {{Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments}},
-url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3543008},
-volume = {52},
-year = {2002}
-}
-@article{Gendler1998,
-abstract = {It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him.},
-author = {Gendler, Tamar Szab\'{o}},
-journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
-number = {5-6},
-pages = {592--610},
-title = {{Exceptional Persons: On the Limits of Imaginary Cases}},
-volume = {5},
-year = {1998}
-}
-@article{Georgalis2003,
-author = {Georgalis, Nicholas},
-doi = {10.1023/A:1022078631600},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Georgalis/Georgalis - 2003 - Burge's Thought Experiment Still in Need of Defense.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Erkenntnis},
-pages = {267--273},
-title = {{Burge's Thought Experiment: Still in Need of Defense}},
-volume = {58},
-year = {2003}
-}
-@article{Georgalis1999,
-author = {Georgalis, Nicholas},
-doi = {10.1023/A:1017145322572},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Georgalis/Georgalis - 1999 - Rethinking Burge's Thought Experiment.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Synthese},
-pages = {145--164},
-title = {{Rethinking Burge's Thought Experiment}},
-volume = {118},
-year = {1999}
-}
-@article{Gettier1963-GETIJT-4,
-abstract = {Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.},
-annote = {        From Duplicate 1 (                   "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"                 - Gettier, Edmund )
-                
-        
-        
-      },
-author = {Gettier, Edmund L.},
-doi = {10.2307/3326922},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Gettier/Gettier - 1963 - Is Justified True Belief Knowledge.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {00032638},
-journal = {Analysis},
-month = jun,
-number = {6},
-pages = {121--123},
-title = {{"Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"}},
-url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326922},
-volume = {23},
-year = {1963}
-}
-@article{Godel1947,
-author = {G\"{o}del, Kurt},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/G\"{o}del/G\"{o}del - 1947 - What is Cantor's Continuum Problem.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {The American Mathematical Monthly},
-number = {9},
-pages = {515--525},
-title = {{What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?}},
-url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2304666},
-volume = {54},
-year = {1947}
-}
-@article{Haggqvist2009,
-annote = {        From Duplicate 1 (                           A Model for Thought Experiments                         - H\"{a}ggqvist, S\"{o}ren )
-And  Duplicate 2 (                           A Model for Thought Experiments                         - H\"{a}ggqvist, S\"{o}ren )
-                
-        
-        
-        From Duplicate 3 (                           A Model for Thought Experiments                         - H\"{a}ggqvist, S\"{o}ren )
-                
-        From Duplicate 2 (                           A Model for Thought Experiments                         - H\"{a}ggqvist, S\"{o}ren )
-                
-        
-        
-        
-        
-      },
-author = {H\"{a}ggqvist, S\"{o}ren},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/H\"{a}ggqvist/H\"{a}ggqvist - 2009 - A Model for Thought Experiments.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
-number = {1},
-pages = {55--76},
-title = {{A Model for Thought Experiments}},
-volume = {39},
-year = {2009}
-}
-@article{Haukioja2005,
-author = {Haukioja, Jussi},
-doi = {10.1080/0967255042000324326},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Haukioja/Haukioja - 2005 - A middle position between meaning finitism and meaning Platonism.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0967-2559},
-journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies},
-month = mar,
-number = {1},
-pages = {35--51},
-title = {{A middle position between meaning finitism and meaning Platonism}},
-url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0967255042000324326},
-volume = {13},
-year = {2005}
-}
-@article{Hood2012,
-abstract = {Philosophers use hypothetical duplication scenarios to explore intuitions about personal identity. Here we examined 5- to 6-year-olds' intuitions about the physical properties and memories of a live hamster that is apparently duplicated by a machine. In Study 1, children thought that more of the original's physical properties than episodic memories were present in the duplicate hamster. In Study 2, children thought that episodic memories of the hamster were less likely to duplicate than events captured by a digital camera. Studies 3 and 4 ruled out lower-level explanations of these effects. Study 5 showed that naming the original hamster further reduced the inferred duplication of memories in the second hamster. Taken together, these studies are consistent with the view that young children think that some mental properties are distinct from physical ones.},
-author = {Hood, Bruce and Gjersoe, Nathalia L and Bloom, Paul},
-doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2012.07.005},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Hood, Gjersoe, Bloom/Hood, Gjersoe, Bloom - 2012 - Do children think that duplicating the body also duplicates the mind.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {1873-7838},
-journal = {Cognition},
-keywords = {Child,Child Development,Child, Preschool,Concept Formation,Female,Humans,Intuition,Male,Mind-Body Relations, Metaphysical},
-month = dec,
-number = {3},
-pages = {466--74},
-pmid = {22902285},
-publisher = {Elsevier B.V.},
-title = {{Do children think that duplicating the body also duplicates the mind?}},
-url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22902285},
-volume = {125},
-year = {2012}
-}
-@article{Horowitz2001,
-abstract = {The purpose of the paper is to show that semantic externalism – the thesis that contents are not determined by ``individualistic'' features of mental states – is mistaken. Externalist thinking, it is argued, rests on two mistaken assumptions: the assumption that if there is an externalist way of describing a situation the situation exemplifies externalism, and the assumption that cases in which a difference in the environment of an intentional state entails a difference in the state's intentional object are cases in which environmental factors determine the state's content. Exposing these mistakes leads to see that the conditions that are required for the truth of externalism are inconsistent.},
-author = {Horowitz, Amir},
-doi = {10.1023/A:1010747032196},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Horowitz/Horowitz - 2001 - Contents Just Are In The Head.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Erkenntnis},
-number = {3},
-pages = {321--344},
-title = {{Contents Just Are In The Head}},
-volume = {54},
-year = {2001}
-}
-@article{Horowitz2005,
-author = {Horowitz, Amir},
-doi = {10.1007/s10670-005-1038-4},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Horowitz/Horowitz - 2005 - Externalism, the environment, and thought-tokens.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0165-0106},
-journal = {Erkenntnis},
-month = jul,
-number = {1},
-pages = {133--138},
-title = {{Externalism, the environment, and thought-tokens}},
-url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10670-005-1038-4},
-volume = {63},
-year = {2005}
-}
-@misc{Horowitz1991,
-abstract = {This volume originated in a conference on "The Place of Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy" which was organized by us and held at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, April 18-20, 1986. The idea behind this conference was to encourage philosophers and scientists to talk to each other about the role of thought experiments in their various disciplines. These papers were either written for the conference, or were written after it by commentators and other participants.... We hope that this volume will be of use to other philosophers and scientists who are interested in thought experiments, as well as inspire more work in this area},
-author = {Horowitz, Tamara and Massey, Gerald J.},
-title = {{Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy}},
-url = {http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3190/1/thought\_experiments\_toc.htm},
-year = {1991}
-}
-@article{Horwich1995,
-author = {Horwich, Paul},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Horwich/Horwich - 1995 - Meaning, Use and Truth.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Mind},
-number = {414},
-pages = {355--368},
-title = {{Meaning, Use and Truth}},
-url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254795},
-volume = {104},
-year = {1995}
-}
-@incollection{Humphreys1993,
-address = {Pittsburgh},
-author = {Humphreys, Paul},
-booktitle = {Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds: Essays on the Philosophy of Adolf Gr\"{u}nbaum},
-editor = {Earman, John},
-pages = {205--227},
-publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press},
-title = {{Seven Theses on Thought Experiments}},
-year = {1993}
-}
-@book{Hutchinson2008a,
-address = {London},
-author = {Hutchinson, Phil},
-isbn = {9780230542716},
-publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
-title = {{Shame and Philosophy: An Investigation in the Philosophy of Emotions and Ethics}},
-url = {http://books.google.at/books?id=ARs\_IgAACAAJ},
-year = {2008}
-}
-@incollection{Hutchinson2008,
-address = {Basingstoke},
-author = {Hutchinson, Phil},
-booktitle = {Shame and Philosophy},
-chapter = {1},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Hutchinson/Hutchinson - 2008 - Experimental Methods and Conceptual Confusion Philosophy, Science, and What Emotions Really Are.Pdf:Pdf},
-isbn = {0230542719},
-pages = {7--41},
-publisher = {Palgrave MacMillan},
-title = {{Experimental Methods and Conceptual Confusion: Philosophy, Science, and What Emotions Really Are}},
-year = {2008}
-}
-@article{Ichikawa2009,
-abstract = {I criticize Timothy Williamson’s characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know.},
-annote = {        From Duplicate 1 (                   Review: Knowing the Intuition and Knowing the Counterfactual                 - Ichikawa, Jonathan )
-And  Duplicate 3 (                   Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual                 - Ichikawa, Jonathan )
-And  Duplicate 4 (                   Review: Knowing the Intuition and Knowing the Counterfactual                 - Ichikawa, Jonathan )
-                
-        
-        
-      },
-author = {Ichikawa, Jonathan},
-doi = {10.1007/s11098-009-9403-9},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Ichikawa/Ichikawa - 2009 - Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0031-8116},
-journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-keywords = {Intuition,Thought experiments,Timothy Williamson},
-language = {en},
-month = apr,
-number = {3},
-pages = {435--443},
-title = {{Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual}},
-url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-009-9403-9/fulltext.html http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s11098-009-9403-9},
-volume = {145},
-year = {2009}
-}
-@article{Jackson1982,
-author = {Jackson, Frank},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Jackson/Jackson - 1982 - Ephinenomenal Qualia.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
-number = {127},
-pages = {127--136},
-title = {{Ephinenomenal Qualia}},
-volume = {32},
-year = {1982}
-}
-@article{Jackson1986,
-author = {Jackson, Frank},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Jackson/Jackson - 1986 - What Mary Didn't Know.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-number = {5},
-pages = {291--295},
-title = {{What Mary Didn't Know}},
-volume = {83},
-year = {1986}
-}
-@article{Klee2008,
-abstract = {The scales across which physical properties exist are vast and subtle in their effects on particular systems placed locally on such scales. For example, human experiential access is restricted only to partial segments of the mass density, size, and temperature scales of the universe. I argue that philosophers must learn to appreciate better the effects of physical scales. Specifically, thought experiments in philosophy should be more sensitive to physical scale effects, because the conclusion of a thought experiment may be undermined by unintentionally ignored scale effects, and the changes required to obtain the foreground state of affairs in a thought experiment might require unacknowledged scale-spanning changes to the contextual background. I discuss four philosophical thought experiments: Putnam's Twin Earth and Brain in a Vat, Searle's Chinese Room, and Chalmers's Zombies Without Qualia. I close by briefly defending the greater interest and importance of physical possibility over logical possibility.},
-author = {Klee, Robert},
-doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00526.x},
-issn = {00261068},
-journal = {Metaphilosophy},
-month = jan,
-number = {1},
-pages = {89--104},
-title = {{Physical Scale Effects and Philosophical Thought Experiments}},
-url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00526.x},
-volume = {39},
-year = {2008}
-}
-@article{Krimsky1973,
-abstract = {Three uses of critical thought experiments outlined in the paper are related to general questions of evaluation. A proposal offered by Karl Popper concerning the so-called apologetic use ofGedankenexperimente is critically assessed. Specifically, his methodological principle that one should not use a second theory in order to defend a first theory against a critical thought experiment is discussed with reference to the photon-boxGedankenexperiment (Einstein-Bohr debates) and the Maxwell-demon paradox. It is argued that the rescuing of one theory from conceptual anomaly by appealing to another need not constitute a misuse of a critical thought experiment.},
-annote = {        From Duplicate 1 (                   The use and misuse of critical Gedankenexperimente                 - Krimsky, Sheldon )
-And  Duplicate 2 (                   The Use and Misuse of Critical Gedankenexperimente                 - Krimsky, Sheldon )
-                
-        
-        
-      },
-author = {Krimsky, Sheldon},
-doi = {10.1007/BF01800847},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Krimsky/Krimsky - 1973 - The Use and Misuse of Critical Gedankenexperimente.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0044-2216},
-journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
-month = sep,
-number = {2},
-pages = {323--334},
-title = {{The Use and Misuse of Critical Gedankenexperimente}},
-url = {http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/BF01800847},
-volume = {4},
-year = {1973}
-}
-@incollection{Kuhn1990,
-address = {Minneapolis},
-author = {Kuhn, Thomas S.},
-booktitle = {Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
-editor = {Savage, C. Wade},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Kuhn/Kuhn - 1990 - Dubbing and redubbing The vulnerability of rigid designation.pdf:pdf},
-number = {C},
-pages = {298--318},
-publisher = {University of Minnesota Press},
-title = {{Dubbing and redubbing: The vulnerability of rigid designation}},
-volume = {14},
-year = {1990}
-}
-@book{Kuhne2005,
-author = {K\"{u}hne, Ulrich},
-isbn = {3518293427},
-pages = {409},
-publisher = {Suhrkamp},
-title = {{Die Methode des Gedankenexperiments}},
-year = {2005}
-}
-@article{Kusch2004,
-author = {Kusch, Martin},
-doi = {10.1177/0306312704044168},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Kusch/Kusch - 2004 - Rule-Scepticism and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge The Bloor-Lynch Debate Revisited.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0306-3127},
-journal = {Social Studies of Science},
-month = sep,
-number = {4},
-pages = {571--591},
-title = {{Rule-Scepticism and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: The Bloor-Lynch Debate Revisited}},
-url = {http://sss.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0306312704044168},
-volume = {34},
-year = {2004}
-}
-@article{Kusch2004a,
-author = {Kusch, Martin},
-doi = {10.1177/0306312704046600},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Kusch/Kusch - 2004 - Reply to my Critics.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0306-3127},
-journal = {Social Studies of Science},
-month = sep,
-number = {4},
-pages = {615--620},
-title = {{Reply to my Critics}},
-url = {http://sss.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0306312704046600},
-volume = {34},
-year = {2004}
-}
-@unpublished{Kusch2013,
-author = {Kusch, Martin},
-booktitle = {Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement: Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011},
-editor = {J\"{a}ger, Christoph and L\"{o}ffler, Winfried},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Kusch/Kusch - 2013 - Jennifer Lackey on Non-Reductionism A Critique.pdf:pdf},
-title = {{Jennifer Lackey on Non-Reductionism: A Critique}},
-year = {2013}
-}
-@book{Kusch2005,
-abstract = {Meaning finitism is a communitarian theory of what it is to master a language. It makes community consensus central in the constitution of normativity. Finitism says that terms have no fixed extensions. The only extensions there are the ’pseudo‐extensions’ of arrays of exemplars concerning correct use. The categorization of newly‐encountered entities is guided by these exemplars, as well as by interests.},
-address = {Oxford},
-author = {Kusch, Martin},
-keywords = {Meaning finitism,extension,meaning scepticism,ostension,paradigm,social institution,sociology of knowledge},
-publisher = {Oxford University Press},
-title = {{Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology}},
-year = {2005}
-}
-@article{Ludwig2007,
-abstract = {There has been a movement recently to bring to bear on the conduct of philosophical thought experiments (henceforth $\backslash$textquotedblleft\{\}thought experiments$\backslash$textquotedblright)1 the empirical techniques of the social sciences, that is, to treat their conduct as in the nature of an anthropological investigation into the application conditions of the concepts of a group of subjects. This is to take a third person, in contrast to the traditional \{\}rst person, approach to conceptual analysis. This has taken the form of conducting surveys about scenarios used in thought experiments.2 It has been called $\backslash$textquotedblleft\{\}experimental philosophy$\backslash$textquotedblright by its practitioners and has been applied across a range of \{\}elds: the philosophy of language, the philosophy of action, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics.3 The results of these surveys have been used to support conclusions about the application conditions of particular concepts of interest in philosophy. They have also been used to support (and been motivated by) skeptical claims about the traditional approach to conceptual analysis. The..},
-annote = {        From Duplicate 1 (                   The Epistemology of Thought Experiments : First Person Versus Third Person Approaches                 - Ludwig, Kirk )
-                
-        
-        
-      },
-author = {Ludwig, Kirk},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Ludwig/Ludwig - 2007 - The Epistemology of Thought Experiments First vs. Third Person Approaches.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Philosophy and the Empirical},
-number = {1},
-pages = {128--159},
-publisher = {Blackwell Pub. Inc.},
-title = {{The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First vs. Third Person Approaches}},
-volume = {31},
-year = {2007}
-}
-@book{Lyons1986,
-address = {Cambridge, MA},
-annote = {Empfehlung von Martin Prinzhorn},
-author = {Lyons, William E.},
-publisher = {MIT Press},
-title = {{The Disappearance of Introspection}},
-year = {1986}
-}
-@article{Matthews1988,
-author = {Matthews, Michael R.},
-doi = {10.1007/BF02356602},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Matthews/Matthews - 1988 - Ernst mach and thought experiments in science education.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0157-244X},
-journal = {Research in Science Education},
-month = dec,
-number = {1},
-pages = {251--257},
-title = {{Ernst mach and thought experiments in science education}},
-url = {http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/BF02356602},
-volume = {18},
-year = {1988}
-}
-@article{McGinn1977,
-abstract = {McGinn argues that, pace Davidson, relational belief attributions do not require a principle of charity. According to McGinn, the requirement of Davidsonian charity turns on the false presumption that ‘most of what others say and believe is going to be true’. But, in this early statement of externalism about the mind, McGinn argues that a subject ‘may be intentionally related to an object \ldots without being able to conceive it aright’; this is because a subject may see an object (which is sufficient for relational attribution) without having preponderantly true beliefs about the object she sees. Thus, because ‘intentionality is prior to veridicality’, we cannot discount the possibility of ‘widespread and deep‐going disagreement between interpreter and interpreted’. McGinn concludes by considering how his externalism about propositional attitudes mirrors Putnam's externalism about meaning, and how rejecting the principle of charity impacts Davidson's method of radical interpretation.},
-author = {McGinn, Colin},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/McGinn/McGinn - 1977 - Charity, Interpretation, and Belief.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
-keywords = {Davidson,Putnam,Quine,Twin Earth,belief,charity,externalism,principle of charity,propositional attitude,radical interpretation,relational belief},
-number = {9},
-pages = {521--535},
-title = {{Charity, Interpretation, and Belief}},
-url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025795},
-volume = {74},
-year = {1977}
-}
-@book{McLean2004,
-address = {Frankfurt},
-author = {McLean, Penny},
-isbn = {3596158389},
-pages = {384},
-publisher = {Fischer},
-title = {{Science and Fiction}},
-year = {2004}
-}
-@article{Mellor1977,
-abstract = {I have tried in this paper to dispose of some of modern essentialism's newer and more seductive arguments. Putnam's twin earth tales do not, As he supposes, Dispose of fregean alternatives to essentialist theory. His own account of the extension of natural kind terms is false of nearly all natural kinds and would not yield essentialism even if it were true. Kripke's theory of the reference of kind terms likewise fails to yield essentialism as a product of the necessary self-Identity of natural kinds. The stock candidates for essential properties, Moreover, Are either not even shared in this world by all things of the kind, Or their status is evidently more a feature of our theories than of the world itself. In short, Our essentialists' premises are false, Their arguments invalid, And the plausibility of their conclusions specious. Their essences can go back in their aristotelian bottles, Where they belong.},
-author = {Mellor, D H},
-doi = {10.1007/s10441-008-9056-7},
-issn = {00070882},
-journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
-pages = {299--312},
-pmid = {18802777},
-title = {{Natural Kinds}},
-volume = {28},
-year = {1977}
-}
-@article{Merricks1997,
-author = {Merricks, Trenton},
-doi = {10.1023/A:1004210420052},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Merricks/Merricks - 1997 - Fission and personal identity over time.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-number = {2},
-pages = {163--186},
-title = {{Fission and personal identity over time}},
-volume = {88},
-year = {1997}
-}
-@article{Miscevic2000,
-author = {Miscevic, Nenad},
-doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00931.x},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Miscevic/Miscevic - 2000 - Intuition as a Second Window.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {00384283},
-journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
-month = mar,
-number = {S1},
-pages = {87--112},
-title = {{Intuition as a Second Window}},
-url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00931.x},
-volume = {38},
-year = {2000}
-}
-@article{Moue2006,
-abstract = {An overview is provided of how the concept of the thought experiment has developed and changed for the natural sciences in the course of the 20th century. First, we discuss the existing definitions of the term ‘thought experiment’ and the origin of the thought experimentation method, identifying it in Greek Presocratics epoch. Second, only in the end of the 19th century showed up the first systematic enquiry on thought experiments by Ernst Mach’s work. After the Mach’s work, a negative attitude towards thought experiments came in the beginning of the 20th century, which went on until the Thomas Kuhn’s and Karl Popper’s work on thought experiments. Only from the mid-1980s did thought experiments begin to be considered relevant to scientific enterprise. Finally, we show the existing empirical and ‘functional’ theories which have developed about the nature and purpose of thought experiments.},
-annote = {        From Duplicate 1 (                   Tracing the Development of Thought Experiments in the Philosophy of Natural Sciences                 - Moue, Aspasia S.; Masavetas, Kyriakos A.; Karayianni, Haido )
-And  Duplicate 2 (                   Tracing the Development of Thought Experiments in the Philosophy of Natural Sciences                 - Moue, Aspasia S.; Masavetas, Kyriakos A.; Karayianni, Haido )
-                
-        
-        
-      },
-author = {Moue, Aspasia S. and Masavetas, Kyriakos A. and Karayianni, Haido},
-doi = {10.1007/s10838-006-8906-8},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Moue, Masavetas, Karayianni/Moue, Masavetas, Karayianni - 2006 - Tracing the Development of Thought Experiments in the Philosophy of Natural Sciences.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0925-4560},
-journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
-keywords = {epistemology,natural science,philosophy of physics,scientific discovery,scientific method,scientific reasoning,thought experiments},
-month = nov,
-number = {1},
-pages = {61--75},
-title = {{Tracing the Development of Thought Experiments in the Philosophy of Natural Sciences}},
-url = {http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s10838-006-8906-8},
-volume = {37},
-year = {2006}
-}
-@article{Nichols2010,
-author = {Nichols, Shaun and Bruno, Michael},
-doi = {10.1080/09515089.2010.490939},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Nichols, Bruno/Nichols, Bruno - 2010 - Intuitions about personal identity An empirical study.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0951-5089},
-journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
-month = jun,
-number = {3},
-pages = {293--312},
-title = {{Intuitions about personal identity: An empirical study}},
-url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09515089.2010.490939},
-volume = {23},
-year = {2010}
-}
-@incollection{Norton2002,
-abstract = {Thought experiments are ordinary argumentation disguised in a vivid pictorial or narrative form. This account of their nature will allow me to show that empiricism has nothing to fear from thought experiments. They perform no epistemic magic. In so far as they tell us about the world, thought experiments draw upon what we already know of it, either explicitly or tacitly; they then transform that knowledge by disguised argumentation. They can do nothing more epistemically than can argumentation. I defend my account of thought experiments in Section 3 by urging that the epistemic reach of thought experiments turns out to coincide with that of argumentation and that this coincidence is best explained by the simple view that thought experiments just are arguments. Thought experiments can err----a fact to be displayed by the thought experiment - anti thought experiment pairs of Section 2. Nonetheless thought experiments can be used reliably and, I urge in Section 4., this is only possible if they are governed by some very generalized logic. I will suggest on evolutionary considerations that their logics are most likely the familiar logics of induction and deduction, recovering the view that thought experiment is argumentation. Finally in Section 5 I defend this argument based epistemology of thought experiments against competing accounts. I suggest that these other accounts can offer a viable epistemology only insofar as they already incorporate the notion that thought experimentation is governed by a logic, possibly of very generalized form.},
-annote = {        From Duplicate 1 (                   Why Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Empiricism                 - Norton, John D. )
-                
-        From Duplicate 1 (                           Why Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Empiricism                         - Norton, John D. )
-                
-        
-        
-        
-        
-        From Duplicate 3 (                   Why Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Empiricism                 - Norton, John D. )
-                
-        
-        
-      },
-author = {Norton, John D.},
-booktitle = {Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science},
-editor = {Hitchcock, Christopher},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Norton/Norton - 2004 - Why Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Empiricism.pdf:pdf},
-pages = {44--66},
-publisher = {Blackwell},
-title = {{Why Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Empiricism}},
-year = {2004}
-}
-@book{Parfit1986,
-address = {Oxford},
-author = {Parfit, Derek},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Parfit/Parfit - 1986 - Reasons and Persons.epub:epub},
-isbn = {0-19-824908-X},
-pages = {560},
-publisher = {Oxford University Press},
-title = {{Reasons and Persons}},
-year = {1986}
-}
-@article{Peijnenburg2003,
-abstract = {A characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy is its ample use of thought experiments. We formulate two features that can lead one to suspect that a given thought experiment is a poor one. Although these features are especially in evidence within the philosophy of mind, they can, surprisingly enough, also be discerned in some celebrated scientific thought experiments. Yet in the latter case the consequences appear to be less disastrous. We conclude that the use of thought experiments is more successful in science than in philosophy},
-annote = {        From Duplicate 2 (                   When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones?                 - Peijnenburg, Jeanne; Atkinson, David )
-And  Duplicate 3 (                   When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones?                 - Atkinson, David )
-And  Duplicate 4 (                   When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones?                 - Peijnenburg, Jeanne; Atkinson, David )
-                
-        
-        
-      },
-author = {Peijnenburg, Jeanne and Atkinson, David},
-doi = {10.1023/B:JGPS.0000005164.26228.f7},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Peijnenburg, Atkinson/Peijnenburg, Atkinson - 2003 - When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0925-4560},
-journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
-keywords = {epr,kant,newton,s antinomies,s bucket,thought experiments},
-number = {2},
-pages = {305--322},
-publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
-title = {{When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones?}},
-url = {http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?id=doi:10.1023/B:JGPS.0000005164.26228.f7},
-volume = {34},
-year = {2003}
-}
-@article{Peijnenburg2007,
-abstract = {We have never entirely agreed with Daniel Cohnitz on the status and r\^{o}\{\}le of thought experiments. Several years ago, enjoying a splendid lunch together in the city of Ghent, we cheerfully agreed to disagree on the matter; and now that Cohnitz has published his considered opinion of our views, we are glad that we have the opportunity to write a rejoinder and to explicate some of our disagreements. We choose not to deal here with all the issues that Cohnitz raises, but rather to restrict ourselves to three specific points},
-annote = {        From Duplicate 2 (                   On Poor and Not so Poor Thought Experiments. A Reply to Daniel Cohnitz                 - Atkinson, David )
-And  Duplicate 3 (                   On Poor and Not so Poor Thought Experiments. A Reply to Daniel Cohnitz                 - Peijnenburg, Jeanne; Atkinson, David )
-And  Duplicate 4 (                   On Poor and Not so Poor Thought Experiments. A Reply to Daniel Cohnitz                 - Peijnenburg, Jeanne; Atkinson, David )
-                
-        
-        
-      },
-author = {Peijnenburg, Jeanne and Atkinson, David},
-doi = {10.1007/s10838-007-9038-5},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Peijnenburg, Atkinson/Peijnenburg, Atkinson - 2007 - On Poor and Not so Poor Thought Experiments. A Reply to Daniel Cohnitz.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0925-4560},
-journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
-month = may,
-number = {1},
-pages = {159--161},
-title = {{On Poor and Not so Poor Thought Experiments. A Reply to Daniel Cohnitz}},
-url = {http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s10838-007-9038-5},
-volume = {38},
-year = {2007}
-}
-@book{Perry1993,
-author = {Perry, John},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Perry/Perry - 1993 - The Problem of the Essential Indexical and other Essays.pdf:pdf},
-title = {{The Problem of the Essential Indexical and other Essays}},
-year = {1993}
-}
-@book{Popper1994,
-address = {T\"{u}bingen},
-author = {Popper, Karl},
-publisher = {J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)},
-title = {{Logik der Forschung}},
-year = {1994}
-}
-@article{Pummer2012b,
-author = {Pummer, T.},
-doi = {10.1093/analys/ans134},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Pummer/Pummer - 2012 - Intuitions about large number cases.pdf:pdf},
-issn = {0003-2638},
-journal = {Analysis},
-month = nov,
-number = {1},
-pages = {37--46},
-title = {{Intuitions about large number cases}},
-url = {http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/analys/ans134},
-volume = {73},
-year = {2012}
-}
-@article{Putnam1973,
-author = {Putnam, Hilary},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Putnam/Putnam - 1973 - Meaning and Reference.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-number = {19},
-pages = {699--711},
-title = {{Meaning and Reference}},
-url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025079},
-volume = {70},
-year = {1973}
-}
-@article{Putnam1975,
-author = {Putnam, Hilary},
-file = {:Users/zoro/Documents/papers/Putnam/Putnam - 1975 - The Meaning of Meaning.pdf:pdf},
-journal = {Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
-pages = {131--193},
-title = {{The Meaning of "Meaning"}},
-volume = {7},
-year = {1975}
-}
-@incollection{Putnam1996,
-address = {Armonk, London},
-author = {Putnam, Hilary},
-booktitle = {The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam's "The Meaning of 'Meaning'"},
-editor = {Pessin, Andrew and Goldberg, Sanford},
-pages = {xv--xxii},
-publisher = {M.E. Sharpe},
-title = {{Introduction}},
-year = {1996}
-}
-@book{Rescher2005,
-author = {Rescher, Nicholas},
-isbn = {0765802929},
-pages = {189},
-publisher = {Transaction Publishers},
-title = {{What If?: Thought Experimentation in Philosophy}},
-year = {2005}