

Algebraic Attacks on Block Ciphers from a Gröbner Basis Perspective It's like Gaussian elimination, but exponential

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"Thus, if we could show that solving a certain system requires at least as much work as solving a system of simultaneous equations in a large number of unknowns, of a complex type, then we would have a lower bound of sorts for the work characteristic." [Sha49]

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- 1 Gröbner Bases and Varieties
- 2 Block Cipher Example
- 3 Computing Gröbner Bases
- 4 Specialized Attacks in Algebraic Cryptanalysis

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### 1 Gröbner Bases and Varieties

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## Some notation and definitions

- $P = k[x_0, ..., x_{n-1}]; k \text{ a field}$
- I is an ideal  $\subset P$ .  $m, n \in I \rightarrow m + n \in I$ ;  $v \in P \rightarrow v \cdot m \in I$
- $< f_0, \ldots, f_{n-1} >$  is the ideal spanned by  $f_0, \ldots, f_{n-1}$ .
- $V(f_0, \ldots, f_{n-1}) = \{(a_0, \ldots, a_{m-1}) \in k^m : f_i(a_0, \ldots, a_{m-1}) = 0$ for all  $0 \le i < n\}$ .
- V(I) is the variety of I. Especially, if  $I = \langle f_0, \ldots, f_{n-1} \rangle$ , then  $V(I) = V(f_0, \ldots, f_{n-1})$



Given a set "complicated" set  $f_0, \ldots, f_{n-1}$ , compute a simpler set  $g_0, \ldots, g_{m-1}$ , such that  $\langle f_0, \ldots, f_{n-1} \rangle = \langle g_0, \ldots, g_{m-1} \rangle$  and consequently  $V(f_0, \ldots, f_{n-1}) = V(g_0, \ldots, g_{m-1})$ .

Those "complicated" sets are for example:

- AES (128-bit, 10 rounds) 8000 equations in 1600 variables over  $\mathbb{F}_2$  [CP02] or 5248 equations in 3968 variables over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$  [MR02].
- CTC (255-bit, 6 rounds) 11985 equations in 6375 variables over  $\mathbb{F}_2.$

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How do we know where to look for a simpler set?

## Little Detour: Monomial Orderings

Monomials can be ordered in different ways, i.e. there is no canonical ordering.

Important examples include:

**lexi**cographical Given e.g. *a*, *b*, *c* then *a* is always greater than *b* . . . like in a phone book.

**deg**ree **lex**icographical Sort by degrees first, then use *lex* 

block Every element from one block  $B_1$  is always bigger than any element from another block  $B_2$  (like *lex*), but inside the blocks use e.g. *deglex*.

Leading monomials etc. are always considered with respect to some monomial ordering.

# (I) (Reduced) Gröbner Bases

### Definition (Gröbner Basis)

Fix a monomial order. A finite subset  $G = \{g_0, \ldots, g_{m-1}\}$  of an ideal I is said to be a *Gröbner basis* or standard basis if

$$\langle LT(g_0),\ldots,LT(g_{m-1})\rangle = \langle LT(I)\rangle.$$

### Definition (Reduced Gröbner Basis)

A reduced Gröbner basis for a polynomial ideal I is a Gröbner basis for G such that:

1 
$$LC(f) = 1$$
 for all  $f \in G$ ;

**2** For all  $f \in G$ , no monomial of f lies in  $\langle LT(G - \{f\}) \rangle$ .



Consider (and ignore abuse of notation):

$$\begin{split} 0 &= \kappa_{0,0} + \kappa_{1,2}, 0 = \kappa_{0,2} + \kappa_{1,1}, 0 = \kappa_{0,1} + \kappa_{1,0}, 0 = 1 + \kappa_{1,2} + Z_{1,2}, 0 = \kappa_{1,1} + Z_{1,1}, 0 = \kappa_{1,0} + Z_{1,0}, \\ 0 &= Z_{1,1} + Y_{1,2} + Y_{1,1}, 0 = Z_{12} + Y_{10}, 0 = Z_{10} + Y_{11} + Y_{10}, 0 = \kappa_{02} + X_{12}, 0 = 1 + \kappa_{01} + X_{11}, \\ 0 &= \kappa_{00} + X_{10}, 0 = Y_{12} + Y_{10} Y_{11} + X_{10}, 0 = Y_{12} + Y_{11} + Y_{11} Y_{12} + Y_{10} + X_{12} + X_{10}, \\ 0 &= Y_{12} + Y_{10} + X_{12} + X_{12} Y_{11} + X_{10}, 0 = 1 + Y_{12} + Y_{11} + Y_{10} Y_{12} + X_{11} + X_{10}, \\ 0 &= 1 + Y_{12} + Y_{11} + Y_{10} + X_{11} + X_{11} Y_{10} + X_{10}, 0 = 1 + Y_{12} + Y_{11} + Y_{10} + X_{11} + X_{11} X_{12} + X_{10}, \\ Y_{12} + Y_{10} + X_{12} Y_{10} + X_{10} Y_{12}, 0 = 1 + Y_{10} + X_{12} + X_{11} + X_{10} Y_{12}, \\ 0 &= 1 + Y_{11} + X_{12} Y_{12} + X_{11} + X_{10} + X_{10} Y_{12}, X_{11} Y_{11} + X_{10} + X_{10} Y_{12}, Y_{11} + Y_{10} + X_{12} + X_{10} Y_{11}, \\ 0 &= 1 + Y_{11} + X_{10} Y_{10}, 0 = 1 + Y_{11} + X_{11} + X_{10} X_{12}, 0 = 1 + Y_{10} + X_{12} + X_{10} + X_{10} X_{11} \\ \\ \text{The reduced Gröbner basis with respect to the lex monomial ordering is:} \end{split}$$

$$0 = K_{02}, 0 = 1 + K_{01}, 0 = 1 + K_{00}, 0 = 1 + K_{12}, 0 = K_{11}, 0 = 1 + K_{10}, 0 = Z_{12}, 0 = Z_{11}, 0 = 1 + Z_{10}, 0 = 1 + Y_{12}, 0 = 1 + Y_{11}, 0 = Y_{10}, 0 = X_{12}, 0 = X_{11}, 0 = 1 + X_{10}$$



- An ideal is zero-dimensional if V(I) is finite.
- The radical of *I* denoted by √*I*, is the set {*f* : *f<sup>e</sup>* ∈ *I* for some integer *e* ≥ 1}.
- A perfect field is a field of chracteristic *p* where every element has a *p* − *th* root or the characteristic is zero.
- An elimination ideal is defined as: Given  $I = \langle f_0, \dots, f_{m-1} \rangle \subset k[x_0, \dots, x_{n-1}]$ , the *I*-th elimination ideal  $I_l$  is the ideal of  $k[x_{l+1}, \dots, x_{n-1}]$  defined by  $I_l = I \cap k[x_{l+1}, \dots, x_{n-1}]$ .

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# **V(I)** The Shape Lemma I

### Theorem (The Shape Lemma)

Let k be a perfect field, let  $I \subset P$  be a zero-dimensional radical ideal. Let  $g_{n-1} \in k[x_{n-1}]$  be the monic generator of the elimination ideal  $I \cap k[x_{n-1}]$ , and let  $d = deg(g_{n-1})$ . Then the following statements are true:

■ The reduced Gröbner basis of the ideal I with respect to the lexicographic ordering x<sub>0</sub> > · · · > x<sub>n-1</sub> is of the form

$$\{x_0 - g_0, \ldots, x_{n-2} - g_{n-2}, g_{n-1}\},\$$

where  $g_0, ..., g_{n-2} \in k[x_{n-1}]$ ;

2 The polynomial  $g_{n-1}$  has d distinct zeros  $a_0, \ldots, a_{d-1} \in k$ , and the set of zeros of I is  $\{(g_0(a_i), \ldots, g_{n-2}(a_i), a_i) : i = 0, \ldots, d-1\}.$ 

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To bring an ideal over  $\mathbb{F}_p$  in the form such that the shape lemma applies, add the "field polynomials"  $(\{x_i^p - x_i\}$  for every  $0 \le i < n)$  to the ideal. This makes sure, that:

- solutions from the algebraic closue are excluded as x<sup>p</sup><sub>i</sub> − x<sub>i</sub> factors completely over F<sub>p</sub>,
- the ideal is zero-dimensional (implied by above statement),
- the ideal is a radical ideal as GCD(<sup>d</sup>(x<sub>i</sub><sup>p</sup>-x<sub>i</sub>)/dx<sub>i</sub>, x<sub>i</sub><sup>p</sup> x<sub>i</sub>) = 1 (Seidenberg's Lemma).



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## CTC Overview: Bird's Eye View I

The cipher operates on block sizes which are multiples of 3. So the block size is  $B \cdot s$  where s = 3 and B may be chosen. The cipher is defined in rounds where each round performs the same operation on the input data except that a different round key is added each time. The output of round i - 1 is the input of round i. Each round consists of a parallell application of B S-boxes, the application of the linear diffusion layer, and a final key addition of the round key.





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# Gröbner Bases and Varieties Block Cipher Example Computing Gröbner Bases Specialized Attacks in Algebraic Cryptanalysis R V(I) CTC Overview: Some Details

- The S-Box is defined over GF(2<sup>3</sup>) as the non-linear random permutation [7, 6, 0, 4, 2, 5, 1, 3]. The transformation from GF(2)<sup>3</sup> to GF(2<sup>3</sup>) is the "natural"-mapping.
- This gives rise to 14 lineary independent quadratic equations in the input and output variables
- The diffusion layer is very thin:

$$\begin{split} & Z_{i,(257\%Bs)} = Y_{i,0} \text{ for all } i = 1 \dots N_r, \\ & Z_{i,(j \cdot 1987 + 257\%Bs)} = Y_{i,j} + Y_{i,(j+137\%Bs)} \text{ for } j \neq 0 \text{ and all } i. \end{split}$$

The key schedule is a simple permutation of wires.



$$P_0 + K_{0,0} + X_{1,0},$$
  

$$P_1 + K_{0,1} + X_{1,1},$$
  

$$P_2 + K_{0,2} + X_{1,2},$$

 $Y_{1,0} + Y_{1,1} + Z_{1,0}$  $1 + X_{1,0} + X_{1,1} + X_{1,1}X_{1,0} + X_{1,2} + Y_{1,0}$  $Y_{1,1} + Y_{1,2} + Z_{1,1}$  $1 + X_{1,1} + X_{1,2}X_{1,0} + Y_{1,1}$  $Y_{1,0} + Z_{1,2}$  $1 + X_{1,1} + Y_{1,0}X_{1,0} + Y_{1,1}$  $X_{1,2} + Y_{1,0} + Y_{1,1} + Y_{1,1}X_{1,0}$  $K_{0,1} + K_{1,0}$  $1 + X_{1,0} + X_{1,1} + X_{1,2}X_{1,1} + Y_{1,0} + Y_{1,1} + Y_{1,2}$  $K_{0,2} + K_{1,1}$  $1 + X_{1,0} + X_{1,1} + Y_{1,0} + Y_{1,0}X_{1,1} + Y_{1,1} + Y_{1,2}$  $K_{0,0} + K_{1,2}$  $X_{1,0} + Y_{1,1}X_{1,1} + Y_{1,2}X_{1,0},$  $1 + X_{11} + X_{12} + Y_{10} + Y_{12}X_{10} + Y_{12}X_{11}$  $Z_{1,0} + K_{1,0} + C_{0}$  $Y_{1,0} + Y_{1,0}X_{1,2} + Y_{1,2} + Y_{1,2}X_{1,0}$  $Z_{1\ 1} + K_{1\ 1} + C_{1}$  $X_{1,0} + X_{1,2} + Y_{1,0} + Y_{1,1}X_{1,2} + Y_{1,2}$  $Z_{1,2} + K_{1,2} + C_{2}$  $1 + X_{1,0} + X_{1,1} + Y_{1,1} + Y_{1,2}X_{1,0} + Y_{1,2}X_{1,2}$  $X_{1,0} + Y_{1,1}Y_{1,0} + Y_{1,2}$  $1 + X_{1,0} + X_{1,1} + Y_{1,1} + Y_{1,2} + Y_{1,2}Y_{1,0}$  $X_{1,0} + X_{1,2} + Y_{1,0} + Y_{1,1} + Y_{1,2} + Y_{1,2}Y_{1,1}$ 

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Recall the definition of a Gröbner basis. It is a set G of polynomials  $g_0, \ldots g_{m-1}$  such that:

$$\langle LT(g_0),\ldots,LT(g_{m-1})\rangle = \langle LT(I)\rangle.$$

Now, try to create elements in  $\langle LT(I) \rangle$  and not in  $\langle LT(g_0), \ldots, LT(g_{m-1}) \rangle$ . If you find such an element **add it** to the basis. If such an element provably cannot be constructed *G* is a Gröbner basis. This procedure **terminates** as the ideals of leading terms created this way are strictly increasing and such a sequence **must stabilize** eventually due to the **Ascending Chain Condition**. At this point  $\langle LT(g_0), \ldots, LT(g_{m-1}) \rangle = \langle LT(I) \rangle$ .



Bruno Buchberger showed that every cancelation of leading terms may be accounted to *S-polynomials*.

### Definition (S-Polynomial)

Let  $f, g \in k[x_1, \ldots, x_n]$  be polynomials  $\neq 0$  and define  $x^{\gamma} = \text{LCM}(\text{LM}(f), \text{LM}(g))$ . Then the S-polynomial of f and g is defined as

$$S(f,g) = \frac{x^{\gamma}}{\operatorname{LT}(f)} \cdot f - \frac{x^{\gamma}}{\operatorname{LT}(g)} \cdot g.$$

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# (I) Polynomial Reduction

The S-polynomial h of  $g_i, g_j$  is not in  $< LT(g_i), LT(g_j) >$  but it is in < LT(I) >. It may be in  $G_r = <\{g_k | k \neq i, j\} >$ .

### Definition

Let  $G=\{g_0,\ldots,g_{m-1}\}\subset P$  . Given a polynomial  $h\in P$  , we say that h reduces to zero modulo G, written

$$h \xrightarrow{G} 0$$

if h can be written in the form

$$h = a_0g_0 + \cdots + a_{m-1}g_{m-1},$$

such that whenever  $a_i g_i \neq 0$ , we have  $h \geq a_i g_i$ .



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- Intermediate basis grows pretty quickly
- Major bottleneck is reduction modulo G2
- Need strategy which S-polynomial to construct in which order
- Need criteria which S-polynomial reduces to zero
- Computing with respect to *lex* takes much longer than e.g. *deglex*
- Runtime is exponential or worse in general. Solving polynomial equation systems in NP-hard.
- We don't know much about the actual runtime Buchberger's algorithm applied to a given ideal basis.

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# (I) Runtime II

Situation could be better for algebraic attacks:

- zero-dimensional (one solution)
- systems are often sparse yet overdefined
- working over simple fields like 𝔽<sub>2</sub>
- systems are highly structured

Several improvements and specializations to Buchberger's algorithm exist

- Gebauer-Möller installation
- $\bullet$   $F_4$  and  $F_5$
- SlimGB
- Gröbner Proofing

# /(I) State of the Art: *F*<sub>4</sub> [Fau99]

### Theorem

Construct the coefficient matrix A for an ideal basis F and call the (reduced) row echelon form  $\tilde{A}$ . Then  $\tilde{F}$  constructed from  $\tilde{A}$  is called the row echelon form of F. Let  $\tilde{F}^+$  denote the set

 $\{g \in \tilde{F} : LM(g) \not\in LM(F)\}.$ 

The elements of  $\tilde{F}^+$  are joined with a subset H of the original F, such that:

$$LM(H) = LM(F)$$
 and  $|H| = |LM(F)|$ 

holds. Then the ideal < F > is spanned by  $H \cup \tilde{F}^+$ .

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# (I) Meet-in-the-Middle [CMR05]



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## D Meet-in-the-Middle Results

- Implemented on top of Singular's Gröbner basis engine
- Faster for *lex* monomial ordering than naïve approach
- Faster for *degrevlex* monomial ordering up to B = 2.



Abbildung: Runtimes for B=1 and term ordering *lex* 

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# V(I) Gröbner Surfing: Idea



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# (I) Gröbner Surfing: Algorithm

```
def groebner_surf(F):
    """
    Returns a Groebner basis for a given MQ problem F.
    INPUT:
        F --- MQ problem, separable in rounds
    OUTPUT:
        a Groebner basis for F with respect to F.ring().term_order()
    """
    singular.option("redSB")
    P = F.ring()
    gb = P.ideal([0])
    for i in range(len(F.round)):
        gb = (gb + P.ideal(F.round[i])).groebner_basis()
    return gb
```

# (I) Gröbner Surfing: Correctness

# Correctness Algorithm is in fact selection strategy. It doesn't affect correctness.

## Termination Buchberger's Algorithm terminates, thus *Nr* times Buchberger's Algorithm terminate as well.

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## Gröbner Surfing Results I

## Lexicographical Term Ordering

- Faster than naïve approach and Meet-in-the-Middle for B = 1
- Graded Reverse Lexicographical & Block Term Ordering
  - Split equation systems in blocks by rounds, use *degrevlex* in blocks [Wei06]
  - Faster than naïve Buchberger for *degrevlex*.
  - Also: Gröbner basis looks better, as blocks eliminate.
- Why is this faster?
  - Exploits structure: We know the dependencies
  - Reduces intermediate basis grow: reduction after every round
  - Thus it is not faster for *degrevlex* in general

## Gröbner Surfing Results II

### A good monomial order:

```
sage: F, s = ctc_MQ(Nr=3, variable_order=1, term_order=block_order(Nr=3))
sage: F.ring()._singular_()
     characteristic : 2
     number of vars : 39
                 1 : ordering dp
          block
                               K_3,2 K_3,1 K_3,0 Z_3,2 Z_3,1 Z_3,0
                    : names
                                Y_3,2 Y_3,1 Y_3,0 X_3,2 X_3,1 X_3,0
                                K_2,2 K_2,1 K_2.0
          block
                  2 : ordering
                                dp
                    : names
                                Z_2,2 Z_2,1 Z_2,0 Y_2,2 Y_2,1 Y_2,0
                                X_2,2 X_2,1 X_2,0 K_1,2 Kv1,1 K_1,0
                      ordering dp
          block
                  3 :
                                Z_1,2 Z_1,1 Z_1,0 Y_1,2 Y_1,1 Y_1,0
                    : names
                                X_1,2 X_1,1 X_1,0 K_0,2 K_0,1 K_0,0
          block
                  4 : ordering C
```

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# Gröbner Surfing Results III



Abbildung: Runtimes for B = 2

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# () Gröbner Surfing Results IV



Abbildung: Runtimes for B = 3

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- First Buchberger Criterion: Suppose that we have  $f, g \in G$ , such that the leading monomials of f and g are pairwise prime. Then the S-polynomial of f and g reduces to zero.
- We have *n* equations in *n* variables, so make sure each leading monomial is univariate and distinct from each other.
- We get a zero-dimensional Gröbner basis *CTCgb* for CTC ideals.
- Basis is still quadratic, but unclear how to exploit the fact that it is Gröbner basis; FGLM [FGLM93] and Gröbner Walk [CKM97] are too slow.

Questions?

### Thank You!

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