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ab / openid-connect-core-1_0.html

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<table summary="layout" width="66%" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tr><td><table summary="layout" width="100%" border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="1">
<tr><td class="header">Draft</td><td class="header">N. Sakimura, Ed.</td></tr>
<tr><td class="header">&nbsp;</td><td class="header">NRI</td></tr>
<tr><td class="header">&nbsp;</td><td class="header">D. Recordon</td></tr>
<tr><td class="header">&nbsp;</td><td class="header">Facebook</td></tr>
<tr><td class="header">&nbsp;</td><td class="header">J. Bradeley</td></tr>
<tr><td class="header">&nbsp;</td><td class="header">Protiviti Government Services</td></tr>
<tr><td class="header">&nbsp;</td><td class="header">B. de Madeiros</td></tr>
<tr><td class="header">&nbsp;</td><td class="header">Google</td></tr>
<tr><td class="header">&nbsp;</td><td class="header">M. Jones</td></tr>
<tr><td class="header">&nbsp;</td><td class="header">Microsoft</td></tr>
<tr><td class="header">&nbsp;</td><td class="header">E. Jay, Ed.</td></tr>
<tr><td class="header">&nbsp;</td><td class="header">MGI1</td></tr>
<tr><td class="header">&nbsp;</td><td class="header">June 16, 2011</td></tr>
</table></td></tr></table>
<h1><br />OpenID Connect Core 1.0 - draft 06</h1>

<h3>Abstract</h3>

<p>OpenID Connect is an identity framework that provides authentication,
      authorization, and attribute transmition capability. It allows third
      party attested claims from distributed sources. The specification suite
      builts on OAuth 2.0 and consists of Building Blocks (Core, JSON Web
      Token, JSON Web Signatures, JSON WEB Encryption, JSON Web Keys, Simple
      Web Discovery), Protocol Bindings (e.g, Artifact Binding, Authorization
      Code Binding, User Agent Binding) and Extensions. This specification is
      the "Core" of the suite that defines the messages used and abstract flow
      which will be further constrained or extended in the companion
      specifications in the suite.
</p><a name="toc"></a><br /><hr />
<h3>Table of Contents</h3>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#rnc">1.</a>&nbsp;
Requirements Notation and Conventions<br />
<a href="#terminology">2.</a>&nbsp;
Terminology<br />
<a href="#anchor1">3.</a>&nbsp;
Overview<br />
<a href="#anchor2">4.</a>&nbsp;
Messages<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#anchor3">4.1.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Endpoint<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#anchor7">4.2.</a>&nbsp;
Token Endpoint<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#anchor10">4.3.</a>&nbsp;
UserInfo Endpoint<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#anchor14">4.4.</a>&nbsp;
Introspection Endpoint<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#anchor16">4.5.</a>&nbsp;
Session Management<br />
<a href="#serializations">5.</a>&nbsp;
serializations<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#qss">5.1.</a>&nbsp;
Query String serialization<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#js">5.2.</a>&nbsp;
JSON Serialization<br />
<a href="#sigs">6.</a>&nbsp;
Signatures<br />
<a href="#encryption">7.</a>&nbsp;
Encryption<br />
<a href="#anchor27">8.</a>&nbsp;
Verification<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#anchor28">8.1.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Request Verification<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#anchor29">8.2.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Response Verification<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#anchor30">8.3.</a>&nbsp;
UserInfo Request Verification<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#anchor31">8.4.</a>&nbsp;
UserInfo Response Verification<br />
<a href="#extensions">9.</a>&nbsp;
Extensions<br />
<a href="#security_considerations">10.</a>&nbsp;
Security Considerations<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#assertion_manufacture">10.1.</a>&nbsp;
Assertion manufacture/modification<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#assertion_disclosure">10.2.</a>&nbsp;
Assertion disclosure<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#assertion_repudiation">10.3.</a>&nbsp;
Assertion repudiation<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#assertion_redirect">10.4.</a>&nbsp;
Assertion redirect<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#assertion_reuse">10.5.</a>&nbsp;
Assertion reuse<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#artifact_manufacture">10.6.</a>&nbsp;
Secondary authenticator manufacture<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#artifact_capture">10.7.</a>&nbsp;
Secondary authenticator capture<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#assertion_substitution">10.8.</a>&nbsp;
Assertion substitution<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#auth_req_disclosure">10.9.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Request Disclosure<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#anchor32">10.10.</a>&nbsp;
Timing Attack<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#authn_proc_threats">10.11.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Process Threats<br />
<a href="#iana">11.</a>&nbsp;
IANA Considerations<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#oauth_params">11.1.</a>&nbsp;
OAuth Parameters Registry<br />
<a href="#anchor36">12.</a>&nbsp;
Open Issues and Things To Be Done (TBD)<br />
<a href="#anchor37">Appendix&nbsp;A.</a>&nbsp;
Acknowledgements<br />
<a href="#anchor38">Appendix&nbsp;B.</a>&nbsp;
Document History<br />
<a href="#rfc.references1">13.</a>&nbsp;
Normative References<br />
<a href="#rfc.authors">&#167;</a>&nbsp;
Authors' Addresses<br />
</p>
<br clear="all" />

<a name="rnc"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.1"></a><h3>1.&nbsp;
Requirements Notation and Conventions</h3>

<p>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
      "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
      document are to be interpreted as described in <a class='info' href='#RFC2119'>[RFC2119]<span> (</span><span class='info'>Bradner, S., &ldquo;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,&rdquo; March&nbsp;1997.</span><span>)</span></a>
      .
</p>
<p>Throughout this document, values are quoted to indicate that they are
      to be taken literally. When using these values in protocol messages, the
      quotes MUST NOT be used as part of the value.
</p>
<a name="terminology"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.2"></a><h3>2.&nbsp;
Terminology</h3>

<p>In addition to "Access Token", "Refresh Token", "Authorization Code",
      "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server", "Authorization Endpoint",
      "Client", "Client Identifier", "Client Secret", "Protected Resource",
      "Resource Owner", "Resource Server", "Token Endpoint" defined in <a class='info' href='#RFC5849'>OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Hammer-Lahav, E., &ldquo;The OAuth 1.0 Protocol,&rdquo; April&nbsp;2010.</span><span>)</span></a> [RFC5849], this specification defines the
      following terms: </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>Assertion</dt>
<dd>A set of Claims about the End-User which is
          attested by the OP and Resource Servers.
</dd>
<dt>Authentication</dt>
<dd>An act of verifying End-User's identity
          through the verification of the credential.
</dd>
<dt>Base64url</dt>
<dd>Base 64 Encoding <a class='info' href='#RFC3548'>[RFC3548]<span> (</span><span class='info'>Josefsson, S., &ldquo;The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings,&rdquo; July&nbsp;2003.</span><span>)</span></a>
          with URL and Filename Safe Alphabet without padding.
</dd>
<dt>Claims</dt>
<dd>A piece of information about an Entity that a
          Claims Provider asserts about that Entity.
</dd>
<dt>Entity</dt>
<dd>Something that has separate and distinct
          existence and that can be identified in context.
</dd>
<dt>End-user</dt>
<dd>A human resource owner.
</dd>
<dt>OpenID Provider (OP)</dt>
<dd>Authorization Servers that are
          able to support OpenID Connect Messages. OP.
</dd>
<dt>OP Endpoints</dt>
<dd>End-User Authentication, Authorization,
          and Token Endpoint.
</dd>
<dt>OpenID Request Object</dt>
<dd>A JSON object that holds the
          request variables. It holds OpenID request variables. It MAY also
          contain other OAuth parameters for the request signing purpose, in
          which case the parameter values MUST match with the OAuth request
          parameters.
</dd>
<dt>Relying Party (RP)</dt>
<dd>Client and Resource Servers.
</dd>
<dt>RP Endpoints</dt>
<dd>The endpoint to which the OP responses
          are returned through redirect.
</dd>
<dt>UserInfo Endpoint</dt>
<dd>A protected resource that when
          presented with a token by the client returns authorized information
          about the current user.
</dd>
<dt>Session Token</dt>
<dd>A JWS token that provides claims about
          an authenticated user but may or may not be bound to an
          authentication session.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote>

<a name="anchor1"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.3"></a><h3>3.&nbsp;
Overview</h3>

<p>OpenID Connect protocol in abstract follows the following steps.
</p>
<p></p>
<ol class="text">
<li>The Client sends a request to the Server's End-User Authorization
          Endpoint.
</li>
<li>The Server authenticates the user and obtains appropriate
          authorization.
</li>
<li>The Server responds with access_token and a few other
          variables.
</li>
<li>The Client sends a request with the access_token to the Userinfo
          Endpoint.
</li>
<li>Userinfo Endpoint returns the additional user information
          supported by the Server.
</li>
</ol><p>Each message may be signed and encrypted. When the message is
      encrypted, it MUST be signed first then encrypted. This specification
      only defines the abstract messsage flow and message formats. The actual
      use MUST be based on one of the companion protocol bindings
      specifications such as <a class='info' href='#OpenID.AB'>OpenID Connect Artifact
      Binding 1.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Sakimura, N., Ed., Bradley, J., de Madeiros, B., Ito, R., and M. Jones, &ldquo;OpenID Connect Artifact Binding 1.0,&rdquo; January&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [OpenID.AB] or <a class='info' href='#OpenID.AC'>OpenID Connect
      Authorization Code Binding 1.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Mortimore, C., Ed., Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., de Madeiros, B., Ito, R., and M. Jones, &ldquo;OpenID Connect Authorization Code Binding 1.0,&rdquo; January&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [OpenID.AC].
</p>
<a name="anchor2"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4"></a><h3>4.&nbsp;
Messages</h3>

<p>
</p>
<p>In OpenID Connect protocols in abstract, the process proceeds by the
      Client interacting with Endpoints. There are number of Endpoints
      involved.
</p>
<p></p>
<ol class="text">
<li>Authorization Endpoint: The Client sends a request to the Server
          at the Authorization endpoint. The Server then authenticate the
          End-User to find out if he is eligible to make the authorization.
          Then, upon the authorization action of the End-User, the Server
          returns an Authorization Response that includes Authorization Code,
          <tt>code</tt>. For some Clients, Implicit Grant
          may be used to obtain <tt>access_token</tt>
          without using <tt>code</tt>. In this case, <tt>response_type</tt> MUST be set to <tt>token</tt>.
</li>
<li>Token Endpoint: The Client sends the Access Token Request to the
          Token Endpoint to obtain Access Token Response which includes <tt>access_token</tt> and <tt>session</tt> token.
</li>
<li>UserInfo Endpoint: The <tt>access_token</tt>
          MAY be sent to the UserInfo Endpoint to obtain user
          information/assertion/claims about the user by sending a request to
          the userinfo endpoint.
</li>
<li>Session Management Endpoints: The <tt>session</tt> token MAY be sent to these endpoints to
          manage the session.
</li>
</ol><p>Both Request and Response may either be serialized into <a class='info' href='#qss'>Query String serialization<span> (</span><span class='info'>Query String serialization</span><span>)</span></a> or <a class='info' href='#RFC4627'>JSON<span> (</span><span class='info'>Crockford, D., &ldquo;The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),&rdquo; July&nbsp;2006.</span><span>)</span></a> [RFC4627].
</p>
<p>
</p>
<a name="anchor3"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.1"></a><h3>4.1.&nbsp;
Authorization Endpoint</h3>

<p>Client sends Authorization Request to the Authorization Endpoint to
        obtain Authorization Response.
</p>
<a name="auth_req"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.1.1"></a><h3>4.1.1.&nbsp;
Authorization Request</h3>

<p>Section 4.1.1 and 4.2.1 of <a class='info' href='#RFC5849'>OAuth
          2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Hammer-Lahav, E., &ldquo;The OAuth 1.0 Protocol,&rdquo; April&nbsp;2010.</span><span>)</span></a> [RFC5849] defines OAuth Authorization Request parameters. In this
          specification, the values to the parameters are defined as
          follows.
</p>
<p></p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>response_type</dt>
<dd>The is a space delimited, case
              sensitive list of string values(Pending Oauth 2.0 changes).
              Acceptable values are <tt>code</tt>, <tt>token</tt>, <tt>session</tt>,
              and <tt>none</tt>. The value MUST include
              <tt>code</tt> for requesting an Authorization
              Code, <tt>token</tt> for requesting an Access
              Token, <tt>session</tt> for requesting a
              Session Token, and <tt>none</tt> if no
              response is needed..
</dd>
<dt>scope</dt>
<dd>It MUST include <tt>openid</tt> as one of the string.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>In addition, this specification defines the following
          extension parameters.
</p>
<p>
            </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>req</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. A <a class='info' href='#jwt'>JWT<span> (</span><span class='info'>Jones, M., Belfanz, D., Bradeley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer, J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, &ldquo;JSON Web Token,&rdquo; January&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [jwt]
              encoded <a class='info' href='#OpenIDReq'>OpenID Request
              Object<span> (</span><span class='info'>OpenID Request Object</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
<dt>request_uri</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. A URL that points to the
              OpenID Request Object.
</dd>
<dt>display</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. A string value that specifies
              how the authorization server displays the authentication page to
              the user.
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>none</dt>
<dd>The authorization server MUST NOT display
                  any authentication page.
</dd>
<dt>popup</dt>
<dd>The authorization server displays a
                  popup authentication page.
</dd>
<dt>mobile</dt>
<dd>The authorization server performs
                  authentication using a mobile device???
</dd>
</dl></blockquote>
</dd>
<dt>prompt</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. A space delimited, case sensitive
              list of string values that specifies how the authorization
              server prompts the user for reauthentication and reapproval. The
              possible values are :
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>login</dt>
<dd>The authorization server MUST prompt the
                  user for reauthentication.
</dd>
<dt>consent</dt>
<dd>The authorization server MUST prompt
                  the user for reapproval before returning information to the
                  client.
</dd>
<dt>select_account</dt>
<dd>The authorization server MUST
                  prompt the user to select a user account if the current
                  account does not match the account in the request.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote>
</dd>
<dt>nonce</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. A random, unique string. The nonce
              value is returned in the session token.
</dd>
<dt>session_aud</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. The identifier of the target
              audience for a session token.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>
          
</p>
<p>Following is a non-normative example when they are sent
            in the query parameters serialization.
</p><div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>GET /authorize?scope=openid&amp;response_type=code
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
&amp;req=HeADeR.pAyl0rd.cRypT0 HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com</pre></div>
<p>
</p>
<a name="OpenIDReq"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.1.1.1"></a><h3>4.1.1.1.&nbsp;
OpenID Request Object</h3>

<p>The OpenID Request object is used to provide OpenID request
            parameters that MAY differ from the default ones. Implementing
            support for the OpenID Request object is OPTIONAL. Supporting it
            is necessary for implementations that need to request or provide
            sets of claims other than the default UserInfo claim set.
</p>
<p>If present, the OpenID Request object is passed as the value of
            a "req=" OAuth 2.0 parameter and is represented as a JWT.
            Parameters that affect the information returned from the UserInfo
            Endpoint are in the "inf" member. Parameters that affect the
            information returned in the Session Token are in the "ses" member.
            If the same parameters are available both as query strings and in
            the OpenID Request Object, the later takes the precedence.
</p>
<p>
              
<p>An example an OpenID request object is as
                follows:
</p><div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>{
 "inf":
   {
     "clm":
       {
         "name": null,
         "displayName": {"opt": true},
         "emails": null,
         "photos": {"opt": true},
       },
     "fmt": "sig"
   }
 "ses":
   {
     "clm":
       {
        "aat": null
       }
     "mxa": 86400,
     "eaa": 2
   }
}</pre></div>
            

<p>The OpenID Request object is a <a class='info' href='#jwt'>JWT<span> (</span><span class='info'>Jones, M., Belfanz, D., Bradeley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer, J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, &ldquo;JSON Web Token,&rdquo; January&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [jwt]
            that MAY contain a set of members defined by this specification
            and MAY contain other members that are not defined by this
            specification. The JWT MAY be signed or unsigned. When it is
            unsigned, it will be indicated by the JWT <tt>"sig":"none"</tt> convention in the JWT
            header.
</p>
<p>The members defined by this specification are:
</p>
<p></p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>inf</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. (UserInfo Endpoint request):
                Requests affecting the values to be returned from the UserInfo
                Endpoint. If not present, the UserInfo Endpoint behaves in the
                default manner.
</dd>
<dt>ses</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. (Session Token request): Requests
                affecting the values to be included in the Session Token. If
                not present, the default Session Token contents are used. If
                present, these parameters are used to request deltas to the
                default contents of the Session Token.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>If signed, the OpenID Request object SHOULD contain the
            standard JWT "iss" and "aud" claims.
</p>
<p>The structure of the "inf" (UserInfo Endpoint request) member
            is a JSON object that MAY contain the following members:
</p>
<p></p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>clm</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. (Requested Claims): Set of
                requested claims from the UserInfo Endpoint. If not present,
                the default UserInfo claims held by the IdP are returned.
</dd>
<dt>fmt</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. (Format): The requested format for
                the UserInfo Endpoint information. If not present, the format
                is an unsigned JSON object.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>The "clm" member is a JSON object with a member for each
            requested claim. The member names are the requested claim names.
            The member values may be either:
</p>
<p></p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>null</dt>
<dd>This indicates that this claim is being
                requested in the default manner. In particular, this is a
                required claim. OR
</dd>
<dt>A JSON Object</dt>
<dd>This is used to provide additional
                information about the claim being requested.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>All members of the "clm" object are OPTIONAL.
</p>
<p>The members of the JSON object value following a claim name
            defined by this specification are:
</p>
<p></p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>opt</dt>
<dd>If this is an optional claim, this member's
                value MUST be <tt>true</tt>, else, if
                present, its value MUST be <tt>false</tt>,
                which indicates that it is a required claim. If it is not
                present, it is a required claim.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>Other members MAY be defined to provide additional
            information about the requested claim. If the "clm" member is
            present in the "info" object, the claims requested within it
            override the default claim set that would otherwise be returned
            from the UserInfo Endpoint.
</p>
<p>The "fmt" member of the "inf" object is used to specify the
            requested format of the UserInfo Endpoint contents. Values defined
            are:
</p>
<p></p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>nor</dt>
<dd>(normal) - in which case the contents are an
                unsigned JSON object
</dd>
<dt>sig</dt>
<dd>(signed) - in which case the contents are a
                signed JWT
</dd>
<dt>enc</dt>
<dd>(encrypted) - in which case the contents are
                an signed and encrypted JWT
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>All members of the "inf" object are OPTIONAL. Other
            members MAY be present and if so, SHOULD understood by both
            parties.
</p>
<p>The structure and function of the "ses" (Session Token request)
            member of the OpenID Request object is similar to that of the
            "inf" member. It also contains an optional "clm" member, with the
            same structure as that for the "inf" member. If the "clm" member
            is present in the "ses" object, the claims requested within it
            modify the default claim set that would otherwise be returned in
            the Session Token. Unlike for the "inf" member, typically these
            claims will augment, rather than override the default set.
</p>
<p>Following claim MAY be requested in the Session Token by
            specifying it in the "clm" member:
</p>
<p></p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>aat</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. (authenticated at): Requests that
                the "aat" claim be present. The claim value is the number of
                seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the
                date/time that the user authentication occurred. (The "aat"
                claim semantically corresponds to the openid.pape.auth_time
                response parameter.)
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>In addition to the "clm" member, this additional member
            is defined within the "ses" member of the OpenID Request
            object:
</p>
<p></p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>mxa</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. (max authentication age):
                Specifies that the user must be actively authenticated if any
                present authentication is older than the specified number of
                seconds. (The "mxa" request parameter corresponds to the
                OpenID 2.0 openid.pape.max_auth_age request parameter.)
</dd>
<dt>eaa</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. (entity authentication assurance):
                Specifies the X.eaa / <a class='info' href='#ISO29115'>ISO/IEC29115<span> (</span><span class='info'>McCallister, E., &ldquo;ITU-T Recommendation X.eaa | ISO/IEC 2nd CD 29115 --           Information technology &ndash; Security techniques &ndash; Entity           authentication assurance framework,&rdquo; .</span><span>)</span></a> [ISO29115] entity authentication
                assurance level that is requested by the client.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>It is anticipated that additional "ses" parameters MAY be
            defined to request that additional properties hold for the
            authentication - for instance, that certain authentication
            policies be applied (in the same spirit of the OpenID 2.0
            openid.pape.auth_policies values), or that the authentication
            conform to the policies defined by a specified trust framework.
            These parameters MAY be defined by extension specifications.
</p>
<p>All members of the "ses" object are OPTIONAL. Other members MAY
            be present and if so, SHOULD understood by both parties.
</p>
<p>All members of the OpenID Request object are OPTIONAL. Other
            members MAY be present and if so, SHOULD be understood by both
            parties.
</p>
<a name="anchor4"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.1.2"></a><h3>4.1.2.&nbsp;
Authorization Response</h3>

<p>When the <tt>response_type</tt> in the request
          includes <tt>code</tt>, the Authorization
          Response MUST return the parameters defined in section 4.1.2 of
          <a class='info' href='#OAuth2.0'>OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Hammer-Lahav, E., Ed., Recordon, D., and D. Hardt, &ldquo;OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol,&rdquo; November&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [OAuth2.0]. Response values for other
          requested <tt>response_type</tt> parameters are
          returned in the Access Token Endpoint (Need Confirmation). Note that
          if the <tt>response_type</tt> in the request
          includes <tt>token</tt>, the <a class='info' href='#access_token_response'>Access Token Response<span> (</span><span class='info'>Access Token Response</span><span>)</span></a> defined
          later MUST be returned instead. The <tt>response_type</tt> "none" preempts all other values
          and no other response values are included.
</p>
<p>For example, the Authorization Server redirects the End-User's
          user-agent by sending the following HTTP response:
</p><div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.com/cb?code=i1WsRn1uB1&amp;state=1f 8skd</pre></div>
<p>
</p>
<a name="anchor5"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.1.3"></a><h3>4.1.3.&nbsp;
Authorization Error Response</h3>

<p>If the end-user denies the access request or if the request
          fails, the authorization server informs the client by returning
          parameters defined in section 4.1.2.1 of <a class='info' href='#RFC5849'>OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Hammer-Lahav, E., &ldquo;The OAuth 1.0 Protocol,&rdquo; April&nbsp;2010.</span><span>)</span></a> [RFC5849] .
</p>
<a name="anchor6"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.1.3.1"></a><h3>4.1.3.1.&nbsp;
Error Codes</h3>

<p>In addition to the error codes defined in section 4.1.2.1 of
            <a class='info' href='#RFC5849'>OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Hammer-Lahav, E., &ldquo;The OAuth 1.0 Protocol,&rdquo; April&nbsp;2010.</span><span>)</span></a> [RFC5849], this specification
            defines the following additional error codes:
</p>
<p>
              </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>invalid_request_redirect_uri</dt>
<dd>The redirect_uri in
                the request is missing or malformed.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_request_signature</dt>
<dd>The request has an
                invalid signature.
</dd>
<dt>login_required</dt>
<dd>The authorization server requires
                user authentication.
</dd>
<dt>session_selection_required</dt>
<dd>The user is required
                to select a session at the authorization server.
</dd>
<dt>approval_required</dt>
<dd>The authorization server
                requires user approval.
</dd>
<dt>user_mismatched</dt>
<dd>The current logged in user at
                the authorization server does not match the requested
                user.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>
            
</p>
<p>The error codes can be extended by the string prefixed by
            <tt>x_</tt>. If custome error code are used,
            <tt>error_uri</tt> MUST be provided.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<a name="anchor7"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.2"></a><h3>4.2.&nbsp;
Token Endpoint</h3>

<p>Access Token Request / Response interacts with a Token Endpoint.
        Upon the successful request, it returns two tokens, an Access Token
        and a Session Token if requested.
</p>
<a name="access_token_request"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.2.1"></a><h3>4.2.1.&nbsp;
Access Token Request</h3>

<p>The client obtains an access token by authenticating with the
          authorization server and presenting its access grant (in the form of
          an authorization code, resource owner credentials, an assertion, or
          a refresh token).
</p>
<p>The request parameters of of the Access Token Request is defined
          in section 4.1.3 of <a class='info' href='#RFC5849'>OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Hammer-Lahav, E., &ldquo;The OAuth 1.0 Protocol,&rdquo; April&nbsp;2010.</span><span>)</span></a> [RFC5849] .
</p>
<a name="access_token_response"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.2.2"></a><h3>4.2.2.&nbsp;
Access Token Response</h3>

<p>After receiving and verifying a valid and authorized Access Token
          Request from the client, the Authorization Server returns a Positive
          Assertion that includes an Access Token. The parameters in the
          successful response is defined in Section 4.2.2 of <a class='info' href='#OAuth2.0'>OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Hammer-Lahav, E., Ed., Recordon, D., and D. Hardt, &ldquo;OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol,&rdquo; November&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [OAuth2.0] .
</p>
<p>In addition, this specification defines the following
          parameter:
</p>
<p>
            </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>session</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED if it was requested in the
              authorization request. It is a <a class='info' href='#jws'>JWS<span> (</span><span class='info'>Jones, M., Belfanz, D., Bradeley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer, J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, &ldquo;JSON Web Signatures,&rdquo; March&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [jws] of
              the <a class='info' href='#SessionToken'>session token<span> (</span><span class='info'>Session Token</span><span>)</span></a> described
              below.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>
          
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Following is a non-normative example.
</p><div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>{
    "access_token": "SlAV32hkKG",
    "token_type": "jwt",
    "refresh_token": "8xLOxBtZp8",
    "expires_in": 3600,
    "session":"jwtheader.jwtpayload.jwtcrypto"
}</pre></div>
<p>
</p>
<p>As in the <a class='info' href='#RFC5849'>OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Hammer-Lahav, E., &ldquo;The OAuth 1.0 Protocol,&rdquo; April&nbsp;2010.</span><span>)</span></a> [RFC5849], Clients SHOULD
          ignore unrecognized response parameters.
</p>
<a name="SessionToken"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.2.2.1"></a><h3>4.2.2.1.&nbsp;
Session Token</h3>

<p>The Session Token is a JWS signed claim that attests the
            following:
</p>
<p>
              </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>server_id</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. The unique identifier of the
                authorization server such that when paired with the user_id
                creates a globally unique and never reassigned identifier.
</dd>
<dt>client_id</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. The unique identifier of the
                client.
</dd>
<dt>user_id</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. A locally unique and never
                reassigned identifier for the user, which is intended to be
                consumed by the Client. e.g. "24400320" or
                "AItOawmwtWwcT0k51BayewNvutrJUqsvl6qs7A4". It MUST NOT exceed
                255 ASCII characters in length.
</dd>
<dt>aud</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. The <a class='info' href='#jwt'>JWT<span> (</span><span class='info'>Jones, M., Belfanz, D., Bradeley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer, J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, &ldquo;JSON Web Token,&rdquo; January&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [jwt]aud (audience) claim.
</dd>
<dt>exp</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. The <a class='info' href='#jwt'>JWT<span> (</span><span class='info'>Jones, M., Belfanz, D., Bradeley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer, J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, &ldquo;JSON Web Token,&rdquo; January&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [jwt]
                exp (expiration time) claim.
</dd>
<dt>pape</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. (TBD) If we want this token to be
                short, we probably want to define a shorter equivalent of
                PAPE.
</dd>
<dt>nonce</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. If the authorization request
                includes a nonce request value, then this value is REQUIRED
                and it's value is set to the same value as the request
                value.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>
            
</p>
<p>
</p>
<a name="anchor8"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.2.3"></a><h3>4.2.3.&nbsp;
Token Error Response</h3>

<p>If the token request is invalid or unauthorized, the
          authorization server constructs the error response. The parameters
          of the Token Error Response is defined as in Section 5.2 of <a class='info' href='#RFC5849'>OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Hammer-Lahav, E., &ldquo;The OAuth 1.0 Protocol,&rdquo; April&nbsp;2010.</span><span>)</span></a> [RFC5849].
</p>
<p>
</p>
<a name="anchor9"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.2.3.1"></a><h3>4.2.3.1.&nbsp;
Error Codes</h3>

<p>In addition to the error codes defined in Section 5.2 of <a class='info' href='#RFC5849'>OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Hammer-Lahav, E., &ldquo;The OAuth 1.0 Protocol,&rdquo; April&nbsp;2010.</span><span>)</span></a> [RFC5849], this specification defines the
            following error codes.
</p>
<p></p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>invalid_client_secret</dt>
<dd>The client secret does not
                matched pre-shared secret code, is of a different type, or has
                an invalid signature.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_secret_type</dt>
<dd>The specified secret type is
                unsupported.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_request_signature</dt>
<dd>The request has an
                invalid signature.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_request_code</dt>
<dd>The authorization code is
                missing, malformed, or invalid.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>The error codes can be extended by the string prefixed by
            <tt>x_</tt>. If custome error code are used,
            <tt>error_uri</tt> MUST be provided.
</p>
<a name="anchor10"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.3"></a><h3>4.3.&nbsp;
UserInfo Endpoint</h3>

<p>UserInfo Request/Response interacts with UserInfo Endpoint.
</p>
<a name="anchor11"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.3.1"></a><h3>4.3.1.&nbsp;
UserInfo Request</h3>

<p>Client MAY send request with following parameters to the UserInfo
          Endpoint to obtain further information about the user.
</p>
<p>
            </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>access_token</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. The access_token obtained
              above.
</dd>
<dt>user_id</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. A locally unique and never
              reassigned identifier for the user. e.g. "24400320" or
              "AItOawmwtWwcT0k51BayewNvutrJUqsvl6qs7A4". It MUST NOT exceed
              255 ASCII characters in length. It could be a pairwise private
              identifier of the enduser between the Client and the Server.
</dd>
<dt>client_id</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. The client identifier
              recognized by the authorization server.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>
          
</p>
<a name="anchor12"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.3.2"></a><h3>4.3.2.&nbsp;
UserInfo Response</h3>

<p>The response is a JSON object which contains some (or all) of the
          following reserved keys:
</p>
<p>[ToDo: Replace with scim based definition -- Pam doing the
          table.]
</p>
<p>
            </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>user_id</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. A locally unique and never
              reassigned identifier for the user. e.g. "24400320" or
              "AItOawmwtWwcT0k51BayewNvutrJUqsvl6qs7A4". It MUST NOT exceed
              255 ASCII characters in length. It MUST NOT be reassigned to
              another user.
</dd>
<dt>server_id</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. The unique identifier of the
              authorization server such that when paired with the user_id
              creates a globally unique and never reassigned identifier.
</dd>
<dt>client_id</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. The client identifier
              recognized by the authorization server.
</dd>
<dt>asserted_user</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. One of "true" if the
              access was issued for this user or "false" if it is for a
              different user.
</dd>
<dt>profile_urls</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. An array of URLs that
              belong to the user across any number of domains.
</dd>
<dt>display_name</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. The display name of the
              user. e.g., "David Recordon".
</dd>
<dt>given_name</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. The first name of the user.
              e.g., "David".
</dd>
<dt>family_name</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. The family name of the user.
              e.g., "Recordon".
</dd>
<dt>email</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. The verified email address of the
              user. e.g., "recordond@gmail.com".
</dd>
<dt>language</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. End User's preferred language
              as specified by ISO639.
</dd>
<dt>picture</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. The URL of End User's Picture.
              e.g., "http://graph.facebook.com/davidrecordon/picture".
</dd>
<dt>openid</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED if OpenID variables were specified
              in the Authorization Request. It is a JSON Object that includes
              the claim responses.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>
          
</p>
<p>
</p>
<a name="anchor13"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.3.3"></a><h3>4.3.3.&nbsp;
UserInfo Error Response</h3>

<p>The Authorization Server includes one of the following error
          codes with the error response:
</p>
<p>
            </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>invalid_request </dt>
<dd>The request is missing a required
              parameter, includes an unsupported parameter or parameter value,
              repeats a parameter, includes multiple credentials, utilizes
              more than one mechanism for authenticating the client, or is
              otherwise malformed.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_client</dt>
<dd>The client identifier provided is
              invalid, the client failed to authenticate, the client did not
              include its credentials, provided multiple client credentials,
              or used unsupported credentials type.
</dd>
<dt>unauthorized_client </dt>
<dd>The authenticated client is
              not authorized to use the access grant type provided.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_grant</dt>
<dd>The provided access grant is
              invalid, expired, or revoked (e.g. invalid assertion, expired
              authorization token, bad end-user password credentials, or
              mismatching authorization code and redirection URI).
</dd>
<dt>unsupported_grant_type</dt>
<dd>The access grant included -
              its type or another attribute - is not supported by the
              authorization server.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_scope</dt>
<dd>The requested scope is invalid,
              unknown, malformed, or exceeds the previously granted scope.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_access_token</dt>
<dd>The access token is not valid
              for the requested resource, malformed, is in an incorrect
              format, outside the valid scope, or expired.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_refresh_token</dt>
<dd>The refresh token is not
              valid, malformed, is in an incorrect format, outside the valid
              scope, or expired.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_request_signature</dt>
<dd>The request has an
              invalid signature.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_request_type</dt>
<dd>The request type is
              unsupported.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_request_atype</dt>
<dd>The request contains an
              unsupported response assertion type.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_request_recipient</dt>
<dd>The recipient of the
              request is invalid or does not match.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>
          
</p>
<a name="anchor14"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.4"></a><h3>4.4.&nbsp;
Introspection Endpoint</h3>

<p>The introspection endpoint returns a text JSON object which
        contains information about the end user associated with supplied
        access token or session. It is for use by clients that cannot or do
        not wish to handle signed tokens.
</p>
<p>Request Parameters: One of the following parameters
</p>
<p>
          </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>access_token</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. A token obtained from the
            token endpoint.
</dd>
<dt>session</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. A session token obtained from the
            authorization request.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>
        
</p>
<p>Both parameters are optional, but at least one parameter must be
        supplied.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Response:
</p>
<p>The response is a text JSON object of the <a class='info' href='#SessionToken'>session token<span> (</span><span class='info'>Session Token</span><span>)</span></a> using the
        "application/json" media type. If the request contains an access
        token, the authorization server creates a version of a session token
        and returns it as a JSON object. However, a session is not created. If
        the request contains a session token, then the server returns the JSON
        object of the session token.
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example of a request to the
        introspection endpoint:
</p>
<p>
          </p>
<div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>Request:

GET /op/introspection?access_token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6
ImNsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSJ9.eyJpc3N1ZXIiOiJodHRwOlwvXC9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBs
ZS5jb20iLCJjbGllbnRfaWQiOiJjbGllbnQuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJhdWRpZW5jZSI6ImNsa
WVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsImlkIjoidXNlcl8yMzQyMzQiLCJleHAiOjEzMDM4NTI4ODB9.a
JwagC6501Da-zK-X8Az9B-Y625aSEfxVuBpFEDjOxQ
Host: server.example.com

Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json

{
"server_id": "http://server.example.com",
"client_id": "http://client.example.net",
"user_id": "Jane Doe",
"aud": "http://client.example.net",
"exp": "1236485123"
}
</pre></div><p>

        
</p>
<a name="anchor15"></a><br /><hr />
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<a name="rfc.section.4.4.1"></a><h3>4.4.1.&nbsp;
Error Codes</h3>

<p>In addition to the error codes defined in Section 5.2 of <a class='info' href='#RFC5849'>OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>Hammer-Lahav, E., &ldquo;The OAuth 1.0 Protocol,&rdquo; April&nbsp;2010.</span><span>)</span></a> [RFC5849], this specification defines the
          following error codes.
</p>
<p>
            </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>invalid_access_token</dt>
<dd>The access token is not valid
              for the requested resource, malformed, is in an incorrect
              format, outside the valid scope, or expired.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_session</dt>
<dd>The session token is not valid for
              the requested resource, malformed, is in an incorrect format, or
              expired.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>
          
</p>
<a name="anchor16"></a><br /><hr />
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<a name="rfc.section.4.5"></a><h3>4.5.&nbsp;
Session Management</h3>

<p>The OpenID Connect Core supports life-cycle session management and
        synchronization for third parties that support authentication with the
        authorization server. In addition, session management for fourth
        parties such as desktop, native or mobile applications that utilizes
        authorization server credentials at fourth party web sites are also
        supported.
</p>
<a name="anchor17"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.5.1"></a><h3>4.5.1.&nbsp;
Creating Sessions</h3>

<p>To create a session, the client sends an authorization request to
          the authorization server with <tt>session</tt> as
          one of the <tt>response_type</tt> values. If the
          <tt>response_type</tt> includes the value <tt>code</tt>, then a session token is returned in the
          response of the Token Endpoint when the Access Token is retrieved.
          If the <tt>response_type</tt> includes the value
          <tt>token</tt>, then a session token is returned
          as a parameter in the redirection URI specified in the request. In
          either case, a session token will also be returned along with the
          access token when submitting a refresh token to the token access
          endpoint if the initial authorization request included <tt>session</tt> in the <tt>response_type</tt> parameter.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<a name="anchor18"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.5.1.1"></a><h3>4.5.1.1.&nbsp;
User-Agent Flow</h3>

<p>User-agents can use the OAuth implicit grant flow by including
            <tt>token</tt> and <tt>session</tt> in the <tt>response_type</tt> of the authorization request to
            get a session token.
</p>
<p>
              </p>
<ol class="text">
<li>The user-agent makes an authorization request to the
                authorization endpoint.
</li>
<li>The authorization authenticates the user and returns an
                access and session token.
</li>
<li>The user-agent and client servlet can then use the session
                management endpoints by presenting the session token to the
                endpoints.
</li>
</ol><p>
            
</p>
<p>
              </p>
<div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>                                 +----------------------------------+
+----------+                     |                                  |
|          |                     |      +----------------------+    |
|          |                     |      |    Authorization     |    |
|          |                     |      |         server       |    |
|user-agent|                     |      +----------------------+    |
|          |                     |      |   +---------------+  |    |
|          |&gt;--------------------|------|--&gt;| Authorization |  |    |
|          |&lt;--------------------|------|--&lt;| Endpoint      |  |    |
+----------+                     |      |   +---------------+  |    |
    ^                 +----------|------|--&lt;| Check_Session |  |    |
    |                 | +--------|------|--&gt;| EndPoint      |  |    |
    |                 | |        |      |   +---------------+  |    |
    v                 | |        |      +----------------------+    |
+----------+          | |        |                                  |
|          |          | |        |                                  |
|client    |&lt;---------+ |        |      +----------------------+    |
|servlet   |&gt;-----------+        |      |     Profile API/     |    |
|          |                     |      |     UserInfo Endpoint|    |
|          |                     |      |                      |    |
|          |&gt;--------------------|-----&gt;|                      |    |
|          |&lt;--------------------|-----&lt;|                      |    |
|          |                     |      |                      |    |
|          |                     |      |                      |    |
+----------+                     |      +----------------------+    |
                                 |                                  |
                                 |                                  |
                                 +----------------------------------+
</pre></div><p>

            
</p>
<p>
              </p>
<div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>                             +-----------------------------+
                             |                             |
                             |      Authorization          |
                             |         Server              |
+-------------+              |                             |
|             |              |     +--------------------+  |
| User-Agent  |              |     |  Refresh Session   |  |
|             |              |     |    Endpoint        |  |
|             |&gt;-------------|----&gt;|                    |  |
|             |&lt;-------------|----&lt;|                    |  |
|             |              |     |                    |  |
|             |              |     +--------------------+  |
|             |              |     |  End Session       |  |
|             |&gt;-------------|----&gt;|    Endpoint        |  |
|             |&lt;-------------|----&lt;|                    |  |
|             |              |     |                    |  |
|             |              |     +--------------------+  |
+-------------+              +-----------------------------+
</pre></div><p>

            
</p>
<a name="anchor19"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.5.1.2"></a><h3>4.5.1.2.&nbsp;
Web Server Flow</h3>

<p>Web server clients can use the OAuth authorization code flow by
            including <tt>code</tt> and <tt>session</tt> in the <tt>response_type</tt> parameter of the authorization
            request to obtain a session token. The session token is returned
            along with the access token after the client submits the
            authorizaiton code to the access token endpoint.
</p>
<p>
              </p>
<div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>                                 +----------------------------------+
+----------+                     |                                  |
|          |                     |      +----------------------+    |
|          |                     |      |    Authorization     |    |
|          |                     |      |         server       |    |
|user-agent|                     |      +----------------------+    |
|          |                     |      |   +---------------+  |    |
|          |&gt;--------------------|------|--&gt;| Authorization |  |    |
|          |&lt;--------------------|------|--&lt;| Endpoint      |  |    |
+----------+                     |      |   +---------------+  |    |
    ^                 +----------|------|--&lt;| Access Token  |  |    |
    |                 | +--------|------|--&gt;| EndPoint      |  |    |
    |                 | |        |      |   +---------------+  |    |
    v                 | |        |      |   | Session       |  |    |
+----------+          | |        |      |   | Management    |  |    |
|          |          | |        |      |   | Endpoints     |  +    |
|client    |&lt;---------+ |        |      |   +---------------+  |    |
|servlet   |&gt;-----------+        |      +----------------------+    |
|          |                     |                                  |
|          |                     |      +----------------------+    |
|          |                     |      |     Profile API/     |    |
|          |                     |      |     UserInfo Endpoint|    |
|          |&lt;--------------------|-----&lt;|                      |    |
|          |&gt;--------------------|-----&gt;|                      |    |
+----------+                     |      +----------------------+    |
                                 |                                  |
                                 |                                  |
                                 +----------------------------------+
</pre></div><p>

            
</p>
<a name="anchor20"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.5.1.3"></a><h3>4.5.1.3.&nbsp;
4th Party Native Applications</h3>

<p>Fourth party native applications involve four parties: 1) the
            user, 2) the native (desktop) application, 3) the authorization
            server, and 4) the client servlet web application. The native
            application uses protected resources from a client servlet but it
            integrates with authentication services from the authorization
            server directly. The native application directs the user to
            perform authentication at the authorization server to obtain
            access and session tokens. The tokens can then be used to access
            protected resources at the web servlet client. The process of
            obtaining a session token for the native application is very
            similar to that of using the web server flow method. However, the
            target audience of the session token is not the the native
            application, but that of the client servlet. The client needs to
            indicate the target audience for the session token by setting the
            <tt>session_aud</tt> parameter in the
            authorization request to that of the identifier of the client
            servlet.
</p><div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>                                     +-----------------------------+
+----------------+                   |                             |
|                |                   |   Authorization             |
|   Native App   |                   |      Server                 |
|                |                   |                             |
|                |                   |      +--------------------+ |
|                |&gt;------------------|-----&gt;| Authorization      | |
|                |&lt;------------------|-----&lt;|   Endpoint         | |
|                |                   |      |                    | |
|                |                   |      |                    | |
|                |                   |      +--------------------+ |
|                |                   |      | Access Token       | |
|                |&gt;------------------|-----&gt;|   Endpoint         | |
|                |&lt;------------------|-----&lt;|                    | |
|                |                   |      |                    | |
|                |                   |      +--------------------+ |
|                |&gt;------------------|-----&gt;| Session Mgmt       | |
|                |&lt;------------------|-----&lt;|   Endpoints        | |
|                |                   |      |                    | |
+----------------+                   |      |                    | |
        ^                            |      |                    | |
        |                            |      +--------------------+ |
        v                            |                             |
+----------------+                   |                             |
| Client         |                   +-----------------------------+
| Servlet        |
|                |
+----------------+
</pre></div>
<p>
</p>
<p>When accessing protected resources at the client servlet, the
            native application sends the session token as an Auth HTTP header
            in the request. The client servlet can check the validity of the
            session token by verifying the cryptographic information or by
            sending the token to the check token endpoint.
</p>
<p>
              </p>
<div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>GET /resource1
Auth : sess_jwtheader.sess_jwtpayload.sess_jwtcrypto
Host: servlet.example.com

</pre></div><p>

            
</p>
<a name="anchor21"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.5.1.3.1"></a><h3>4.5.1.3.1.&nbsp;
Browser Load</h3>

<p>Some native applications may wish to start an authenticated
              browser session for the same user. The native application starts
              a browser with the location of the client servlet and passing a
              session token as a query parameter. The client servlet
              immediately initiates a request to the refresh session endpoint
              with the session token. The user may need to reauthenticate at
              the authorization server. The client servlet then gets an
              session token that is session synchronized with the
              authorization server.
</p>
<p>
                </p>
<div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>
                                        +--------------------------+
+------------+      +-----------+       |                          |
|            |      |           |       |   Authorization Server   |
| Native App |&gt;----&gt;|User-Agent |       |                          |
|            |      |           |       |    +------------------+  |
|            |      |           |&gt;------|---&gt;| Session Refresh  |  |
|            |      |           |&lt;------|---&lt;|    Endpoint      |  |
+------------+      +-----------+       |    |                  |  |
      ^                   ^             |    +------------------+  |
      |                   |             |                          |
      v                   v             |                          |
+--------------------------------+      |                          |
|                                |      |                          |
|       Client Servlet           |      |                          |
|                                |      |                          |
+--------------------------------+      +--------------------------+



GET
/refesh_token?state=bar&amp;redirect_uri=https://foo.com/oauth2callback&amp;session=$session_token // never uses immediate mode here, to allow login
Host: www.example.com

Response:

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://foo.com/oauth2callback?state=bar&amp;session=$new_session_token


</pre></div><p>

              
</p>
<a name="anchor22"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.5.1.4"></a><h3>4.5.1.4.&nbsp;
Session Synchronization</h3>

<p>A session token is usually bound to a user's sign in session at
            the authorization server, but in some cases, such as offline
            access by a web server or native application, it may not be.
            Session tokens obtained in the following scenarios are bound to a
            user's signed-in state at the authorization server:
</p>
<p></p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Redeeming a code for an access and session token by way of
                indirect communication through the browser
</li>
<li>Obtaining an access and session token in the authorization
                response through the browser
</li>
<li>Obtaing a session token at the refresh session endpoint by
                submitting a previously issued session token
</li>
</ul><p>Session tokens obtained in the above manner are session
            synchronized.
</p>
<p>If a session token is obtained by submitting a refresh token at
            the access token endpoint, then the resulting session token is not
            bound to a user's sign in state at the authorization server. The
            client may be in offline mode or the user has logged out from the
            authorization server. If a session bound session token is desired,
            the client should obtain a new session token by sending a request
            to the refresh session endpoint.
</p>
<a name="anchor23"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.5.1.5"></a><h3>4.5.1.5.&nbsp;
Session Management Endpoints</h3>

<p>To manage a session, the client sends a request to the session
            management endpoints at the authorization server. The session
            management endpoints at the authorization server are:
</p>
<p>
              </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>Session Refresh</dt>
<dd>Refreshes an expired Session
                Token
</dd>
<dt>Check Session</dt>
<dd>Get a plain text JSON structure
                from a session token
</dd>
<dt>End Session</dt>
<dd>Ends a session
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>
            
</p>
<p>
</p>
<a name="anchor24"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.5.1.5.1"></a><h3>4.5.1.5.1.&nbsp;
Session Refresh</h3>

<p>To refresh a session that has expired, the client sends a
              request to the Refresh Session endpoint with a Session Token. A
              new Session Token is returned in JWS format.
</p>
<p>Request Parameters:</p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>session</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. A previously issued session
                  token from an authorization request. The session token MAY
                  be expired.
</dd>
<dt>state</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. An opaque value used by the
                  Client to maintain state between the request and callback.
                  If provided, the Authorization Server MUST include this
                  value when redirecting the user-agent back to the Client.
                  Clients are strongly advised to use this variable to relate
                  the request and response.
</dd>
<dt>redirect_uri</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. An absolute URI to
                  which the authorization server will redirect the user-agent
                  to with the new Session Token.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote>

<p>Response:
</p>
<p>The response is a new Session Token. In a typical HTTP
              binding, an HTTP 302 redirect to the specified redirect_uri in
              the request with a new Session Token.
</p>
<p>
                </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>session</dt>
<dd>A new Session Token
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>
              
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative session refresh request:
</p>
<p>
                </p>
<div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>Request:

GET /op/refresh_session?session=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6
ImNsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSJ9.eyJpc3N1ZXIiOiJodHRwOlwvXC9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBs
ZS5jb20iLCJjbGllbnRfaWQiOiJjbGllbnQuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJhdWRpZW5jZSI6ImNsa
WVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsImlkIjoidXNlcl8yMzQyMzQiLCJleHAiOjEzMDM4NTI4ODB9.a
JwagC6501Da-zK-X8Az9B-Y625aSEfxVuBpFEDjOxQ
&amp;state=bar&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fidtoken_cb
Host: server.example.com

Response:

HTTP/1.1 302 OK
Location: http://client.example.com/idtoken_cb#session=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJh
bGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImNsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSJ9.eyJpc3N1ZXIiOiJodHRwO
lwvXC9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJjbGllbnRfaWQiOiJjbGllbnQuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20
iLCJhdWRpZW5jZSI6ImNsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsImlkIjoidXNlcl8yMzQyMzQiLCJle
HAiOjEzMDM4NTI4ODB9.aJwagC6501Da-zK-X8Az9B-Y625aSEfxVuBpFEDjOxQ&amp;state=bar&amp;
expires_in=3600
</pre></div><p>

              
</p>
<a name="anchor25"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.5.1.5.2"></a><h3>4.5.1.5.2.&nbsp;
Check Session</h3>

<p>For clients that are not capable of dealing with JWS signed
              Session Tokens, they can send the Session Token to the Check
              Session endpoint. It will validate the Session Token and return
              a plain text JSON structure of the Session Token.
</p>
<p>Request Parameters:</p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>session</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. A previously issued Session
                  Token
</dd>
</dl></blockquote>

<p>Response:
</p>
<p>The response body is a plain text JSON structure of the
              base64url decoded payload of the signed Session Token. In a
              typical HTTP binding, the response is a HTTP 200 response code
              with the content-type header set to "application/json".
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example of a check session
              request:
</p>
<p>
                </p>
<div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>Request:
POST /op/check_session?session=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6
ImNsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSJ9.eyJpc3N1ZXIiOiJodHRwOlwvXC9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBs
ZS5jb20iLCJjbGllbnRfaWQiOiJjbGllbnQuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJhdWRpZW5jZSI6ImNsa
WVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsImlkIjoidXNlcl8yMzQyMzQiLCJleHAiOjEzMDM4NTI4ODB9.a
JwagC6501Da-zK-X8Az9B-Y625aSEfxVuBpFEDjOxQ

Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "iss":"http://server.example.com",
  "client_id","http://client.example.com",
  "audience", "http://client.example.com",
  "user_id":"user_328723",
  "exp":1303852880
}

</pre></div><p>

              
</p>
<a name="anchor26"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.4.5.1.5.3"></a><h3>4.5.1.5.3.&nbsp;
End Session</h3>

<p>To end the session, the client sends a Session Token to the
              End Session endpoint. Upon receiving the request, the
              authorization server performs the logout flow for the user and
              then redirects the user-agent to the specified redirect_uri.
</p>
<p>Request Parameters:</p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>session</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. A previously issued Session
                  Token
</dd>
<dt>state</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. An opaque value used by the
                  Client to maintain state between the request and callback.
                  If provided, the Authorization Server MUST include this
                  value when redirecting the user-agent back to the Client.
                  Clients are strongly advised to use this variable to relate
                  the request and response.
</dd>
<dt>redirect_uri</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. An absolute URI to
                  which the authorization server will redirect the
                  user-agent.
</dd>
</dl></blockquote>

<p>Response:
</p>
<p>The response is dependant on the particular binding. In HTTP
              binding, the response is a HTTP 302 redirect response to the
              redirect_uri specified in the request.
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative session refresh request:
</p>
<p>
                </p>
<div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>Request:

GET /op/end_session?session=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6
ImNsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSJ9.eyJpc3N1ZXIiOiJodHRwOlwvXC9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbX
BsZS5jb20iLCJjbGllbnRfaWQiOiJjbGllbnQuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJhdWRpZW5jZSI6I
mNsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsImlkIjoidXNlcl8yMzQyMzQiLCJleHAiOjEzMDM4NTI4
ODB9.aJwagC6501Da-zK-X8Az9B-Y625aSEfxVuBpFEDjOxQ
&amp;state=bar
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fendtoken_cb
Host: server.example.com

...
   Authorizion server performs logout flow
...

Response:

HTTP/1.1 302 OK
Location: http://client.example.com/endtoken_cb?state=bar
</pre></div><p>

              
</p>
<a name="serializations"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.5"></a><h3>5.&nbsp;
serializations</h3>

<p>Each message can be serialized either in query parameter
      serialization or JSON serialization unless it was explicitly stated in
      the previous sections.
</p>
<a name="qss"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.1"></a><h3>5.1.&nbsp;
Query String serialization</h3>

<p>In order to serialize the parameters into Query String
        Serialization, the client constructs the string by adding the
        following parameters to the end-user authorization endpoint URI query
        component using the <tt>application/x-www-form-urlencoded</tt> format as
        defined by <a class='info' href='#html401'>HTML 4.01 Specification<span> (</span><span class='info'>Ragget, D., &ldquo;HTML 4.01 Specification,&rdquo; December&nbsp;1999.</span><span>)</span></a> [html401]:
</p>
<p>Following is a non-normative example of such
          Serialization.
</p><div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>GET /authorize?scope=openid&amp;response_type=code
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com</pre></div>
<a name="js"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.2"></a><h3>5.2.&nbsp;
JSON Serialization</h3>

<p>The parameters are serialized into a JSON structure by adding each
        parameter at the highest structure level. Parameter names and string
        values are included as JSON strings. Numerical values are included as
        JSON numbers. Each parameter may have JSON Structure as its value.
</p>
<p>Following is a non-normative example of such
          Serialization.
</p><div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>{
  "access_token":"SlAV32hkKG",
  "expires_in":3600,
  "refresh_token":"8xLOxBtZp8",
  "openid": {
    "type": "http://openid.net/specs/ab/1.0#id_res",
    "mode": "id_res",
    "op_endpoint": "https://op.example.com/op_endpoint",
    "client_id": "http://rp.example.com/",
    "server_id": "http://op.example.com/",
    "claimed_id": "https://example.com/alice#1234",
    "identity": "alice",
    "issued_at": 1274889460
  }
}</pre></div>
<a name="sigs"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.6"></a><h3>6.&nbsp;
Signatures</h3>

<p>Depending on the transport through wich the messages are transported,
      the integrity of the message may not be guaranteed, nor the originator
      of the message is not authenticated. To mitigate these risks, OpenID
      Connect supports <a class='info' href='#jws'>JSON Web Signatures(JWS)<span> (</span><span class='info'>Jones, M., Belfanz, D., Bradeley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer, J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, &ldquo;JSON Web Signatures,&rdquo; March&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [jws].
</p>
<p>Following is the parameters for JWT.
</p>
<p></p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>typ</dt>
<dd>OPTIONAL. One of <tt>"JWT"</tt>, <tt>"openid2json+sig"</tt>.
</dd>
<dt>alg</dt>
<dd>REQUIRED. One of the algorithm specified in Table
          4 of <a class='info' href='#jwt'>JWT<span> (</span><span class='info'>Jones, M., Belfanz, D., Bradeley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer, J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, &ldquo;JSON Web Token,&rdquo; January&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [jwt]
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>Compact Serialization SHOULD BE used when passing it through
      query parameters, while JSON serialization SHOULD BE used when returning
      it in HTTP Body.
</p>
<p>Following is a non-normative example of such signature in
        Compact serialization, where HS256 algorithm was used (with line
        breaks for display purposes only):
</p><div style='display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto'><pre>eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
.
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk</pre></div>
<p>
</p>
<a name="encryption"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.7"></a><h3>7.&nbsp;
Encryption</h3>

<p>To achieve message confidentiality and audience restriction, OpenID
      Connect uses <a class='info' href='#jwe'>JSON Web Encryption (JWE)<span> (</span><span class='info'>Jones, M., Belfanz, D., Bradeley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer, J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, &ldquo;JSON Web Encryption,&rdquo; March&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [jwe].
</p>
<a name="anchor27"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.8"></a><h3>8.&nbsp;
Verification</h3>

<p>
</p>
<a name="anchor28"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.8.1"></a><h3>8.1.&nbsp;
Authorization Request Verification</h3>

<p>If the request was signed, the Server MUST verify the signature as
        in JWT.
</p>
<a name="anchor29"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.8.2"></a><h3>8.2.&nbsp;
Authorization Response Verification</h3>

<p>To verify the validity of the Authorization Response, the client
        MUST to the following:
</p>
<p>
          </p>
<ol class="text">
<li>If the response was signed, the Client SHOULD verify the
            signature as in JWT as the first step.
</li>
<li>Check that OP that it connected was really the intended OP
            through TLS/SSL server certificate check if the endpoint is
            TLS/SSL endpoint.
</li>
<li>Check that current time is within the validity period.
</li>
</ol><p>
        
</p>
<p>If the client does not verify the signature, it MUST make a User
        Info API request.
</p>
<a name="anchor30"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.8.3"></a><h3>8.3.&nbsp;
UserInfo Request Verification</h3>

<p>If the request was signed, the Server MUST verify the signature as
        in <a class='info' href='#jwt'>JWT<span> (</span><span class='info'>Jones, M., Belfanz, D., Bradeley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer, J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, &ldquo;JSON Web Token,&rdquo; January&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> [jwt].
</p>
<a name="anchor31"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.8.4"></a><h3>8.4.&nbsp;
UserInfo Response Verification</h3>

<p>To verify the validity of the UserInfo Response, the client MUST to
        the following:
</p>
<p>
          </p>
<ol class="text">
<li>If the response was signed, the Client SHOULD verify the
            signature as in JWT as the first step.
</li>
<li>Check that OP that it connected was really the intended OP
            through TLS/SSL server certificate check if the endpoint is
            TLS/SSL endpoint.
</li>
<li>Check if the current time is within the validity period.
</li>
</ol><p>
        
</p>
<p>
</p>
<a name="extensions"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.9"></a><h3>9.&nbsp;
Extensions</h3>

<p>OpenID Connect supports the extension parameters in OpenID Request
      Object, Session Token, and UserInfo Response.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<a name="security_considerations"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.10"></a><h3>10.&nbsp;
Security Considerations</h3>

<p>Followings are the list of attack vectors and remedies that were
      considered for this specification.
</p>
<p>For details of the attack vector, see <a class='info' href='#SP800-63'>[SP800&#8209;63]<span> (</span><span class='info'>National Institute of Standards and             Technology, &ldquo;NIST SP800-63rev.1: Electronic Authentication           Guideline,&rdquo; .</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="assertion_manufacture"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.1"></a><h3>10.1.&nbsp;
Assertion manufacture/modification</h3>

<p>To mitigate this attack, there are two ways to mitigate it.
</p>
<p>
          </p>
<ol class="text">
<li>The assertion may be digitally signed by the OP. The Relying
            Party SHOULD check the digital signature to verify that it was
            issued by a legitimate OP.
</li>
<li>The assertion may be sent over a protected channel such as
            TLS/SSL. In order to protect the integrity of assertions from
            malicious attack, the OP MUST be authenticated. In this
            specification, the assertion is always sent over TLS/SSL protected
            channel.
</li>
</ol><p>
        
</p>
<a name="assertion_disclosure"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.2"></a><h3>10.2.&nbsp;
Assertion disclosure</h3>

<p>The Assertion disclosure can be mitigated in the following two
        ways.
</p>
<p>
          </p>
<ol class="text">
<li>Assertion is sent over TLS/SSL protected channel, where RP is
            authenticated by "client_id" and "client_secret".
</li>
<li>Signed Assertion is encrypted by the RP's public key.
</li>
</ol><p>
        
</p>
<a name="assertion_repudiation"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.3"></a><h3>10.3.&nbsp;
Assertion repudiation</h3>

<p>To mitigate this threat, the assertion may be digitally signed by
        the OP using a key that supports non-repudiation. The RP SHOULD check
        the digital signature to verify that it was issued by a legitimate
        OP.
</p>
<a name="assertion_redirect"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.4"></a><h3>10.4.&nbsp;
Assertion redirect</h3>

<p>To mitigate this threat, the assertion includes the identity of the
        RP for whom it was generated as "client_id". The RP verifies that
        incoming assertions include its identity as the recipient of the
        assertion.
</p>
<a name="assertion_reuse"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.5"></a><h3>10.5.&nbsp;
Assertion reuse</h3>

<p>The assertion includes a timestamp and a short lifetime of
        validity. The Relying Party checks the timestamp and lifetime values
        to ensure that the assertion is currently valid.
</p>
<a name="artifact_manufacture"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.6"></a><h3>10.6.&nbsp;
Secondary authenticator manufacture</h3>

<p>Due to the large entropy requirement of the Artifact ("code") and
        short life nature of its validity, the success probability of this
        attack is extremely low.
</p>
<a name="artifact_capture"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.7"></a><h3>10.7.&nbsp;
Secondary authenticator capture</h3>

<p>Secondary authenticator (="code") is transmitted only through
        HTTPS, thus it is protected between the OP and the User-Agent, and
        User-Agent and the RP.
</p>
<p>Only the place it can be captured is the User-Agent where the TLS
        session is terminated, and is possible if the User-Agent is infested
        by malwares. However, it renders no usefulness as long as the profile
        in use either RP authentication or assertion encryption.
</p>
<a name="assertion_substitution"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.8"></a><h3>10.8.&nbsp;
Assertion substitution</h3>

<p>Responses to assertion requests is bound to the corresponding
        requests by message order in HTTP, as both assertions and requests are
        protected by TLS that can detect and disallow malicious reordering of
        packets.
</p>
<a name="auth_req_disclosure"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.9"></a><h3>10.9.&nbsp;
Authentication Request Disclosure</h3>

<p>If the authentication request is POSTed directly through a
        protected channel, it is not possible to disclose the authentication
        request.
</p>
<p>If the Request File is encrypted by the OP's public key, the
        authentication request will not be disclosed unless OP's private key
        gets compromised or the encryption algorithm becomes vulnerable.
</p>
<a name="anchor32"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.10"></a><h3>10.10.&nbsp;
Timing Attack</h3>

<p>Timing attack can be used to reduce the effctive key length of the
        signature if the time required to return the response in case of
        signature error and correct signature exists. Care should be taken in
        the implementation to avoid this attack.
</p>
<a name="authn_proc_threats"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.11"></a><h3>10.11.&nbsp;
Authentication Process Threats</h3>

<p>In the category of Authentication Process Threats, following
        threats exists.
</p>
<p></p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Online guessing
</li>
<li>Phishing
</li>
<li>Pharming
</li>
<li>Eavesdropping
</li>
<li>Replay
</li>
<li>Session hijack
</li>
<li>Man-in-the-middle
</li>
</ul><p>Authentication process per se as described in NIST
        SP800-63-rev1 is out of scope for this protocol, but care SHOULD be
        taken to achieve appropriate protection.
</p>
<a name="iana"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.11"></a><h3>11.&nbsp;
IANA Considerations</h3>

<a name="oauth_params"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.11.1"></a><h3>11.1.&nbsp;
OAuth Parameters Registry</h3>

<p>
</p>
<a name="anchor33"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.11.1.1"></a><h3>11.1.1.&nbsp;
Scope Parameters</h3>

<p>The following is the parameter registration request for the
          "scope" parameter as defined in this specification:
</p>
<p>
            </p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: openid
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: The End-User Authorization Endpoint
              request, the End-User Authorization Endpoint response, the Token
              Endpoint request, the Token Endpoint response, and the <tt>WWW-Authenticate</tt> header field.
</li>
<li>Change controller: IETF
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): [[ this document ]]
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul><p>
          
</p>
<a name="anchor34"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.11.1.2"></a><h3>11.1.2.&nbsp;
Authorization Request Parameters</h3>

<p>The follwoing is the parameter registration request for the
          Authorization Reqeust in this specification:
</p>
<p>
            </p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: openid
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: IETF
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): [[ this document ]]
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul><p>
          
</p>
<a name="anchor35"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.11.1.3"></a><h3>11.1.3.&nbsp;
Access Token Response Parameters</h3>

<p>The following is the parameter registration request for the
          Access Token Response in this specification:
</p>
<p>
            </p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: openid
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Access Token Response
</li>
<li>Change controller: IETF
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): [[ this document ]]
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul><p>
          
</p>
<a name="anchor36"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.12"></a><h3>12.&nbsp;
Open Issues and Things To Be Done (TBD)</h3>

<p>[[To be removed from the final specification.]]
</p>
<p>Following items remains to be done in this draft.
</p>
<p>
        </p>
<ol class="text">
<li>Clean Up and add references.
</li>
<li>Update JWT/JWS/JWE related things with the most current version
          of them.
</li>
<li>Finish the security consideration section.
</li>
<li>Properly capitalize the Defined Words.
</li>
<li>Better to split the Authentication and Authorization server?
          (Model-wise, yes, but it gets complicated. Current model is
          implicitly assuming that the Authentication and Authorization server
          are operated by the same entity and the protocol between them are
          proprietary.)
</li>
</ol><p>
      
</p>
<a name="anchor37"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.A"></a><h3>Appendix A.&nbsp;
Acknowledgements</h3>

<p>As a successor version of <a class='info' href='#OpenID.authentication-2.0'>OpenID Authentication 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>specs@openid.net, &ldquo;OpenID Authentication 2.0,&rdquo; 2007.</span><span>)</span></a> [OpenID.authentication&#8209;2.0],
      this specification heavily relies on <a class='info' href='#OpenID.authentication-2.0'>OpenID Authentication 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>specs@openid.net, &ldquo;OpenID Authentication 2.0,&rdquo; 2007.</span><span>)</span></a> [OpenID.authentication&#8209;2.0].
      Please refer to Appendix C of <a class='info' href='#OpenID.authentication-2.0'>OpenID Authentication 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>specs@openid.net, &ldquo;OpenID Authentication 2.0,&rdquo; 2007.</span><span>)</span></a> [OpenID.authentication&#8209;2.0] for
      the full list of the contributors for <a class='info' href='#OpenID.authentication-2.0'>OpenID Authentication 2.0<span> (</span><span class='info'>specs@openid.net, &ldquo;OpenID Authentication 2.0,&rdquo; 2007.</span><span>)</span></a> [OpenID.authentication&#8209;2.0].
</p>
<p>This specification is largely compliant with OAuth 2.0 draft 15. As
      the draft is not yet referenceable, relevant text has been incorporated
      into this draft. Please refer to the OAuth 2.0 specification for the
      list of contributors.
</p>
<p>In addition, the OpenID Community would like to thank the following
      people for the work they've done in the drafting and editing of this
      specification.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
        </p>
<blockquote class="text">
<p>Anthony Nadalin (tonynad@microsoft.com), Microsoft.
</p>
<p>Breno de Medeiros (breno@gmail.com), Google.
</p>
<p>Chuck Mortimore (cmortimore@salesforce.com), Salesforce.com.
</p>
<p>David Recordon (dr@fb.com)&lt;author&gt;, Facebook.
</p>
<p>George Fletcher (george.fletcher@corp.aol.com), AOL.
</p>
<p>Hideki Nara (hideki.nara@gmail.com), Takt Communications.
</p>
<p>John Bradley (jbradely@mac.com) &lt;author&gt;, Protiviti
          Government Service.
</p>
<p>Mike Jones (Michael.Jones@microsoft.com), Microsoft.
</p>
<p>Nat Sakimura (n-sakimura@nri.co.jp) &lt;author/editor&gt;, Nomura
          Research Institute, Ltd.
</p>
<p>Paul Tarjan (pt@fb.com), Facebook.
</p>
<p>Ryo Itou (ritou@yahoo-corp.jp), Yahoo! Japan.
</p>
</blockquote><p>
      
</p>
<a name="anchor38"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<a name="rfc.section.B"></a><h3>Appendix B.&nbsp;
Document History</h3>

<p>
        </p>
<blockquote class="text"><dl>
<dt>-01</dt>
<dd>First Draft that incorporates the core of both
          openidonnect.com proposal and OpenID Artifact Binding RC3 and
          abstracted.
</dd>
<dt>-02</dt>
<dd>Catch up to OAuth 2.0 d15. Replaced JSS and JSE to
          JWS and JWE. Section grouping and reorganizations. Added more
          contributors.
</dd>
<dt>-03</dt>
<dd>Combined with Session Management. Moved "openid"
          back to Token Endpoint. Renaming the sections according to the
          Endpoint names. Rewrote intro to the Messages section to be more
          approacheable.
</dd>
<dt>-04</dt>
<dd>To keep the ID Token small so that it fits cookie
          more easily, moved OPTIONAL parameters to UserInfo endpoint
          response.
</dd>
<dt>-05</dt>
<dd>Reference OAuth 2.0 now since it will be
          stable.
</dd>
<dt>-06</dt>
<dd>Claims Syntax. Session Token. Misc. 
</dd>
</dl></blockquote><p>
      
</p>
<a name="rfc.references1"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<h3>13.&nbsp;Normative References</h3>
<table width="99%" border="0">
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="ISO29115">[ISO29115]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">McCallister, E., &ldquo;ITU-T Recommendation X.eaa | ISO/IEC 2nd CD 29115 --
          Information technology &ndash; Security techniques &ndash; Entity
          authentication assurance framework,&rdquo; ISO/IEC&nbsp;29115.<p>
Defines LoA
</p>
</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OAuth2.0">[OAuth2.0]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Hammer-Lahav, E., Ed., Recordon, D., and D. Hardt, &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-16">OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol</a>,&rdquo; November&nbsp;2011.</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OpenID.AB">[OpenID.AB]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Sakimura, N., Ed., Bradley, J., de Madeiros, B., Ito, R., and M. Jones, &ldquo;<a href="http://openid.net/specs/ab/1.0/">OpenID Connect Artifact Binding 1.0</a>,&rdquo; January&nbsp;2011.</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OpenID.AC">[OpenID.AC]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Mortimore, C., Ed., Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., de Madeiros, B., Ito, R., and M. Jones, &ldquo;<a href="http://openid.net/specs/ab/1.0/">OpenID Connect Authorization Code Binding 1.0</a>,&rdquo; January&nbsp;2011.</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OpenID.authentication-2.0">[OpenID.authentication-2.0]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">specs@openid.net, &ldquo;OpenID Authentication 2.0,&rdquo; 2007 (<a href="http://www.openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.txt">TXT</a>, <a href="http://www.openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html">HTML</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC1421">[RFC1421]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:104-8456@mcimail.com">Linn, J.</a>, &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1421">Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures</a>,&rdquo; RFC&nbsp;1421, February&nbsp;1993 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1421.txt">TXT</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC1422">[RFC1422]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:kent@BBN.COM">Kent, S.</a>, &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1422">Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management</a>,&rdquo; RFC&nbsp;1422, February&nbsp;1993 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1422.txt">TXT</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC1423">[RFC1423]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:balenson@tis.com">Balenson, D.</a>, &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1423">Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers</a>,&rdquo; RFC&nbsp;1423, February&nbsp;1993 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1423.txt">TXT</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC1424">[RFC1424]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:burt@rsa.com">Kaliski, B.</a>, &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1424">Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: Key Certification and Related Services</a>,&rdquo; RFC&nbsp;1424, February&nbsp;1993 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1424.txt">TXT</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC1750">[RFC1750]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:dee@lkg.dec.com">Eastlake, D.</a>, <a href="mailto:crocker@cybercash.com">Crocker, S.</a>, and <a href="mailto:jis@mit.edu">J. Schiller</a>, &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1750">Randomness Recommendations for Security</a>,&rdquo; RFC&nbsp;1750, December&nbsp;1994 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1750.txt">TXT</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC2119">[RFC2119]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:sob@harvard.edu">Bradner, S.</a>, &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119">Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</a>,&rdquo; BCP&nbsp;14, RFC&nbsp;2119, March&nbsp;1997 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt">TXT</a>, <a href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc2119.html">HTML</a>, <a href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc2119.xml">XML</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC2616">[RFC2616]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:fielding@ics.uci.edu">Fielding, R.</a>, <a href="mailto:jg@w3.org">Gettys, J.</a>, <a href="mailto:mogul@wrl.dec.com">Mogul, J.</a>, <a href="mailto:frystyk@w3.org">Frystyk, H.</a>, <a href="mailto:masinter@parc.xerox.com">Masinter, L.</a>, <a href="mailto:paulle@microsoft.com">Leach, P.</a>, and <a href="mailto:timbl@w3.org">T. Berners-Lee</a>, &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616">Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1</a>,&rdquo; RFC&nbsp;2616, June&nbsp;1999 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt">TXT</a>, <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616.ps">PS</a>, <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616.pdf">PDF</a>, <a href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc2616.html">HTML</a>, <a href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc2616.xml">XML</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC2617">[RFC2617]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:john@math.nwu.edu">Franks, J.</a>, <a href="mailto:pbaker@verisign.com">Hallam-Baker, P.</a>, <a href="mailto:jeff@AbiSource.com">Hostetler, J.</a>, <a href="mailto:lawrence@agranat.com">Lawrence, S.</a>, <a href="mailto:paulle@microsoft.com">Leach, P.</a>, Luotonen, A., and <a href="mailto:stewart@OpenMarket.com">L. Stewart</a>, &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2617">HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication</a>,&rdquo; RFC&nbsp;2617, June&nbsp;1999 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2617.txt">TXT</a>, <a href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc2617.html">HTML</a>, <a href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc2617.xml">XML</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC3339">[RFC3339]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:GK@ACM.ORG">Klyne, G., Ed.</a> and <a href="mailto:chris.newman@sun.com">C. Newman</a>, &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3339">Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps</a>,&rdquo; RFC&nbsp;3339, July&nbsp;2002 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3339.txt">TXT</a>, <a href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc3339.html">HTML</a>, <a href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc3339.xml">XML</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC3548">[RFC3548]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Josefsson, S., &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3548">The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</a>,&rdquo; RFC&nbsp;3548, July&nbsp;2003 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3548.txt">TXT</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC3629">[RFC3629]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Yergeau, F., &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3629">UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646</a>,&rdquo; STD&nbsp;63, RFC&nbsp;3629, November&nbsp;2003 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3629.txt">TXT</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC3986">[RFC3986]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:timbl@w3.org">Berners-Lee, T.</a>, <a href="mailto:fielding@gbiv.com">Fielding, R.</a>, and <a href="mailto:LMM@acm.org">L. Masinter</a>, &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986">Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</a>,&rdquo; STD&nbsp;66, RFC&nbsp;3986, January&nbsp;2005 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986.txt">TXT</a>, <a href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc3986.html">HTML</a>, <a href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc3986.xml">XML</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC4627">[RFC4627]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Crockford, D., &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4627">The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)</a>,&rdquo; RFC&nbsp;4627, July&nbsp;2006 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4627.txt">TXT</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC5246">[RFC5246]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246">The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</a>,&rdquo; RFC&nbsp;5246, August&nbsp;2008 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt">TXT</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC5849">[RFC5849]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Hammer-Lahav, E., &ldquo;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849">The OAuth 1.0 Protocol</a>,&rdquo; RFC&nbsp;5849, April&nbsp;2010 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5849.txt">TXT</a>).</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="SP800-63">[SP800-63]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">National Institute of Standards and
            Technology, &ldquo;<a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-63-rev1/SP800-63-Rev1_Dec2008.pdf">NIST SP800-63rev.1: Electronic Authentication
          Guideline</a>,&rdquo; NIST&nbsp;SP800-63.<p>
Defines LoA
</p>
</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="html401">[html401]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Ragget, D., &ldquo;<a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/html401/">HTML 4.01 Specification</a>,&rdquo; December&nbsp;1999.</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="jwe">[jwe]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Jones, M., Belfanz, D., Bradeley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer, J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, &ldquo;<a href="http://self-issued.info/docs/draft-jones-json-web-signature-01.html">JSON Web Encryption</a>,&rdquo; March&nbsp;2011.</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="jws">[jws]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Jones, M., Belfanz, D., Bradeley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer, J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, &ldquo;<a href="http://self-issued.info/docs/draft-jones-json-web-signature-01.html">JSON Web Signatures</a>,&rdquo; March&nbsp;2011.</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="jwt">[jwt]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Jones, M., Belfanz, D., Bradeley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer, J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, &ldquo;<a href="http://jsonenc.info/sig/1.0/">JSON Web Token</a>,&rdquo; January&nbsp;2011.</td></tr>
</table>

<a name="rfc.authors"></a><br /><hr />
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right"><tr><td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td></tr></table>
<h3>Authors' Addresses</h3>
<table width="99%" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
<tr><td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Nat Sakimura (editor)</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Nomura Research Institute,
      Ltd.</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author" align="right">Email:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:n-sakimura@nri.co.jp">n-sakimura@nri.co.jp</a></td></tr>
<tr cellpadding="3"><td>&nbsp;</td><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">David Recordon</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Facebook Inc.</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author" align="right">Email:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:dr@fb.com">dr@fb.com</a></td></tr>
<tr cellpadding="3"><td>&nbsp;</td><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">John Bradley</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Protiviti
      Government Services</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author" align="right">Email:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:jbradley@mac.com">jbradley@mac.com</a></td></tr>
<tr cellpadding="3"><td>&nbsp;</td><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Breno de Madeiros</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Google Inc.</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author" align="right">Email:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:breno@google.com">breno@google.com</a></td></tr>
<tr cellpadding="3"><td>&nbsp;</td><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Mike Jones</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Microsoft Corporation</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author" align="right">Email:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a></td></tr>
<tr cellpadding="3"><td>&nbsp;</td><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Edmund Jay (editor)</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">MGI1</td></tr>
<tr><td class="author" align="right">Email:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:ejay@mgi1.com">ejay@mgi1.com</a></td></tr>
</table>
</body></html>