openid@justin.richer.org http://justin.richer.org/

OpenID Heart Working Group The OpenID Connect protocol defines an identity federation system that allows a relying party to request and receive authentication and profile information about an end user This specification profiles the OpenID Connect protocol to increase baseline security, provide greater interoperability, and structure deployments in a manner specifically applicable to (but not limited to) the healthcare domain.

This document profiles the OpenID Connect specification for use in providing identity information supporting secure Representational State Transfer (RESTful) interfaces. Because OpenID Connect is built on OAuth 2.0, this profile inherits all requirements of the HEART Profile for the use of OAuth 2.0. All requirements herein are in addition to the OAuth 2.0 profile.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. All uses of JSON Web Signature (JWS) and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) data structures in this specification utilize the JWS Compact Serialization or the JWE Compact Serialization; the JWS JSON Serialization and the JWE JSON Serialization are not used.

This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Authorization Code", "Authorization Endpoint", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server", "Client", "Client Authentication", "Client Identifier", "Client Secret", "Grant Type", "Protected Resource", "Redirection URI", "Refresh Token", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server", "Response Type", and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0, the terms "Claim Name", "Claim Value", and "JSON Web Token (JWT)" defined by JSON Web Token (JWT), and the terms defined by OpenID Connect Core 1.0.

All ID Tokens MUST be signed by the OpenID Provider's private signature key. All clients MUST validate the signature of an ID Token before accepting it using the public key of the issuing server, which is published in JSON Web Key (JWK) format. ID Tokens MAY be encrypted using the appropriate key of the requesting client. All clients MUST verify the following in received ID tokens: The "issuer" field is the Uniform Resource Locater (URL) of the expected issuer The "audience" field contains the client ID of the client The "expiration", "issued at", and "not before" timestamps for the token are dates (integer number of seconds since from 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z UTC) within acceptable ranges The ID Token MUST expire and SHOULD have an active lifetime no longer than five minutes. This example ID token has been signed using the server's RSA key:

Its claims are as follows:

Servers MUST support the UserInfo Endpoint and, at a minimum, the openid scope and sub (subject) claims. In an example transaction, the client sends a request to the UserInfo Endpoint like the following:

And receives a document in response like the following:

Servers MUST support the generation of JWT encoded responses from the UserInfo Endpoint in addition to unsigned JSON objects. Signed responses MUST be signed by the OpenID Provider's key, and encrypted responses MUST be encrypted with the authorized client's key. The OpenID Provider MUST support the RS256 signature method (the Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) signature algorithm with a 256-bit hash) and MAY use other asymmetric signature and encryption methods listed in the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification.

Clients MAY optionally send requests to the authorization endpoint as signed or encrypted request objects using the request parameter as defined by OpenID Connect. Servers MUST accept requests containing a request object signed by the client's private key. Servers MUST validate the signature on such requests against the client's registered public key. Clients must register their keys during client registration as described in the HEART OAuth 2.0 profile. Servers MUST accept request objects encrypted with the server's public key. Servers MAY accept request objects by reference using the request_uri parameter.

OpenID Providers MUST provide acr (authentication context class reference, equivalent to the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) element of the same name) and amr (authentication methods reference) values in ID tokens. It is RECOMMENDED that the standardized Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) established by the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Trust Framework be used for the acr values: LOA 1: http://idmanagement.gov/ns/assurance/loa/1 LOA 2: http://idmanagement.gov/ns/assurance/loa/2 LOA 3: http://idmanagement.gov/ns/assurance/loa/3 Note that OpenID Connect cannot provide LOA 4 identity assertions due to the way that the FICAM LOA values are currently defined. The amr value is an array of strings describing the set of mechanisms used to authenticate the user to the OpenID Provider. Providers that require multi-factor authentication will typically provide multiple values (for example, memorized password plus hardware-token-generated one-time password). The specific values MUST be agreed upon and understood between the OpenID Provider and any Relying Parties. In the future, this profile will likely reference and make use of the draft Vectors of Trust standard.

All OpenID Connect servers are uniquely identified by a URL known as the issuer. This URL serves as the prefix of a service discovery endpoint as specified in the OpenID Connect Discovery standard. The discovery document MUST contain at minimum the following fields: The fully qualified issuer URL of the server The fully qualified URL of the server's authorization endpoint defined by The fully qualified URL of the server's token endpoint defined by The fully qualified URL of the server's introspection endpoint defined by OAuth Token Introspection The fully qualified URL of the server's revocation endpoint defined by OAuth Token Revocation The fully qualified URI of the server's public key in JWK Set format The following example shows the JSON document found at a discovery endpoint for an authorization server:

Clients and protected resources SHOULD cache this discovery information. It is RECOMMENDED that servers provide cache information through HTTP headers and make the cache valid for at least one week. The server MUST provide its public key in JWK Set format, such as the following 2048-bit RSA key:

Clients and protected resources SHOULD cache this key. It is RECOMMENDED that servers provide cache information through HTTP headers and make the cache valid for at least one week.

All transactions MUST be protected in transit by TLS as described in BCP195. All clients MUST conform to applicable recommendations found in the Security Considerations sections of and those found in the OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations document.

Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) are widely used to protect data exchanged over application protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, IMAP, POP, SIP, and XMPP. Over the last few years, several serious attacks on TLS have emerged, including attacks on its most commonly used cipher suites and their modes of operation. This document provides recommendations for improving the security of deployed services that use TLS and DTLS. The recommendations are applicable to the majority of use cases. Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Google Salesforce Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Illumila

openid@justin.richer.org http://justin.richer.org/

The OpenID Community would like to thank the following people for their contributions to this specification: Mark Russel, Mary Pulvermacher, David Hill, Dale Moberg, Adrian Gropper, Eve Maler, Danny van Leeuwen, John Moehrke, Aaron Seib, John Bradley, Debbie Bucci, Josh Mandel, and Sarah Squire. The original version of this specification was part of the Secure RESTful Interfaces project from The MITRE Corporation, available online at http://secure-restful-interface-profile.github.io/pages/

Copyright (c) 2015 The OpenID Foundation. The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft or Final Specification solely for the purposes of (i) developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts and Final Specifications based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF. The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. The OpenID Foundation invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.

-2015-12-01 Replaced "mitre.org" with "example.com". Updated references. Added VoT. -2015-04-01 Imported content from Secure RESTful OAuth profile.