But even if Erdogan is ousted in the polls, a foreign policy U-turn for Turkey is not a given, analysts said. While figures close to the opposition have indicated that if victorious, it would reorient Turkey back to the West, others say core foreign policy issues are likely to remain unchanged.

Despite their disagreements, Turkey has been useful to its Western allies under Erdogan. Last year Ankara helped mediate a landmark grains export deal between Ukraine and Russia, and even provided Ukraine with drones that played a part in countering Russian attacks. And while Sweden is still awaiting its accession to NATO, Finland has been allowed in.

What are voters’ main concerns?
High on voters’ list of concerns is the state of the economy and the damage caused by the earthquake. Even before the February disaster, Turkey was struggling with rising prices and a currency crisis that in October saw inflation hit 85%.

That impacted the purchasing power of the public and is “fundamentally the reason why Erdogan’s popularity has been eroded,” said Sinan Ulgen, a former Turkish diplomat and chairman of Istanbul-based think-tank EDAM. “That is going to be the major handicap for Erdogan,” he said.

Voters are also casting their ballots based on whom they see as more capable of managing the fallout from the earthquake, as well as shielding the country from future disasters, analysts say, adding that Erdogan’s popularity had not taken the expected political impact.

“There is a debate about which electoral platform provides the right solution to address these vulnerabilities and enhance Turkey’s resilience to these national disasters,” Ulgen said.

Apart from the economy and the government’s management of Turkey’s frequent natural disasters, voters are likely concerned with Erdogan’s turn away from democracy – something the opposition has campaigned to reverse.

In his interview with CNN, Erdogan defended his economic policies and denied cracking down on freedoms.

Who is likely to win?
Despite facing the strongest opposition yet to his rule, Erdogan’s future does not look as dark as some predicted earlier this year.

The president is supported by a substantial religious sector, which appears to have barely been dented by the flailing economy or the government’s shambolic early response to the earthquake.

Erdogan’s critics argue that Erdogan further galvanized his support base by leveling unsupported allegations at the opposition camp. He accused Kilicdaroglu of colluding with Kurdish terror groups and repeatedly referred to the opposition leader — a member of the liberal Muslim Alevi minority — as a not-good-enough Muslim.

“This strategy of ‘not good Muslim and backed by terrorists’ appealed to right-wing voters that were supposed to pick Kilicdaroglu,” said Soner Cagaptay, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Cagaptay argues that while Erdogan’s message did not resonate in Turkey’s big cities and the relatively affluent southern coastline, all of which voted largely for the opposition, it garnered necessary support from poorer parts of the country, namely in central regions and on the Black Sea coast.

“There, support for Kilicdaroglu was suppressed because right-wing voters whose own parties backed Kilicdaroglu did not pick him,” he said.

Erdogan’s messaging was also amplified by his broad sway over Turkish media, critics argued.

Still, Sunday’s run-off is a first-ever presidential second round in Turkey. In 2019, Erdogan’s ruling party lost the major cities in mayoral elections, including his own hometown, Istanbul. On May 14, the majority of Istanbul’s votes went to the opposition.

It remains to be seen what Sunday’s election holds, but if Erdogan wins by a landslide, Cagaptay said, “he will be vindicated on unorthodox economic policies, lack of rule of law and the end of social autonomy.”